1986 PLP 1650 (CLC)
Mst. RASHIDA KHATOON‑‑Applicant Versus MAHFOOZ K. ASIF and 3 others‑‑Respondents
| Citation | 1986 PLP 1650 (CLC) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | K.A.Ghani, J |
| Parties | Mst. RASHIDA KHATOON‑‑Applicant Versus MAHFOOZ K. ASIF and 3 others‑‑Respondents |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1986 PLP 1650 (CLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1986 PLP 1650 (CLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: K.A.Ghani, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1986 PLP 1650 (CLC) (Mst. RASHIDA KHATOON‑‑Applicant Versus MAHFOOZ K. ASIF and 3 others‑‑Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Maroof Ali Khan for Applicant. Respondents Nos. 1 and 4 (absent). Makhdoom Abdul Wali for Respondents Nos.2 and 3. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1 and 4. Date of hearing: 5th March, 1986.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss.7(v)(e) & 7 (xi)(cc)‑‑Suit for recovery of property from tenant‑ Court‑fees to be paid‑‑Court‑fees for recovery of property from tenant, after service of notice to quit, held, would be according to amount of rent of property to which suit reds, payable for the year next before filing of suit‑‑Provisions of S. 7(v)(e) of Act VII of 1870 would not be applicable because tenant could not become trespasser‑ Relationship of landlord and tenant between parties would not cease to exist even upon determination of tenancy by service of notice, or where lease was for a fixed period by afflux of time. Nandan Singh v. Debi Din A I R 1914 All. 282; Vithaldas v. Ghulam Ahmed and another A I R 1927 Nag. 156; Govinda Kumar Sur v. Mohini Mohan Sen and others A I R 1930 Cal. 42; Chhaba Ram v. Ne_thu Ram A I R 1941 Lah. 39; Ishardas v. Qazi Muhammad A I R 1945 Pesh. 16; Rupji Jeraj v. The Trustees of the port of Bombay AIR 1953 Bomb. 168 and Harishchandra Golcha v. Jiwai Rao Cotton Mills Ltd. A 1 R 1972 Madh. Pre. 150 ref. (b) Civil procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑ 115‑‑Court Fees Act (VII of 1870), S. 7(xi)(cc)‑‑Where trial Court omitted to take into consideration relevant provision of law relating to payment of court‑fee viz. S.7(xi)(cc) of Court Fees Act, High Court in revisional jurisdiction, held, would set aside order of Court based on erroneous application of law.
Judgment & Decree
I have heard Mr. Maroof Ali Khan, learned counsel for the plaintiff /applicant as well as Mr. Makhdoom Abdul Wali, Advocate for the respondents hos.2 and
3. After hearing the learned Advocates for the parties 1 find that the learned Civil Judge omitted to take into consideration the provision of section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees Act, the relevant portion of which is reproduced below:‑ "Section
7. The amount of fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinafter mentioned shall be computed as follows:‑ (xi) between landlord and tenant: in the following suits between landlord and tenant:‑ (a) ........................................................ (b) .............................................................. (c) ............................................................. (cc) for the recovery of immovable property from a tenant, including a tenant holding over after the determination of a tenancy. (d) (e) (f) ............................................................. according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers, payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint." A perusal of the relevant provisions of the law reproduced above, would show that on the suit for recovery of the property from the tenants after notice to quit has been served upon them, court‑fee is to be paid according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property to which the suit refers payable for the year next before the filing the suit and not under section 7(v)(e) of their Act for the reason that the tenant does not become a trespasser. In law the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties do not cease to exist even upon determination of the tenancy by service of notice or where the lease is for a fixed period by efflux of time. The view taken by me as above finds support from a large number of cases, some of which are reported as Nandan Singh v. Debi Din A I R 1914 All. 282; Vithaldas v. Ghulam Ahmed and another A I K 1527 Nag. 15ti; Govinda Kumar Sur v. Mohini Mohan Sen and others A I R 1930 Cal. 42; Chhaba Ram v. Nathu Ram A I R 1941 Lan. 39; Ishardas v. Qazi Muhammad A I R 1945 Pesh. 16; Rupji Jeraj v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay A I R 1953 Bom. 168 and Harishchandra Golcha v. Jiwai Rao Cotton Mills Ltd. A I R 1972 Madh. Pra.
150. Instead of discussing all the above cited cases I would content myself by examining the case reported as Chhaba Ram v. Nathu Ram (ibid). The facts of the said case were that a suit for ejectment of the tenant and recovery of arrears of rent was filed against the defendant whose tenancy had been determined by serving a notice to quit. Though the suit was decreed by the trial Court the learned District Judge in appeal dismissed the same holding that the plaint was not properly stamped and that court‑fee should have been paid advalorem on the property as the suit was really against the defendant as a trespasser. The case in the circumstances came up in appeal before the High Court wherein the question for consideration raised was as to whether the plaint had been properly stamped as falling under section 7(xi)(cc). The learned High Court reversed the Judgment given by the lower appellate Court citing with approval the case of Vithaldas v. Ghulam Ahmed on the principle that even though by notice of ejectment the tenancy is determined, a tenant does not cease to be a tenant 'holding over' for the purposes of section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees Act, as the cause of action accrues from the date on which the tenant refuses to quit in compliance with the notice.
3. The upshot of the above discussion is that the suit filed by the applicant was properly valued in accordance with section 7(xi)(cc) for the purposes of court‑fees and that the provisions of section 7(v)(c) are not attracted as the subject‑matter of it is not a house or garden.
4. This petition, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently the case is remanded to the civil Court of competent to whom it would be forwarded by the District Judge, Karachi (East) for disposal according to law. In the circumstances the parties are left to bear their own costs