1980 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

M. SALEEM CHAUDHRY (CHAIRMAN).‑

In this appeal the appellant is an ex‑Junior Clerk who was employed in the copying branch of the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Multan. He is aggrieved of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Multan dated 11‑3‑1978, in pursuance to the direction received from the Commissioner, Multan Division, dated 16‑3‑1978, vide which the aforesaid authority directed the appellant to approach this Tribunal to obtain the necessary verdict. The brief facts leading to this appeal are that the appellant was dismissed from service on 15‑11‑1968, by the order of Deputy Commissioner, Multan as the appellant had suffered a conviction under section 161/109, P. P. C. read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Multan and was sentenced to one year's imprisonment. For this reason the appellant was dismissed from service without issuing him charge‑sheet, holding any enquiry or issuing any show‑cause notice. It appears that the appellant on appeal to the Lahore High Court was acquitted on 23‑6‑1977 by the order of Mr. Justice Malik Saeed Hassan, (as he then was) and his conviction and sentence was set aside on the ground that the defence version ih the criminal case put forth by the present appellant could not be considered unreasonable. The appellant after his acquittal appeared to have approached the Deputy Commissioner, Multan, for his re‑instatement who referred the shatter to the Commissioner and the Commissioner advised the Deputy Commissioner to treat the order of acquittal to have been based on the ground that the benefit of doubt has been given to the appellant. He further advised the Deputy Commissioner to direct the appellant to approach the Service Tribunal. The Deputy Commissioner, passed the order accordingly. Hence the present appeal filed before us by the appellant on 22‑3‑1978. After going through the appeal and hearing the parties, we are of the view that it was for the departmental authorities, in the first instance, to decide the issue themselves and only thereafter the appellant was entitled to approach this Tribunal. Section 4 of the Punjab Services Tribunal Act, 1974, which creates a right of appeal in favour of the aggrieved civil servants is very clear which may be reproduced below :‑ "Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service including disciplinary matters may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him, or within six months of the establishment of the appropriate Tribunal, whichever is later, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal: Provided that‑

(a) Where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental authority is provided under the Punjab Civil Servants Ordinance, 1974, or any rules made thereunder, no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal unless the aggrieved civil servant has preferred an appeal or application for review or representation to such departmental authority and period of ninety days has elapsed from the date on which such appeal, application or representation was so preferred." Thus it is only after a final order has been passed by the departmental authorities that the right accrued to the civil servant to approach this Tribunal. We find in this case that the departmental authorities did not pass any final order and rather left the appellant to approach this Tribunal straightway. In order to relieve the appellant of further distress, we may observe that the re‑instatement of the appellant could not be denied for the reason that the procedure followed in the dismissal of the appellant by the departmental authorities was based on the Notification No. 904‑SR‑VI‑65, dated 8‑7‑1965, which authorises the dismissal of the civil servant concerned without complying with the requirements of issuing a charge‑sheet, holding an enquiry or issuing the show‑cause notice, in case where the civil servant concerned had suffered a conviction. Since the conviction of the appellant has been set aside, therefore, the dismissal order in pursuance of the aforesaid Notification was not maintainable. We accordingly direct that the appellant is entitled to be re‑instated. The observation of the department that it i A possible to read the order of the High Court to acquit the appellant b giving him the benefit of doubt was only relevant in the context of the entitlement of the appellant to get the salary. Even on that score, we d not find that the judgment proceeds upon the aforesaid basis. In fact, the defence version has been considered reasonable and has been accepted. Thus the prosecution case is not proved and the acquittal in the circumstances will have to be deemed as honourable. In our view, the appellant is also entitled to the salary. Consequently, the appeal succeeds with costs which is fixed at Rs.

100. Appeal accepted.