P L D 1979 Lahore 176 (PLP)

This writ petition has been filed to call in question the judgment and decree passed under the Family Courts Act, 1964, in favour of the respondent, for recovery of dower money. Learned counsel for the petitioner has reiterated the point raised at the time of motion hearing, namely, that even though decree could be passed by a Family Court against a husband, it was not competent to pass a decree of dower against a surety. Relying on the Preamble of the Family Courts Act learned counsel has argued that the Family Courts were constituted to decide disputes between those parties only which are directly involved in the family disputes, and a surety may, or may not be involved in the family dispute and thus remain, out of the ambit of such a dispute.

2. Learned counsel for the respondent relying on the list of subjects in the Schedule to the Act and the definition of "Party" in section 2(d) thereof contended that all matters relating to dower whether they are directly in dispute between the spouses or connected with those disputes, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Courts by virtue of the provisions contained in section 5 of the Act. The Preamble and the provisions of sections 2(d) and 5 relied upon by the !earned counsel read as follows : "Preamble.-Whereas it is expedient to make provisions fur the establishment of Family Courts for the expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs 'and for matters connected therewith. Section 2(d).-`Party' shall include any person whose presence as such is considered necessary for a proper decision of the dispute and whom the Family Court adds as a Party to such dispute." Section

5. Jurisdiction.-Subject to the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and the Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, the Family Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain, hear and adjudicate upon matter specified in the Schedule."

3. A bare reading of what has been quoted above would show that not only the disputes strictly relating to marriage and family affairs, but some of the other matters as well connected therewith were intended to be entertained and adjudicated upon by the Family Courts. Dower is one of the subjects of disputes relating to marriage and by" virtue of section 5 would fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court. The Schedule does not make any distinction between the dower payable by the husband and the responsibility of a surety to discharge the liability of the husband. This assumption, as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, is strengthened by the definition of 'party' contained in section 2(d). It is wide enough to include a party as such and also other persons whose presence would be necessary for the decision of the dispute. Not only this, but it would also include persons whom the Family Court adds as a party to such a dispute, which otherwise would fall under the Schedule. The husband and the surety are both necessary parties insofar as the determination of questions relating to liability to pay dower are concerned; subject of course, to further question as to whether a surety is involved. The preamble does not, in any way, affect the significance of definition of `party'. Obviously, if there is a dispute about the dower, it relates to marriage and the liability of a surety qua dower is a matter connected with such dispute. The decree passed by the Family Court is not without jurisdiction. .The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force.

4. No other point has been urged. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. S. Q.???????????????????????????????????????????? Petition dismissed.