1987 PLP 2093 (CLC)

‑‑‑ Ss. 68 & 68‑A‑‑Object, scope and comparison of Ss. 68 & 68‑A‑ Section 68‑A, has a cross‑reference to S. 68 of Canal and Drainage Act to the extent that interim order passed initially could be confirmed in any final order to be passed after inquiry envisaged by S.68‑‑Both Ss.68 & 68‑A are inter‑connected; one meant for interim and the other for passing a final order‑‑Civil Court would come in, after the order was made final‑‑Suit against interim order being incompetent, revision was accepted thereagainst and judgment and decree of lower Court were set aside. Aslam Riaz Hussain for Petitioner. Ch. Abdul Majid for Respondents. Date of hearing : 17th May, 1987. This Civil Revision calls in question the judgment/decree dated the 7th of November, 1984, of the learned Addl. District Judge, Faisalabad, whereby the petitioner's appeal was dismissed.

2. The dispute related to dismantling of an internal watercourse through which the petitioner had been till recently receiving canal water for his lands. Allegedly the respondents dismantled it. The petitioner made an application under section 68‑A of the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873, for its restoration whereupon the D.C.O. in his order dated the 14th of January, 1980, restored it temporarily. The respondents challenged this order in the Civil Court contending mainly that the 'Khalal could not have been carved out through their lands. In fact, they denied its existence at all.

3. On the other hand, the petitioner contested the suit reiterating that the 'Khalal existed for a long period and that its dismantling by the respondents was against law. He challenged the competency of the suit as well on the ground that the order under section 68‑A being merely interim could not be assailed in Civil Court. The two C , ourts below spurned this objection and decreed the respondents, suit.

4. Unluckily the Courts below did not see the provisions of section 68‑A carefully. It authorises the D.C.O. to pass only an interim order which had to be made final after observing the procedure laid down in section

68. Further, a suit would lie only to challenge an order finally passed under section

68. For this reason the interim order dated the 14th of January, 1980, passed by the D.C.O. could not have been assailed in the civil suit. It was argued that no issue in regard to this objection was framed and further that there was no nexus between sections 68 and 68‑A. In other words, section 68‑A was claimed to be an independent provision.

5. I am afraid the objections are not much inspiring. Section 68‑A itself is clear. It has a cross‑reference to section 68 to the extent that the interim order passed initially may be confirmed in any final order to be passed after an inquiry envisaged by section

68. Admittedly the D.C.O. was not allowed in this case to continue with the inquiry and pass final orders. The reason was that the present suit was filed prematurely and the proceedings were stayed. The two sections are inter‑connected: one meant for interim and the other for passing 'a final order. Civil Court comes in after the order is made final and, therefore, the present suit did not lie. The revision petition is accepted. The impugned judgment/decree are set aside and the respondents' suit is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. A. A. /N‑38/L Revision accepted.