1988 PLP 513 (PLC)

Malik Ghulam Rasool for Respondent. Date of hearing: 1st February, 1986. The decision dated 7‑10‑1985 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.4 Faisalabad has been challenged, whereby the appellant was directed to allow the respondent to continue in service till he attained the age of 60 years.

2. The respondent had brought grievance petition on 14‑5‑1985. On the said date the learned Presiding Officer was on leave, therefore, the petition was presented before him on 15‑5‑1985. The respondent was informed through notice that he would stand retired with effect from 16‑5‑1985. Since he challenged the notice of retirement before he could actually retire, no question arises that he was not covered by the definition of workman. No doubt in 1985 P L C 1053 it has been held that a person who is no more in service ceases to remain workman but since the respondent was in service at the time he brought the grievance petition, he was at that time covered by the definition. His retirement during the pendency of the petition was immaterial as rule of lis pendence applies.

3. So far as the age of superannuation is concerned, I have already expressed my opinion in several cases that it is 60 years and still I stick to it. The learned counsel for the appellants have tried to stress the point with some more force but I do not think that they have succeeded to show that the age of superannuation is 55 years and that the workers cannot take benefit of rule 33.1 of 1959 Rules as amended in 1977. This is true that first of all the age of superannuation was reduced to 55 years in rule 33.1 in June 1967 and, thereafter, in November 1967 regulation 19 was added to Workers Regulations 1965, wherein the age of retirement was mentioned as 55 years authorising the competent authority to grant extension upto the age of 60 years. Before the insertion of regulation 19 in 1965 Regulations, rules of 1959 were applicable, inasmuch as, no special provision required by Rule 3 governing the workers was present. This is noteworthy that in Standing Orders Ordinance, 1960 there was no provision of retirement at all. Now the question arises whether after the insertion of regulation 19 in 1965 Regulations, the rules of 1959 continued to apply or not. Rules of 1959 could apply in the absence of a special provision governing the service conditions of the workers as is apparent from rule 3 of the said rules, therefore, as soon as the special Regulations of 1965 came in, rules of 1959 ceased to remain applicable. However, so far as the question of retirement is concerned, since initially there was no provision in the regulations of 1965 about it, rule 33.1 continued to be applicable to the workers upto the date regulation 19 was added. Conditions of service cannot be changed to the detriment of the employees but in the present case no such question arises, inasmuch as at the time regulation 19 was inserted, rule 33.1 of 1959 rules provided that the age of retirement was 55 years giving power to the competent authority to grant extension in suitable cases thereafter. So by the insertion of regulation 19 no prejudice was caused to the workers. But the real difficulty arose for the appellants when amendment was made in rule 33.1 in 1977. The age of superannuation was fixed as 60 years by the said amendment for all the employees. The word 'all' appears to have been purposely used. Before that in no amendment of rule 33.1 this word was used. Even when initially the provision of retirement was made the word 'all' was 'not used. This is important to note that at the time the matter was placed before the Board in 49th meeting held in November 1976, a note was put up apprising the Board of the fact that for the workers regulation 19 of 1965 Regulations was present fixing the age of superannuation as 55 years. So when the Board held 49th meeting, it was aware of the fact that the age of superannuation for the workers was 55 years and this appears to be the reason that the word 'all' was used while amending rule 33.1. The intention of the Legislature is clear that rule 33.1 was intended to be applicable to all the Board employees irrespective of the fact whether they were workers or non‑workers. There could have been some scope to say that the intention of the Legislature was different if no note had been put up in the 49th meeting.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants has tried to argue that the word 'employee' is defined in the rules of 1959 and in the regulations of 1965 a list of workers is given, therefore, the intention was not that rule 33.1 would apply to the workers also. The words in which the definition of employee is couched clearly include every kind of employee and even the workers. This cannot be said that the workers are not working under the Board and are not getting salary from the funds of the Board. The intention of the Board by amending rule 33.1 in 49th meeting thus was that there should be a uniformity in the age of superannuation for all the employees irrespective of the fact whether they were workers or non‑workers. The following words appearing in the note are very significant:‑ "It may further be stated that at present the age of retirement of workers is 55 years which is extendable to 60 years by the competent authority subject to medical fitness. This is purely discretionary to allow extension all at once or by instalments. It is for consideration whether the Government policy will be applicable to the workers as well." The last line is very significant, which reads as under:‑ "It is for consideration whether the Government policy will be applicable to the workers as well." The Board after considering this portion of the note decided that the benefit should‑ be given to the workers as well and for this reason, as mentioned above, the word 'all' was used while amending rule 33.1 in the 49th meeting. No word of the Legislature is to be taken as superfluous and meaningless. This is noteworthy that the original minutes of 87th meeting held on 4‑6‑1980 were not produced. It, therefore, cannot be said that whatever is written in the order dated 30‑6‑80 was actually passed by the Board. Even if for the sake of arguments it be said that the order referred to above is the faithful reproduction of what was decided in 87th meeting, it cannot be taken to be an amendment of rule 33.1, but may be called an interpretation of the said rule. An explanation can be added to a rule at the time it is framed, but it is the jurisdiction of the law Courts only to interpret the law. If in reality the intention of the Board while holding 87th meeting was that rule 33.1 of 1959 rules would not apply to the workers and that they should be governed by regulation 19 of 1965 Regulations, necessary amendments should have been made in rule 33.1 of 1959 rules either deleting the word 'all' or expressly stating that the said rule would not apply to the workers. So in spite of what was said in 87th meeting held on 4‑6‑80, rule 33.1 C continued to be applicable to the workers and the learned lower Court rightly held that the age of retirement for the respondents was 60 years.

5. As a result of the observations made above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. A.E./73/Lb.P Appeal dismissed.