1969 PLP 567 (SCMR)

Ibadat Yar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Yousuf Rafi, Attorney for Respondent No.

1. Respondent No. 2 : Ex parte. Dates of hearing : 7th and 8th May 1969. SAJJAD AHMAD, J.‑The facts of this appeal, by special leave, are as follows. One, Ghazi Mohiuddin, was allotted an area measuring approximately 500 acres situated in Taluka Matli, Dirtrict Hyderabad The appellants Syed Ali and his sister, Mst. Saleha Khatoon and the respondent Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan, filed petitions before the Rehabilitation Authorities, stating that the claim filed by Ghazi Mohiuddin for the allotment in question was false and if that is so and their information is found to be correct, they should, as informers, be given that land. By an order dated the 31st of October 1959, the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Hyderabad, cancelled the allotment of Ghazi Mohiuddin and ordered that the land so released should be allotted to the appellants. Ghazi Mohiuddin and the respondent Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan filed appeals before the Rehabilitation and Settlement Commissioner against this order. During the pendency of these appeals the appellants and the respondent entered into a compromise whereby ii was agreed that Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan may be allotted 150 acres of land out of the total area (including 375 acres already allotted to Syed Ali and his relatives) to be selected by Syed Ali. It may be noted here that the appellants were allotted 375 acres in the same taluka of Matli, District Hyderabad, on 15th, of September 1959. Adding the 475 acres which were allotted to them by the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner, Hyderabad, on the 31st of October 1959, out of the cancelled allotment of Ghazi Mohiuddin, the total area held by the appellants came to 850 acres. The terms of t he compromise as mentioned above, are stated in an application (copy Annexure B/1) which is described as joint application but is signed only by Hidayat Ali Khan on behalf of Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan. However, the order which was recorded by the Rehabilitation Commissioner on the 9th of May 1960, taking note of this compromise was to the effect that Ghazi Mohiuddin had not deliberately filed a false claim, although it does seem that the rights, if any, conferred on him by the President or the Vice‑President of the Dargah Committee were not acquired by him since they were not mutated in his name nor shown to be enjoyed by him. However, since Ghazi Mohiuddin was a beneficiary from the agricultural land assigned to the Dargah in his capacity as the Manager thereof, he is advised to file a claim under paragraph 56, Chapter 1, Part II, of the West Pakistan Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme. Meanwhile, an area of his choice in one compact block to the extent of 1000 produce index units out of the land in question shall be retained by him and to that extent his appeal is allowed". The area thus left with Mohiuddin amounted to 25 acres. For the remainder, it was ordered as follows "The parties, namely, Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan and Syed Ali and Saleha Khatoon have reached a compromise according to which 150 acres to be selected by the latter (i e., Syed Ali and Saleha Khatoon) will go to Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan and the rest to Syed Ali and Saleha Khatoon towards the satisfac tion of their respective claims. I order that this compromise shall be given effect to". On the basis of this order the respondent demanded that the appellants should give him 150 acres of land out of the land which had been allotted to Ghazi Mohiuddin but cancelled to the extent of 473 acres. The appellants thereupon challenged the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner by a writ petition filed on the 25th of November 1963, complaining that the compromise that was effected between the parties and whereby Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan was to be given 150 acres of land out of the total area of 850 acres hold by the appellants, was wrongly changed by the order of the Rehabilitation Commissioner, confining the choice to the area of 475 acres which was withdrawn from the allotment of Ghazi Mohiuddin. It was further complained that the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner had illegally ousted the petitioners (the appellants before us) from the said lands. The High Court has dismissed the petition on the ground that it was a question of fact as to which land was intended to be given by the compromise to Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan and there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the findings of the Rehabilitation Commissioner on that point according to which Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan was to get 150 acres from the land of Ghazi Mohiuddin. The Rehabilitation Commissioner confirmed this order of the 9th of May 1960, by a subsequent order dated the 4th of August 1960, stating definitely that the subject‑matter of dispute before the Court was the land held by Ghazi Mohiuddin, and Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan was to have his choice of 150 acres in a compact block out of that land. It is obvious that the dispute between the parties before the Rehabilitation Commis sioner related to the land of Ghazi Mohiuddin and the land which belonged to the appellants, was irrelevantly brought into the contest. In any case, the terms of compromise as ultimately recorded in the order to which no objection was taken at the time, must hold the ‑field. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the determination of the Settlement Commissioner on this question as upheld by the High Court. The learned Counsel for the respondent has also pointed out that the picture with regard to the disputed land is now changed entirely. In an affidavit filed by respondent, Nawab Siddiq Ali Khan, it is submitted that he took over possession of the land in dispute (i e., 150 acres) after its cancellation from the allotment of Mohiuddin, on the 6th of August 1960, through the Rehabilita tion Authorities. It was thereafter surrendered by him under Martial Law Regulation No. 89 and then repurchased from the Government on payment of the price by instalments some of which have been paid already. Regardless of its past history, the land has now been acquired by the respondent from the Government by a regular purchase under Martial Law Regulation No.

89. The appellants have in a counter‑affidavit accepted this position, but have contended that the respondent had no right to surrender the land in dispute unilaterally and that they are not bound by this transaction. It is not for us to determine the legality of the new acquisition in this appeal, except to take note of the fact that it has taken place. As we are unable to disagree with the High Court, this appeal fails with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.