P L D 1963 Dacca 791 (PLP)

5. In this case, the respondent has averred to the effect that the holding in question is an area which is fastly develop ing into an industrial town and it is situated at the most advan tageous place of the town. The annual letting value of the holding has gone up as it is only 400 yards away from the main railway station and is also close to the riverside. It is possible to determine a reasonable rent for the holding in question and, therefore, the respondent has adopted the first method provided in the rule. We are unable to say in this case that the respon dent has been unreasonable in doing so. As already discussed, the rule itself provides that the alternative procedure is to be followed only when it is not easy to assess the annual rental of the premises. The learned Advocate's contention has accordingly no substance.

6. The next point urged by Mr. Pal is that the respondent has not been providing the petitioner with the amenities as required under rule 43 of the said Rules and, therefore, it is illegal to impose taxes on the petitioner‑company. Rule 43 of the said Rules is as follows: "The imposition of the conservancy rate shall be subject to the restrictions that the rate shall not be leviable in any area until the Municipal Committee makes provisions for the cleaning of private latrines, urinals and cess‑pools and public streets within such area."

7. The petitioner‑company has stated that the Municipal Committee has failed to provide them with these amenities and the company made its own arrangements for cleaning the streets, latrines and the cess‑pools. In the presence of these restrictions on the imposition of the conservancy rates, it has been urged that it is illegal for the respondent to levy taxes on the petitioner.

8. The respondent has stoutly denied the allegations and averred to the effect that it has been providing the petitioner and others of the locality with all amenities and services for cleaning latrines, urinals, cess‑pools and streets in all areas of Kushtia town including the area where the said holding No. 32 is located.

9. In view of the assertions made by the petitioner and the denial thereof by the respondent, it seems to us, that it is note possible to resolve this disputed question of fact by means o If affidavits in this case. Moreover, the fact of payment of taxes in the past by the petitioner‑company has to be taken into con sideration as it is not even alleged that objection was raised on this account in the past. If the respondent had really failed to provide them with the necessary amenities as required by the rule, the petitioner‑company would have raised the objection in the past also inasmuch as there was a rule similar to the said rule 43 under the Bengal Municipal Act as well. That being the position, the petitioner is entitled to no relief in this writ petition on that ground.

10. The next point urged is that the Divisional Commissioner has erred in law in dismissing the appeal preferred by the petitioner‑company.

11. Having been dis‑satisfied with the assessment, the petitioner‑company made an application to the Chairman of the Municipal Committee under rule 28 of the said Rules for review ing the same. On receipt of the said petition, steps enumerated in rule 29 of the Rules were taken and ultimately the sub committee gave the decision as already indicated. Sub‑rule (4) of rule 29 is as follows: "The decision of the majority of the members present shall be the decision of the sub‑committee and shall be final."

12. There is no provision for appeal against the decision of the sub‑committee under rule 29(4) of the said Rules. Provision for another mode of raising objection to the assessment is to be found in rule

8. That rule provides that in case of any objection to the assessment, the aggrieved party is entitled to present a petition to the Municipal Committee within 14 days from the publication of notice of assessment and on presentation of such petition the Municipal Committee is to give its decision. Against that decision, an aggrieved person is given an opportunity under sub‑rule (4) of rule 8 of preferring an appeal to the Controlling Authority, who is the Commissioner of the Division concerned. The petitioner having taken steps under rule 28, instead of rule 8, had no right of preferring an appeal to the Divisional Commissioner, who, in the circumstances of the case, we must hold, rightly dismissed the same.

13. For the reasons stated above, the Rule is discharged, but in the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. MURSHED, J. ‑

I agree. S. B./A.H. Rule discharged.