1996 PLP 1539 (SCMR)

SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQU1, J.

The petitioner is seeking leave to appeal against the order of a learned Judge in Chamber of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 24-5-1994, summarily dismissing the Civil Revision Application No.322 of 1994 filed by the petitioner to challenge the judgment and decree for possession of the suit property passed by the Trial Court in favour of respondents which was confirmed in appeal by the first Appellate Court. The property in suit, namely house No.40 situated in Mohallah Waris Khan, Rawalpindi City was purchased by the predecessor-in-interest of respondents' Farman Ali from its non-Muslim owner, through a registered sale deed dated 18-4-1947. The respondents first instituted ejectment case before the Rent Controller, Rawalpindi, seeking ejectment of petitioner from the premises but it was dismissed on 16-2-1983 as the respondents failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The respondents thereafter instituted a suit for possession on the basis of title which was decreed in their favour. The petitioner's first appeal against the judgment and decree of Trial Court failed so also Civil Revision Application before the High Court giving rise to the present petition. The petitioner resisted the suit filed by the respondents on the ground that the property in suit was purchased ' Benami' by her father Fazal Elahi in the name of Farman Ali, the predecessor-in-interest of respondents, and as such the petitioner being the only legal heir of said Fazal Elahi is the real owner of the property. It was also pleaded that the suit for possession was time-barred. Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, the learned counsel for the petitioner did not press the plea of ' Benami' nature of the transaction in view of the concurrent findings of the Courts below that the suit property was purchased by Farman Ali who was the sole owner of the property. The learned counsel, however, pressed this petition only on the ground that the suit for possession filed by respondents was barred under Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act' only. The contention of the learned counsel has no force. Article 142 of the Act provides limitation of 12 years for possession of immovable property when the plaintiff while in possession of the property had been dispossessed or has discontinued the possession. The cause of action in such cases deemed to have been arisen on the date of dispossession or discontinuation of the possession of plaintiff. This Article does not apply to the present case as the suit was filed by the respondents for possession on basis of title and not on the allegation of dispossession from the property. The next Article relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is Article 144 (ibid), which also prescribed a period of 12 years for claiming possession of immovable property or interest therein not otherwise specially provided for. The cause of action for suit under Article 144 (ibid), arises on the date when the possession of the defendant over the property becomes adverse to the plaintiff. We have gone through the evidence on record and asked the learned counsel for the petitioner to point out the actual date on which possession of the petitioner became adverse to that of the plaintiff. The learned counsel is unable to point out any specific date on which the petitioner claimed adverse possession of the property against the plaintiff. However, the learned counsel contended that since the possession of property from the date of purchase in the name of respondents' predecessor had along been either with the petitioner or with her father, the limitation prescribed in filing of the suit expired within 12 years of the date of purchase. The contention of the learned counsel has no merit. As pointed out by us earlier the limitation for filing suit under Article 144 (ibid) starts on the date on which the defendant's possession became adverse to that of the plaintiff. In the present case the point on which the petitioner claimed adverse possession of the land is the date on which she filed her written statement in the rent proceedings, wherein she denied the title of respondents and claimed to be in possession of the property in her own right. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that from the date of filing written statement in the ejectment case, the suit is within 12 years. In view of the above circumstances, the suit instituted by the respondents was within time. No case for interference with the order of High Court is made out. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed and leave is refused. A.A./M-3041/S Leave refused