1997 PLP 2254 (MLD)

3. The learned Rent Controller settled the following issues: (1) Whether the applicant is entitled to get the possession of the tenament in question under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979? (2) What should the order be?

4. The parties led their evidence and then the learned Rent Controller allowed the ejectment application.

5. I have heard Mr. K.B. Bhutto, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Imran Ahmed, learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the circumstances of this case belie the claim of the respondent. He further submitted that the respondent herself shifted to her daughter's house alongwith her husband but after becoming widow all of sudden she came up with her demand with mala fide intention to deprive the appellant not only of his tenancy right but also to usurp Rs.40,000 which were paid as part payment. Therefore, the claim of the respondent is belied by these circumstances. Alternatively he submitted that, if at all, she is entitled to only, one tenament out of two tenaments. In support of his submission he cited Muhammad Ali Ahmed Khan v. Messrs Taufiq Engineering Works, 1991 CLC 1051, Mst. Razia Khatoon through Legal Heirs v. Dr. Roshan Nanji, 1991 SCMR 840 and Mrs. Baroba v. Manzoor Ahmed 1992 SCMR 1158.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned Judgment and submitted that the total area of the demised premises is 41 sq. yards and it consists of one room on the ground floor and one on the first floor. He also submitted that the tenancy is one and parties are also the same. The total rent is also admittedly Rs.140 per month. Therefore, the question of different tenancies etc. does not arise.

8. Section 14 of the Ordinance contains provisions for the benefit of some landlords including a widow, therefore, it is to be seen in the light of evidence whether she is entitled to the grant of her application for ejectment of the appellant. Admittedly she is a widow. On her behalf one Hussain Bux who is her son‑in‑law and attorney filed affidavit in evidence, but he was not cross-examined. The appellant also submitted his affidavit in evidence as well as the affidavits in evidence, of his witnesses namely M. Arif and Mst. Fatima Bano and they were cross‑examined at length. However, in the record, affidavit of the respondent is also available as "counter‑affidavit" wherein she has categorically denied having received Rs.40,000 as part payment or any deal having been made to dispose of the demised premises for total consideration of Rs.1,00,

000. In cross‑ examination she reiterated the same facts.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant very frankly conceded that evidence of the respondent's attorney has gone unchallenged, but he also submitted that application was submitted under section 151, C.P.C., for permission to crossexaminer the said attorney, but the application was dismissed by the learned Rent Controller on 18‑5‑1995. This fact has been mentioned as ground No.6 of the memo. of appeal and it is alleged that the appellant was deprived of his right to cross‑examine the sole witness of the respondent. This order has not been seriously challenged. The learned Rent Controller did not find sufficient reason to allow the application under section 151, C.P.C. and I see no reason to upset the same.

10. On careful evaluation of the entire evidence I find no force in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. Since the tenancy is one and tenant is also the same person, therefore, this is not the case of more than one premises or tenancies and tenant is also one and the same. In view of this in my humble view, the case‑law cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of this case.

11. In Muhammad Ali Ahmed Khan v. Messrs Taufiq Engineering Works, the main question which came up for consideration was whether the landlord within the purview of section 14 was entitled to file ejectment application in respect of one or more than one premises at the same time. It was held that in cases which fall under section 14 the requirement and need should be restricted to one premises. If it is extended to more than one premises then it is likely to create serious complications and dishonest claims may be pressed taking benefit of the summary procedure of section 14.

12. In Mst. Razia Khatoon v. Dr. Roshan Nanji it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that where two separate tenancies are involved both of the same character i.e. residential or commercial they could not be got vacated by recourse of section 14 of the Ordinance because a restricted right has been made available to a special category for a purpose.

13. In Mrs. Baroba v. Manzoor Ahmed, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that one of the most important ingredients of section 14 of the Ordinance being that the premises from which tenant was sought to be ejected should be required by the landlord for personal use and if the tenant is able to show otherwise it could result in dismissal of such ejectment application.

14. As observed earlier the demised premises is in occupation of the appellant at the rate of Rs.140 per month and by no stretch of imagination it could be treated as a case of two tenaments or separate tenancies. The applicant has also successfully proved her bona fide that the two rooms accommodation of her daughter is insufficient and, therefore, she required the demised premises for her own bona fide use and occupation. I also find no force in the alternate submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent is entitled to only one tenament because the tenament is one and as per her requirement being a widow she is entitled to occupy the same. The impugned judgment passed by the Rent Controller require no interference. Therefore, this appeal having no merit is dismissed with costs. The appellant is directed to hand over vacant possession of the demised premises to the respondent within 60 (sixty) days from the date of this judgment. A.A./S‑63/K Appeal dismissed.