1997 PLP 434 (CLC)
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others‑‑‑Appellants Versus SARKAR and others‑‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1997 PLP 434 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Peshawar |
| Bench Members | Qazi Muhammad Farooq and Salim Dil Khan, JJ |
| Parties | GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others‑‑‑Appellants Versus SARKAR and others‑‑‑Respondents |
| Primary Law | Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1997 PLP 434 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1997 PLP 434 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Peshawar bench comprising: Qazi Muhammad Farooq and Salim Dil Khan, JJ.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1997 PLP 434 (CLC) (GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN and others‑‑‑Appellants Versus SARKAR and others‑‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Shahzad Akbar Khan for Appellants.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑‑S. 54‑‑‑Limitation Ac; (IX of 1908), S.5‑‑‑‑Acquisition of land‑‑ Enhancement of compensation by Referee Court‑‑‑Government's appeal against decision of Referee Court was barred by 334 days‑ ‑‑Condonation of delay‑‑ justification‑‑‑Sufficient cause ‑‑Government claimed indifference on part of its counsel in Trial Court‑‑‑Apart from such claim, Government itself appeared to have committed gross negligence to keep itself in touch with progress of case‑‑ Main ground for condonation of delay in both Courts could not be termed as "sufficient cause within scope of S.5, Limitation Act, 1908‑‑‑1n matter of limitation. Government would be at par with ordinary litigants-- Government also had not explained delay of each day‑‑‑Case for condonation of delay was, thus, not made out‑‑‑Appeal was dismissed as time‑barred in circumstances. Jhanda v. Maqbool Hussain and others 1981 SCMR 126 rel.
Judgment & Decree
QAZI MUHAMMAD FAROOQ, J.‑‑‑This painfully time‑barred Regular First Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11‑5‑1993 of the learned. Senior Civil Judge/Land Acquisition Judge, Swabi whereby in partial modification of the Collector's award the compensation of certain acquired land was enhanced from Rs.39,847. 20 to Rs.1,37,541. 60 per Kanal.
2. With a view to meet the shortcoming C.M. No.130/94 was filed alongwith the appeal for condonation of delay on the grounds of negligence of the learned counsel who represented the appellants in the trial Court and financial loss to the Government.
3. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned counsel representing the appellants at the lower forum had unilaterally left the case unattended and the appellants were throughout labouring under a bona fide belief that they were being represented before the Court and when the' got the knowledge of the decree they obtained a certified copy of the same and filed this appeal. .
4. The impugned judgment and decree were passed on 11‑5‑1993, the application for certified copies was moved on 18‑4‑1994, the copies were I supplied on 5‑5‑1994 and this appeal was filed on 27‑7‑1994. The appeal is thus barred by 334 days. It is not only a case of indifference on the part of the counsel for the appellants in the trial Court but also a case of gross negligence on the part of the appellants and their representatives to keep themselves in touch with the progress of the case. On both counts the main ground for condonation of delay cannot be termed as 'sufficient cause' within the scope of section 5 of the Limitation Act. Reference in this context may be made to Jhanda v. Maqbool Hussain etc. (1981 SCMR 126). It is needless to mention that in the matter of limitation the Government is at par with an ordinary litigant Besides, the appellant‑, have not explained every day of the delay. A case for condonation of delay is thus not made out. Resultantly, C.M. No.130/94 is dismissed and as a corollary the appeal is also dismissed in limine as time‑barred. A.A./2025/P Appeal dismissed.