PLD 1979 Supreme Court 711 (PLP)

KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.‑Sardar Abdul Rehman Khan Durrani (hereinafter called the plaintiff) was appointed to a Gezetted Class II post of a D. S. P. in the Punjab Police Service on 23‑5‑1951. During the period relevant in this case, namely 9‑7‑1955 to 30‑1C‑1959, he was posted and working in Mianwali where he was allegedly involved in certain deals of corruption. A general complaint Exh. P. 1 about Police Officials of that District was made by the Deputy Commissioner concerned on .28‑9‑1959 to the local Superintendent of Police. The latter made some probe to the matter and on 7‑10‑1959 addressed a communication to the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, Dera Ismail Khan Range, suggesting that the plaintiff should be transferred to some other place outside the District and that an officer of the Anti‑Corruption Department be directed to look into the various allegations of corruption levelled against him. The Deputy Inspector General on 8‑10‑1959, forwarded that proposal to the Inspector‑General of Police, Lahore. The latter then on 16‑10‑1959 passed an order transferring the plaintiff to some other station and directing the Deputy Inspector‑General to ask the local Superintendent Police to make an inquiry into the alleged complaint against the plaintiff and submit a report. It appears that the proposal to entrust the matter for probe to the Anti‑Corruption Department was not accepted.

2. The orders aforesaid were complied with. The Superintendent of Police submitted his two reports one dated 18‑12‑1959, Exh. P. 2 and another dated 28‑12‑1959 which was examined by the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police and as the plaintiff had levelled certain counter allegations, the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police himself also made some probe and checked documents etc. whereafter on 5‑1‑1960 vide Exh. P/3, he addressed a communication to the Inspector General of Police (Lahore) enclosing the aforesaid two reports of ‑the Superintendent of Police and his own view or report which too was adverse to the plaintiff. The Inspector‑General of Police forwarded the aforesaid material to the Additional Chief Secretary, Lahore, on 11‑2‑1960 vide Exh. P. W. 3/1 together with a draft charge‑sheet and statement of allegations for approval of the Government and for direction of a formal departmental inquiry. The draft charge‑sheet is Exh. P. W. 3/2 and the accompanying statement of allegations is Exh. P. W. 3/3 (both marked in red as such in trial Court file). This was approved by the Government to be precise by the Additional Chief Secretary and a formal charge‑sheet dated 22‑4‑1960 was consequently served on the plaintiff on 27‑4‑1960. A photostat copy of that charge‑sheet ha$ been shown to us and placed on record by the plaintiff himself who was present in person in Court along with his learned counsel. This charge‑sheet bears an endorsement. "By order of the Governor of West Pakistan". This has been r d during the course of arguments before us as the "first charge‑sheet", It may be mentioned that at that tine there were in for the west Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter called as 1959 Rules).

3. The plaintiff submitted his explanation on 11‑5‑1960, in which he denied the charges and desired a personal hearing in the matter, which was allowed to him. The matter was then routed through the Deputy Secretary (Provincial), who on 13‑9‑1960 drew up a report suggesting suspension of the plaintiff and holding of a formal departmental inquiry and appointment of a regular Inquiry Officer. The case was put up before the Governor, who approved the proposal on 17‑9‑1960. (Relevant extracts of the noting file were placed on record). In consequence a regular charge‑sheet dated 27‑9‑1960 also marked as Exh. P. W. 3/2 was issued to the plaintiff which contained an endorsement "By Order of the Governor of West Pakistan". It has been referred to in the arguments before us as the "second charge‑sheet". It was accompanied by a statement of the allegations also marked as . Exh. P. W. 3/3. Syed Ijaz Hussain C. S. P. was appointed as an Inquiry Officer vide Exh. D/1 and its relevant covering letter dated 27‑9‑1960. The plaintiff submitted his explanation to the Inquiry Officer on 22‑10‑1960, whereafter, a regular inquiry proceeded in which inter alia the above mentioned S. P. and D. I. G. appeared as witnesses. The plaintiff took part in that inquiry and fully cross‑examined the aforesaid two officers at length and led defence. The Inquiry Officer on 4.4‑1961 complied a report Exh. P/4 holding that three out of the four charges of corruption levelled against the plaintiff had been proved. The plaintiff was issued a final show‑cause notice alongwith a copy of the inquiry report on 26‑4‑1961 asking him to explain as to why he should not be dismissed from service. The plaintiff submitted his reply on 11‑5‑1961. which was not found satisfactory and after obtaining the advice of the Provincial Public Service Commission, he was consequently dismissed from service on 28/29‑7‑1961 by the Governor vide Exh. D/2 (A copy of the relevant noting file was placed on record). The second charge‑sheet and all further proceedings, it may be pointed out, recited that they were being processed under the West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules. 1960 (hereinafter called as 1960 Rules), which had come into force on 27‑7‑1960.

4. The plaintiff on 2/14‑3‑1965 filed a civil suit (later amended on 14‑5‑1970) to challenge his dismissal. The case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the plaint/amended plaint, in the notice sent by him under section 80, C. P. C. copy whereof was annexed with the plaint, and as a matter of fact as highlighted in the various written‑arguments which he filed in all the Courts below and in his relevant grounds of appeal and revision was that the disciplinary proceedings against him had to be regulated in toto by 1960 Rules which no doubt were gazetted on 27‑7‑1960 but as they were merely of a procedural nature and dealt with procedural matters, therefore, on the principle that procedural laws are retrospective, these rules .were are also retrospective and covered the plaintiff's case which though initiated earlier but had been finalised before the aforesaid date. The implication of the plea was that after the promulgation of 1960 Rules all old proceedings remained of no legal effect with the result that his case should have been processed de novo, again from the very beginning ; the previous probes or inquiry reports and the "first charge‑sheet" were of no validity ; the material relied upon at the time of issuing the "first charge‑sheet" was result of secretive and ex parse probes and inquiries which could not legally be made use of under 1960 Rules which envisaged two inquiries namely a preliminary inquiry before issuing a charge‑sheet and a final and formal inquiry after the charge‑sheet, both of which had to be open inquiries. It was further pleaded that earlier reports were the result of the bias of the then local Superintendent of Police. Grievance was also made that Syed Fjaz Hussain Shah, C. S. P. was not qualified for being appointed as an Inquiry Officer under the 1960 Rules and that he had not allowed the plaintiff an adequate opportunity to lead defence or cross‑examine witnesses. All these allegations were controverted and it was pleaded that both the stages of proceedings viz. up to the stage of first charge‑sheet, and thereafter from the second charge‑sheet onward were in order under the relevant rules prevalent during those stages. On the pleadings of the parties the learned Civil Judge (so far as relevant for the present appeal) framed one comprehensive issue as to "whether the order dated 29‑7‑1961 dismissing the plaintiff from service is illegal, void and inoperative".

5. After attending to the relevant evidence on record, the learned Civil Judge found no force m the pleas of the plaintiff and dismissed his suit on 4‑6‑1973. He held that West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 were not merely matters of procedure but contained substantive provisions bestowing various rights on civil servants in the matter of security of service and leading of defence, and as such, they were not retrospective in their operation, with the result that the disciplinary proceedings which had been drawn up against the plaintiff under 1959 Rules were in order up to 27‑7‑1960 when 1960 Rules came into force and thereafter rest of the proceedings onward from that stage were valid thereunder. Proceeding to examine the case in this way he held that there was no defect in the issuance of the relevant charge‑sheets on the basis of the material collected by the reporting or probing officers earlier. He further held that there was no defect in the appointment of Syed Ijaz Hussain Shah, C. S. P. as an Inquiry Officer of the plaintiff inasmuch as he was in all respects senior to him. The learned Civil Judge further found that the Inquiry Officer had given full opportunity to the plaintiff to defend himself and to lead defence and that the inquiry did not suffer from any defect. The proceedings taken against the plaintiff were finally held to be quite in order to which merited dismissal of his suit.

6. The plaintiff filed an appeal but without any success as the same was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge on 33‑11‑1974. The learned Additional District Judge endorsed all the views and findings as recorded by the learned trial Court.

7. The plaintiff then filed a Civil Revision No. 92 of 1975 which was accepted by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court by means of his judgment and order dated 11‑10‑1976, whereby he set aside the concurrent judgments and decrees of the two Courts below and decreed the plaintiff's suit. The learned Single Judge it may be mentioned examined the case from the point of view of the applicability of both the Rules viz. the 1959 Rules as well as 1960 Rules. The findings recorded with reference to these Rules were as follows :‑ Regarding 1959 Rules.

(a) It was held that the inquiries started or authorised by the Superintendent of Police, the D. I: G. or the I.‑G. were all unwarranted as those inquiries were not authorised by the Governor of West Pakistan who alone was the "competent authority" to pass orders for holding inquiries of the aforesaid nature. Rules 3 and 4 of 1959 Rules in this respect were referred to, and it was held that under the aforesaid no power had been delegated to those who had been ordering or holding inquiry against the plaintiff and nor was there any delegation of power in their favour under Rule 5 ; (b) that 1959 Rules did not contemplate any inquiry in the absence of the accused official, whereas the reports of the Superintendent of Police and D. I: G./or I: G. were based on ex parte and secret inquiry or inquiries which were from that point of view nullity in the eye of law ; (c) that the reports of the above inquiry or inquiries which were illegal and unauthorised could not have been made the basis of any action against the plaintiff ; (d) that the Governor approved the charge‑sheet dated 22‑4‑1960 in a mechanical manner without applying any independent mind ; and (e) the learned Single Judge was not clear as to which rules were to apply to this case. He, however, observed that if 1959 Rules were to apply, even then for the aforesaid reasons, those rules had not been faithfully complied with. Regarding 1960 Rules.‑‑(a) It was held that whereas Rules of 1959 contemplated only one inquiry, 1960 Rules contemplated two inquiries namely preliminary as well as final or formal. In the instant case as two inquires were held therefore it meant that 1960 Rules were followed. But as the earlier inquiries were unauthorised the same could not have formed a basis of action even under 1960 Rules ; (b) that the reply to the charge‑sheet should have been placed before the Governor who was thereafter to see whether inquiry was to be held or not, but here the reply was sent simply to the Inquiry Officer who then straightaway proceeded with the inquiry. In this way rule 6 (4) of 1960 Rules was violated which caused a great prejudice to the plaintiff ; and (c) that the charge was not framed by the competent authority under 1960 Rules.

8. The Province of Punjab has come up in appeal to this Court by special leave which was granted on 11‑4‑1977 to consider the question of the application and the correct interpretation of the rules relevant to, cases of this typq in general and to the facts and the circumstances of the present case in particular.

9. Khawaja Muhammad Afzal learned Additional Advocate‑General has submitted that the High Court has failed to positively determine as to which set of Rules, namely Rules of 1959 or 1960 were to apply to or regulate this case, with the result that the real matter in controversy got confused and was not appreciated in a correct perspective due to overlapping application of both or either of the two sets of Rules here and there without any certainty on any precise subject, though his own submission was that 1959 Rules applied to this case. It is correct that the High Court has not recorded any positive finding in this respect and has tried to examine the case from the point of view of both sets of Rhles as analysed above a process which apparently was considered to be the safest for the ends of justice. Nevertheless the point raised did need a positive finding and a consequent follow up. We have, therefore, heard the learned counsel for the parties on the subject in detail and the position which in our view has emerged is as follows :‑ "West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 were published in the West Pakistan Gazette (Extraordinary) of 27‑7‑1960. Rule 1(3) of these Rules stated that they shall come into force at once. Rule 16 is headed as `Repeal'." In sub‑rule (1) of this rule it is laid down that "these rules supersede all the existing rules and instructions in regard to matters dealt with in these rules and in particular the following rules in their application to Government Servants‑ (a) The Punjab Civil Services (National Secretary) Rules, 1969 ; (b) The Punjab Civil Services (Prevention of Corruption) Rules, 1953 ; (c) Rules 14.8, 14.10 and 14.13 of the Punjab 'Civil Services Rules, Volume I, Part I ; (d) Rules 33 and 34 of the Sind Civil Services (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules ; (e) The Sind Civil Services (National Security) Rules, 1951 ; (f) Rules 4, 6 and 7 of the North‑West Frontier. Province, Civil Service Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1943 ; (g) The Civil Services (Prevention of Corruption) Rules, 1953 ; (h) Part XII of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules ; (i) The Civil Services (National Security) Rules, 1957 ; and (j) The West Pakistan Government Servants (Discipline and Efficiency) Rules, 1959." Sub‑rule (2) of rule 16 then states that‑ "Notwithstanding the supersession of the rules and instructions specified in sub‑rule (1), hereinafter referred to in this sub‑rule as the said rules and instructions, any departmental inquiry or proceedings pending immediately before the coming into force of these rules, shall be completed and orders passed thereon as if the said rules and instructions had not been superseded. (This sub‑rule was added by notification dated 16‑3‑1961)." From the history of the, present case, as given above, it is clear that the first charge‑sheet to the plaintiff was given under the 1959 Rules on 22‑4‑1960, which means that when 1960 Rules came into force departmental proceeding had been initiated and were already pending against the plaintiff under 1959 Rules and bad not been finalised even by 16‑3‑1961 when sub‑rule (2) to rule 16 was added kind as such they could continue under 1959 Rules. Stated conversely it means that this case was to be governed and regulated not by 1960 Rules but by 1959 Rules. In this respect we may refer to a decision of this Court in Abdul Qadir v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD1967SC507) which in a way also supports the view which we have presently taken. In that case first charge‑sheet was served on an Assistant Sub‑Inspector of Police on 19.3‑1960. He submitted an explanation which was found unsatisfactory and a second charge‑sheet was served on him on 16‑6‑1960. However on 27‑7‑1960 came into force 1960 Rules. Thereafter he was compulsorily retired from service by the D. I: G. Of Police on 12‑8‑1960. The accused official pleaded that as before passing of the final order 1960 Rules came into force with effect from 27‑7‑1960, therefore, his case should have been dealt with under those rules. As against this the Advocate‑General contended that‑ "the operation of West Pakistan Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1960 was excluded with regard to the cases instituted before the coming into of the said rules and pending on the said date by a Notification No. S. O. XII‑2‑167/60 issued on 16‑3‑.1961." The Supreme Court observed that‑‑ "this notification will not, however, apply in the present case, for the impugned order was made long before the amendment and his appeal was also disposed of before that date." This shows and implies that if the final order had not been passed before the promulgation of sub‑rule (2) of rule 16, which was added in rule 16 by the notification dated 16‑3‑1961, then obviously the case had to be governed and regulated by the previous rules. Applying the same principle to the facts and the circumstances of the present case, since here the final order bad not been passed by or before 16‑3‑1961 and the matter was pending both on 27‑7‑1960 as well as 16‑3‑1961 and had not been finalised till then therefore it was to be governed by 1959 Rules as laid down in rule 16 (2) of 1960 Rules themselves. It appears that the aforesaid sub‑rule (2) of rule(1) was not brought to the notice of the High Court due to which the case was not dealt with under the correct provisions relevant to the subject in hand.

10. Proceeding to examine the validity of the departmental proceedings under 1959 Rules against the plaintiff, he and his learned counsel, challenged the same on the grounds which found favour with the High Court and which have been reproduced above‑namely:‑ (a) that the preliminary inquiries held and reports submitted by the S. P. and or authorised by the D. L‑G. or the I: G. were all unwarranted as they were not permitted by any law nor by 1959 Rules or any other rules or instructions on the subject and even otherwise being secretive and ex parte they could not form the basis of issuing any charge‑sheet to the plaintiff on 22‑4‑1960 ; (b) which charge‑sheet ;vas allegedly not authorised or approved by the Government ; and (c) if at all there was any such approval and authentication that was just mechanical inasmuch as the Governor did not apply his independent mind to the facts and the circumstances of the case. We have carefully considered these pleas but we must say that we have not been able to find any merit in them. Taking up the question. whether there was any warrant or authority for holding of an inquiry or for putting up a report on the part of the S. P. and other higher Police Officers it may be mentioned that the said inquiries or reports were nothing but jus of the nature of a preliminary probe into a complaint brought to the notice of the concerned authorities by the Deputy Commissioner of the District. In our view a hen the competent authority had to form any opinion under rule 4 of 1959 Rules whether "there are reasonable grounds for believing that a Government Servant is liable to be dismissed, removed, reduced in rank or compulsorily retired under rule 3 "namely (confining to the facts of this case) he "is corrupt or may reasonably be considered to be corrupt", warranting initiation of formal departmental proceedings against him the competent authority had to do so obviously on the basis of some material which may have been collected by the concerned quarters and which had to be placed before him. The very requirement of seeing the existence of reasonable grounds and the entertainment of the requisite belief implied that the authorities concerned will collect and will have the power to collect the relevant material for placing the same before the competent authority, to enable him to form an opinion on the subject aforesaid. However, there was no provision in 1959 Rules that the accused official was also to be associated in the aforesaid preliminary probe or collection of material or that the said probe had to be made in his presence. The said probe in its very nature was of the type of an investigation and all that could have perhaps been insisted upon was that before putting up the relevant report, the explanation or reply of the accused official, might also be obtained and brought to the notice of the competent authority, so that he may have decided whether there were reasonable grounds for prima facie believing in the guilt of the accused Government Servant. The mere fact therefore that the plaintiff the power of he competent in those authority to issue charge sheet to a Government official who had been in the aforesaid manner reported against. Subject to what has been observed earlier this is on the strict letter of law, though on factual plane, it may be pointed out that as stated in the narration of facts above, the case was put up to the Government after obtaining the reply or receiving counter allegations of the plaintiff with regard to the complaint or reports received against him. As a matter of fact a that stage the plaintiff obtained favourable affidavits of certain persons who had earlier stated something adverse to and against him and forwarded the same to the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police which shows that he was aware, of the complaints and the evidence against him. It is further to mention that the plaintiff fully cross‑examined the then Superintendent Police and the Deputy Inspector‑General who had made the earlier probe or investigation. He also led defence evidence. This shows that there was caused no prejudice to the plaintiff and he had been given ample opportunity to rebut the aforesaid probing or investigation reports. In the circumstances the point raised remains just of a highly technical nature and has no merit both on legal as well as factual levels.

11. As to the point as to who was authority competent to issue the (first) charge‑sheet, we were shown the said charge‑sheet by the plaintiff himself which contained a regular endorsement or authentication that it was being issued "By Order of the Governor of West Pakistan". At this place reference may be made to the Police Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958, which were promulgated by the Governor of 'West Pakistan in exercise of powers conferred on him by clause (1) of Article 2 of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 read with sub‑clause (b) of clause (2) of Article 182 of the late Constitution of 1956. Sub‑rule (t) of rule 2 of these Rules laid down that "Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any service rule for the time being in force in the Province or any part thereof, the authorities for purposes of appointment, appeals, punishments, transfer and controlling travelling allowance, in respect of each person holding post mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule annexed herewith shall be such as are specified against the post of such person in columns 3 to 8 of the said Schedule." Sub‑rule (2) of rule 2 stated that an authority empowered under these rules to impose penalties on the holder of a post shall be competent to impose such penalties on every person holding such post whether such person was appointed by such authority or not". Rule 3 further provided that "these rules supersede all the delegation orders for the time being in force in the Province or any part thereof". Item No. 6 of the Schedule then stated that "appointing authority and authority competent to suspend, reduce in rank, retire compulsorily, remove or dismiss" in the case of Deputy Superintendents of Police (Time Scale and Selection Grade) was to be the "Inspector General of Police". The above‑mentioned Schedule was substituted by the Governor of West Pakistan by a new Schedule vide Services and General Administration Department Notifica tion No. Integ‑15/ 16‑57 dated 24‑2‑1959. In that Schedule against Item No. .6 pertaining to Deputy Superintendent of Police (Time Scale and Selection Grade), the appointing authority and competent authority to reduce in rank, remove or dismiss was shown as (1) Government for direct recruits and (2) Inspector General of Police for promotees. According to Rules of Business of the Government of West Pakistan (1955) prevalent during those days "Government" means the Government of West Pakistan". Rule 2 Wt) defined "Chief Secretary" and stated that it means the officer notified as such in the Gazette and includes the Additional Chief Secretary. In addition to other Departments and functions that may be allotted to him from time to time, he shall be in charge of the Services and General Administration Department and shall also be the Secretary to the Council." (namely the counsel of Ministers). Allocation of business was dealt with in rule 3; which if read with Schedule 1, and rule 9 will show that Services and General Administration Department was under the Chief Secretary. This department was to be "responsible for determination of the principles of control of Government servants including recruitment, conditions of service and discipline". Similarly section B which pertained to the distribution of business among Departments shows that Services and General Administration Department deals with service matters of the kind in hand. Even otherwise though Police Department was as per Schedule II an "attached Department" of Home Department but such of the matters of Home Department regarding "service matters" which were entrusted to Services and General Administration Department could be dealt with by the said Department in other words by its Secretary namely Chief Secretary/ Additional Chief Secretary. According to rule 7(2) "Save in cases where an officer has been specifically empowered to sign an order of instrument of Government, every such order or instrument shall be signed by the Secretary, the Joint Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, the Under Secretary or the Assistant Secretary to Government in the Department concerned and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order or instrument." Reference here may be made also to Article 74 of 1956 Constitution, which was in force during those days. This Article was in force during those days. This Article was headed as "Conduct of business of the Provincial Government" and stated that;

"(1) All executive actions of the Government of a Province shall be expressed to be taken in the‑name of the Governor thereof. (2) The Governor shall by rules specify the manner in which orders and other instruments made and executed in his name shall be authentica ted, and the validity of any order or instrument so authenticated shall not be questioned in any Court on the ground that it was not made or executed by the Governor. (3) The Governor shall also make rules for the allocation and transaction of the business of the Provincial `Government'." Examining the present case in the light of the above law, it will be evident, that during the period relevant in this case "Government of West Pakistan" was the authority competent to dismiss a Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Chief Secretary (which term included the Additional Chief Secretary being the head of the Services and General Administration Department represented the Government of West Pakistan and as such could deal with disciplinary cases of this type The first charge‑sheet in this case draft whereof was vetted and approved by the Additional Chief Secretary was thus authorised by a competent authority on the subject. It was authenticated by a Deputy Secretary and as mentioned above contained an authentication "By order of the Governor of West Pakistan." This authentication as earlier explained was quite in order with the result that this charge‑sheet was not liable to be questioned in Court on the ground that it was not made by a competent authority. See Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji and others (A I R 1945 P C 156) approving the view of Spens, C. J. in Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee and others (AIR 1943 FC75) column 1 with regard to the evidentiary value of such authentication. In that case an order was signed by the Additional Deputy Secretary and contained an authentication "By Order of the Governor". It was held that in the face of that authentication it was not open to challenge that the order was not made by the authority concerned. Similar view was taken in T. Ekambara Naicker and another v. Commissioner of the Madras Corpora tion (A I R 1927 Mad. 22) with reference to analogous provisions of section 49(1) of the Government of India Act, 1919 and it was held that if the Government order was authenticated according to rules, it could not be questioned that it was not the order of the proper authority under the law. To the same strain is Major E. G. Barsay v. State of Bombay (A I R 1963 S C 1'762) which was decided with reference to analogues provisions of Article 77 of the Indian Constitution and where even presumption about the genuineness and validity of the concerned order under section 114(e) of the Evidence Act of 1872 was also raised. The result of this discussion is that the view of the High Court that the first charge sheet was not issued by a competent authority and issued just in routine, mechanically, without application of mind is not correct as the High Court failed to take notice of all that has been mentioned above; In this respect it may be pointed out that we asked the respondent and his learned counsel that if the authority to dismiss him was the Government of West Pakistan then who could have vetted and approved of the "first charge -sheet"? He conceded that in that position the Additional Chief Secretary could have done it. Having seen that the competent authority in this case was the Government of West Pakistan there remains no defect in the first charge‑sheet impugned in this case, and the view of the High Court to the contrary cannot be maintained. Before parting with this subject it may be mentioned that the delegation of authority in favour of the Government as earlier made, was continued even under 1960 Rules by means of the Services and General Administration Department Notification No. S. O. XII‑2‑94/61 dated 12‑4‑1961 reference to which was made by the plaintiff in his notice (copy attached with the plaint) which he served on the Provincial Government under section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908) in which it was pleaded by him that according to that notification Additional Chief Secretary/Government was a delegatee of the powers of the Governor, and that the order of the dismissal, according to him, having been passed by the Governor instead of the Additional Chief Secretary/the Government it bad deprived him of a right of appeal to the Governor, and was as such illegal. Though this plea had been raised on a different plane which was not pressed in any of the courts below and nor before us, but it definitely was an admission and a pointer towards the fact that the Government did possess the delegated powers of the 4G Governor both under the old as well as under 1960 Rules inasmuch as the notification dated 12‑4‑1961 above‑mentioned was nothing but a simple declaration that old delegatees would be considered as delegatees under the new rules as well. Looked out from whatever angle, we have not been able to find any defect in the first charge‑sheet and the proceedings connected therewith.

12. Last but not the least, since we have held above that the case was to be governed by 1959 Rules, therefore, even if the first charge‑sheet is to be ignored, assuming without conceding, on the ground, that it was not proved on the present record that it was issued under the personal orders of the Governor (though we have held that it was not necessary as Provincial Government/Additional Chief Secretary was competent to action the matter (‑the second charge‑sheet (as explained later) which in essence will remain a charge‑sheet under those very rules, has positively been shown to us to have been authorised by the Governor. The relevant noting file was seen by us. It contained the signature of the Governor and it shows that the case was put up in details explaining the reports and the counter allegation of the plaintiff and it was after keeping all the aforesaid in view that the Governor approved of issuing the charge‑sheet. To say, therefore, that the charge‑sheet was not issued by the Governor or that he acted mechanically without application of his independent mind at any stage of this case is incorrect and is not borne out by anything on the present record. In fact the authenticity of second charge‑sheet on the aforesaid account was not disputed before us by the plaintiff or his learned counsel. In that view of the matter any objection on the score aforesaid to the first charge sheet loses all, significance.

13. The next point to be seen is as to what is the effect of 1960 Rules having been expressly quoted and referred to in the covering letter where under second charge‑sheet and statement of allegations were served on the plaintiff; the appointment of the Inquiry Officer was made; the inquiry report was submitted, the ultimate show‑cause notice was issued and the final dismissal order was passed against the plaintiff. In the light of our finding that the case in view of sub‑rule (2) of rule 16 was to be processed and regulated under 1959 Rules, the mere fact that in the aforesaid documents 1960 Rules were referred to and quoted would not detract anything from the validity of the relevant proceedings conducted and steps taken against the plaintiff, so long as, those proceedings and steps can well be covered by and squarelly fall under 1959 Rules both as regards their nature and the competency of the concerned authorities who passed the relevant orders in that respect. In that state of affairs mere citation of a wrong reference will be of no importance. This Court has already held in The Chairman, East Pakistan Railway Board, Chittagong v. Abdul Majid Sardar (P L D 1966 S C 725) that "acts performed and orders made by public authorities deserve due regard by Courts and every possible explanation for their validity should be explored and the whole field of powers in pursuance to which the public authorities act or perform their functions examined and only then if it is found that the act done, order made or proceeding undertaken is without lawful authority should the Courts declare them to be of no legal effect." Such exercise, it appears, was not done by the High Court in this case. It is not denied that Governor was competent to dismiss a D. S. P. It is further manifest and has not been denied as stated above that the second charge‑sheet dated 27‑9‑1960 was issued under the express orders of the Governor. We were shown the original noting file containing approval of the Governor on 17‑9‑1960 to the issuance of the charge‑sheet and the appointment of the Inquiry Officer. The charge‑sheet itself recited that it was being issued by Order of the Governor of West Pakistan". The Inquiry Officer appointed was senior to the plaintiff and as such there was no defect in his appointment. The plaintiff was duly provided with the statement of allega tions. He took part in those proceedings. He cross‑examined the then S, P./D. I.‑G. and was aware of the reports and had rather at some earlier stages filed affidavits of certain witnesses who prior thereto had mad statements against him but later tried to favour him. He led evidence in defence. The Inquiry Officer reported that three out of four charges of corruption levelled against the plaintiff stood proved. The plaintiff was issued a formal show‑cause notice by the Governor along with a copy of the inquiry report. He submitted his explanation. It was found unsatisfactory. The Governor then consulted the Public Service Commission and after complying with all the formalities passed an order of dismissal. The plaintiff filed a review/representation which was also dismissed by the Governor. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the plaintiff had not been given any fair and reasonable opportunity to show cause regarding the action taken against him. It has not been shown to us that there was any defect legal or factual in the aforesaid steps if the case was to be examined with reference to 1959 Rules. On the other hand all this gives a clear impression that the plaintiff rather had double opportunity of his case having been seen by the Governor before the formal inquiry was directed again when final show‑cause notice was issued to him and lastly when order of dismissal was passed. Any suggestion of any prejudice having been caused to the plaintiff in the circumstances thus cannot be maintained.

14. The upshot of the above discussion is that the present appeal is accepted. The judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and restoring the decrees of the courts subordinate thereto, the suit of the plaintiff is dismissed. However, in view of the fact that there had arisen some complicated questions of law in the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. S. A. H. Appeals accepted.