1972 PLP 391 (SCMR)

ANWARUL HAQ, J.‑This petition for special leave to appeal is directed against an order made by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on the 31st May 1972, whereby he has dismissed in limine a revision petition filed by the petitioner, Ghulam Mohammad, against his conviction and sentence under section 307, P. P. C. for the attempted murder of one Mali Khan. He was tried along with two other persons, named Ghulam Hassan and Azizullah, who were also convicted by the trial Court, but acquitted in appeal by the learned Sessions Judge, Mianwali. The sentence of four years' rigorous imprisonment awarded to the petitioner by the learned Magistrate, besides a fine of Rs.500, was reduced in appeal to rigorous imprisonment for two years. The sentence of fine was maintained. Leave to appeal is sought on the following grounds;

(a) No opportunity was allowed by the trial Court to cross- examine two important prosecution witnesses, viz., the Medical expert and the Investigating Officer, thus, causing great prejudice to the petitioner ;. (b) The evidence has not been properly appreciated by the Courts below ; (c) In any case, the sentence of four years' rigorous imprison ment is much too excessive in relation to the nature of the injuries caused to the complainant. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, we are of the view that there is no substance in these grounds.' It appears that the learned counsel for the petitioner did not attend when the prosecution evidence was recorded by the learned Magistrate. However, on an application having been made under section 257 of tile Cr. P. C. the trial Court re‑summoned the two eye‑witnesses for further cross‑examination but declined to re‑call the Medical Officer and the Investigating Officer. The order made by the trial Court in this behalf has not been placed on the record, and therefore, the reasons which actually weighed with the learned Magistrate are not before us, but it can be safely presumed that the two official witnesses were not re‑summoned as their cross -examination did not appear to have any direct bearing on the question of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. The Investigating Officer's testimony was directly relevant for the two acquitted accused, as the Investigating Officer had found them innocent. However, there was nothing important as far as the present petitioner was concerned. As regards the cross‑examination of the Medical Expert's opinion the argument is that by his cross‑examination the petitioner might have been able to show that injury No. 3 sustained by the complainant had not been caused by a firearm. This argument is built on the premise that the doctor had stated it as his opinion that this injury was "probably" caused by a fire‑arm. It appears to the learned counsel that by searching cross‑examination the doctor might have been persuaded to say that the injury was not at all caused by a fire‑arm. The argument is clearly misconceived and far‑fetched. The learned Judge in the High Court has rightly remarked that the nature of the injury was clear from its description and dimensions as noticed in the medico‑legal report and the evidence of the doctor. Such being the case, it is futile to contend that in cross- examination the doctor would have been persuaded to ascribe the injury to some weapon other than a fire‑arm. We are, therefore, of the view that this is not a case where prejudice has been caused to the petitioner by the refusal of the trial Court to re‑call the Medical Expert and the Investigating Officer. It has to be remembered, as pointed out by this Court in the State v. Maulvi Mohammad Jamil (P L D 1965 S C 681) that after the amend ment of section 257 of the Cr. P. C. by Act (XVII of 1964) the witnesses for the prosecution could be subjected to cross-examination only at one stage of the case, whether before or after the charge and there was no right inhering in the accused to have these witnesses recalled when the opportunity for cross-examination had been afforded but not availed of at the proper lime. The contention that the evidence has not been correctly appreciated by the Courts below is not borne out from the record. v Even in the impugned order passed by the High Court, the evidence has been referred to in sufficient detail. Finally, as regards the sentence, this is primarily a matter for the trial Court and the Courts acting in appeal or revision, and the Supreme Court would not ordinarily interfere by imposing its own assessment of the appropriate punishment, unless it he shown g that the sentence is against law or otherwise not in accordance with sound judicial principles. These conditions are not present in the instant case. For the foregoing, reasons, no justification is made out for interference by this Court by way of grant of special leave. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed.