1992 P Cr (PLP)

6. In considering the question of quashing a criminal proceeding at the initial stage when the evidence is yet to be recorded, the allegations against the accused have to be accepted on face value and then it is to be determined, if they constitute an offence. I may usefully borrow the terse observations made by the Supreme Court in the well-known case of M.S. Khawaja v. The State reported in P L D 1965 SC 287 which are as follows:-- "To quash a judicial proceeding in order to `secure the ends of justice' would involve a finding that if permitted to continue, that proceeding would defeat the ends of justice, or in other words, would either operate or perpetuate an injustice. To find an `abuse', it would be necessary to see in the proceeding, a perversion of the purpose of the law such as to cause harassment to an innocent party, to bring about delay, or where the machinery of justice is engaged in an operation from which no result in furtherance of justice can accrue, and similar perverse results."

7. One of the important pronouncements on this point is to be found in Ghullam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan and 4 others, reported in P L D 1967 SC 317, wherein it was made clear that the powers given by section 561-A, Cr.P.C. can certainly not be so utilised as to interrupt or divert the ordinary course of criminal procedure as laid down in the procedural statute.

8. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely reluctant to interfere in a case in which prima facie evidence constituting an offence is disclosed. But, where a civil dispute is turned into a criminal case with a view to cause harassment to accused the High Court will be abdicating its function if it did not come to the rescue of such persons.

9. On a plain reading of F.I.R. and the charge-sheet it seems to me as, clear as daylight that the transaction between the parties is of civil nature and the allegations, even if accepted on face value, would not constitute an offence. Several rulings of different Courts can be cited in support of the contention C raised by learned counsel for applicant, but I may refer only few out of them:-- (i) Ragunath Puri v. Emperor A I R 1932 Pat. 72, (ii) Heywood v. Emperor A I R 1942 Lah. 134, (iii) Zafar Niazi v. Riazuddin P L D 1958 Lah. 738, (iv) J.S. Daver v. lqbal Qadir and another P L D 1962 Pesh.162, (v) Mehmood-ul-Hasan v. Imtiaz Khan and another P L D 1963 Lah. 481, (vi) R.C.P. Guignard v. The State and another P L D 1963 Kar. 868, (vii) Abdul Rashid v. Moinuddin and another 1972 P Cr. L J 724, (viii) Abdul Rehman and another v. The State and another 1988 P Cr. L J 2208, (ix) Mirajuddin and another v. The State 1989 P Cr. L J 441(2), (x) Haji Muhammad Latif v. Farman Ali and another 1990 S C M R 1299, (xi) Mian Muhammad Anwar etc. v. Mian Muhammad Waqar Monnoo and the State 1990 P Cr. L J 353, (xii) Abdul Ghafoor and others v. Raeesuddin and another 1991 M L D 376 and (xiii) Shaikh Muhammad Taqi v. The State 1991 P Cr. L J 963.

10. As observed in M.M.S.T. Chidambaram Chedtiar v. Shanmugham Pillai reported in A I R 1938 Mad. 129, mere deception or mere dishonesty is not a criminal offence. The effect of bouncing of a post-dated cheque was considered in the above case and it was observed:-- "In the world of business things are often done which are betrayals of confidence and deceptions which arouse moral indignation but are nevertheless civil wrongs which can be righted by Civil Courts and are not crimes which can be punished by a Criminal Court. Not every unmoral act is criminal and it is an abuse of the process of a Court to attempt to create new crime in order to compel men to conform to a high standard of probity in business dealings or to force them to execute their promises."

11. The sum secured under the bounced cheque is still recoverable through a competent Civil Court. The issuance of post-dated cheque in such a situation was purely a civil wrong and not a criminal offence.

12. For what has been said above, I accept the application made under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. and quash the proceedings pending against the D applicant in the Court of A.D.M., C.I.A. Karachi, under section 406, P.P.C arising out of Crime No.284 of 1990, Clifton Police Station. SA./A-1103/K Petition accepted.