P L D 2003 Karachi 235 (PLP)

3. In pursuance to such consent order passed in the appeal, the respondent Muhammad Aslam kept on depositing the monthly instalments. However, on 3‑5‑1993 Khawaja Ghaus Mian submitted an application that the respondent Muhammad Aslam had defaulted in payment of instalment so the Nazir be directed to attach the property and after its sale pay the balance amount to the respondent (such being the terms and conditions in the consent order). Such prayer of the respondent was allowed and by an order dated 5‑12‑1993 the Nazir was directed to attach the property and submit the report. During this period, however, C.M.A. No.36 of 1994 praying for extension of time to deposit balance amount was filed but the same having not been persuaded properly was dismissed for non‑prosecution in 1994. However, in order to execute the order of the Court dated 5‑12‑1993, when the Nazir accompanied by the respondent and his counsel visited the property which is a shop, found it opened, where he was informed that it was in possession of the applicant/intervenor, the present appellant.

4. With the above background contained in detail, in the impugned order, the C.M.A. was dismissed being hopelessly time‑barred.

5. It would be very important to notice that against the judgment and decree passed in the suit filed by the respondent Khawaja Ghaus Mian by the learned District Court, a First Civil Appeal was filed as mentioned above, before this Court under section 96, C.P.C. numbered as First Civil Appeal No.7 of 1991. The sole question that has arisen is whether the order of the learned Single Judge passed in a civil appeal under section 96, C.P.C. can be challenged in H.C.A. under the provisions of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.

6. Mr. Khawaja Sharful Islam was repeatedly questioned as to how this High Court Appeal would be competent against the impugned interlocutory order passed in the civil appeal filed under section 96, C.P.C. He failed to submit any cogent explanation or place any legal precedent in support of his contentions but went on giving various evasive replies.

7. There is no denial of the fact that the suit was filed before the learned District Court in its original jurisdiction under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. for recovery of amount and the Judgment Debtor had preferred a First Civil Appeal as stated above under section 96, C.P.C. before this Court. Obviously it being a simple civil appeal under section 96, C.P.C., the matter was being dealt with in exercise of the civil appellate jurisdiction under the aforesaid provisions of the C.P.C.

8. The present High Court Appeal has been filed under section 15 of the Law Reforms Ordinance read with section 3 of the Ordinance. Such appeal is provided under the aforesaid provisions of the Law Reforms Ordinance only against an order which is passed by the learned Single Judge sitting singly dealing with suits in exercise of the original civil jurisdiction.

9. There is no provision in law permitting H.C.A. against an interlocutory order or for that matter a final order passed in civil appeal under section 96, C.P.C., in a High Court Appeal under the Law Reforms Ordinance. In view of the above, therefore, the present High Court Appeal No.57 of 2002 is found very much misconceived. The appellant, it appears was not properly advised.

10. Office objection relating to the maintainability of the present appeal is also upheld.

11. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal in limine alongwith listed C.M.A. No.272 of 2000 but with cost of Rs.10,000.

12. Aforesaid appeal was disposed of vide short order dated 12‑4‑2002, above are the reasons for the same. S.A.K./M‑442/K Appeal dismissed.