P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

Date of hearing : 13th June; 1960. Two petitions were presented to this Court under section 561‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing criminal proceedings pending against the petitioners. One (Criminal Miscellaneous No. 620 of 1960) was presented by Muhammad Rafi Parvez and the other (Criminal Miscellaneous No. 763 of 1960) by Abdul Ghafoor. Both the petitioners were Booking Clerks at Gujrat Railway Station in the year 1953.

2. Early in 1954 the accounts of the Gujrat Railway Station were checked by Inspector of Station Accounts and during the check it was found that a large number of return journey vouchers were fraudulently used, and the amount realized on the tickets issued thereunder was misappropriated by the petitioners.

3. On the basis of the Inspector of Station Accounts report, dated the 6th of March 1954, information was laid with the Railway Police Station Lalamusa, and on the 8th of March 1954 cases were registered under section 420 of the Pakistan Penal Code against Muhammad Rafi Parvez and Abdul Ghafoor. A large number of tickets were‑found to have been issued on the strength of those fraudulent return journey vouchers but only nine cases were selected for the prosecution of the two accused. Sanction of the Central Government for lodging prosecution was issued, in respect of these nine cases, on different dates between the 25th of October 1958 and 3rd of March 1959. Cases were instituted in the Court of Pir Salahuddin, Special Judge, on different dates starting from the 21st of December 1959. Notices were issued for the appearance of the accused on the 14th January 1960, but by the order of the High Court those cases were transferred to the Court of the Special Judge, Jhelum, who summoned the accused for the 1st of April 1960.

4. On the appearance of the accused before the Special Judge on 1st of April 1960, charges were read out to them and as they denied the commission of the offence, a date was fixed for recording evidence. Evidence had not yet been adduced when the two petitioners came to this Court, under section 561‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and asked for the quashing of the proceedings, one on the 26th of April 1960 and the other on the 18th of May 1960.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that since the first information report in respect of these cases was lodged with the police on the 8th of March 1954 and criminal proceedings were instituted in Court in December 1959, in response to which the accused appeared before the Special Judge on the 1st of April 1960, the institution of criminal proceedings after a delay of about six years was an abuse of the process of the Court and proceedings are liable to be quashed under section 561‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Support was sought for this contention from two authorities of this Court reported as Fazal Karim v. The State (P L D 1957 Lah. 837) and Muhammad Hussain v. The State (P L D 1959 Lah. 322). These authorities contain references to certain other authorities on the subject, and support was sought from them as well.

6. In all the cases cited in support of this application the accused persons remained before the Court under the proceedings instituted against them for long periods extending from three to five years, and there had been unnecessary adjournments by the Courts on frivolous grounds. No case has been cited in which a delay of along period between the commission of the offence and the institution of the proceedings has been denounced as abuse of the process of Court.

7. In the cases in hand the offences were registered with the Police on the 8th of March 1954, criminal proceedings were instituted in Court on the 21st of December 1959, and proceedings were handed over to another Court where the accused were summond for 1st of April 1960. There has not been a single unnecessary adjournment by the Court, and the proceedings were not protracted in the Court on account of unnecessary and frivolous adjournments. There has been, no doubt, a delay of about five years and nine months between the registration of the case with the police, and the institution of the criminal proceedings in the Court. The reason for this delay ‑is that sanction for prosecution could not be obtained before 3rd of March 1959. It took the Central Government about 4 or 5 years to issue the sanction.

8. The question which arises in this cage is, whether the delay of four or five years in obtaining sanction for the prosecution, or a delay of five years between the registration of the case and the institution of the criminal proceedings in Court, also tanta?mounts to an abuse of the process of the Court within the meaning of section 561‑A of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

9. Prolongation of proceedings inside the Court over a period of four or five years would no doubt constitute such an abuse, if prolongation of proceedings is occasioned by unnecessary adjournments granted by the Court, on account of which the, accused remains under harassment for long periods, such unneces?sary adjournments do constitute abuse of process of Court. But a delay in instituting proceedings for want of legal sanction, or for want of completion of investigation appears to stand on a different footing. If delays of this type are allowed to bar prose?cution, law of limitation will stand projected in criminal proceedings High Courts by their own authority would be placing time, limits of undefined periods upon the prosecution of criminal offences.

10. It is obvious that Law of Limitation is not known to criminal jurisprudence and it is necessary that criminal proceed?ings should be outside that law, otherwise the accused will be able in many cases to earn exemption from prosecution by placing secretly obstacles in the way of investigation and thereby preventing it from completion within reasonable time. It is true that accused should be brought to book as early as possible and the sword of prosecution should not be allowed to remain hanging over his head for unduly long periods. But if for any good reason a delay of a long period has intervened between the commission of the offence and the institution of the proceedings, that delay should) not always be allowed to operate as a bar against prosecution. If it is allowed to so operate, it would amount to subjecting criminal prosecutions to Law of Limitation for which there is no warrant in law.

11. These two cases are not within the rule of law laid down in the authorities quoted. In those cases the accused were in attendance upon criminal Courts for long periods and were the victims of unnecessary adjournments granted by the Court. In the cases in hand the accused were not before criminal Courts for more than two months when they came to this Court for quashing the proceedings. There has been not a single unnecessary adjournment. If these proceedings are now quashed only because, there has been a long delay of four or five years between the commission of the offence and the institution of the proceedings, criminal prosecutions would be brought under the Law of Limitation, which this Court has no authority to do. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the proceedings in these two cases are not liable to be quashed and these two petitions are dismissed. K. B. A.?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Petitions dismissed.