P L D 1983 Lahore 252 (PLP)

This S. A. O. has been filed by the tenant whose defence had been struck off by the Rent Controller for non-compliance with the order under section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 19959. His appeal before the Additional District Judge also failed.

2. The learned counsel appearing in support of this second appeal has submitted that the Rent Controller had ordered the appellant that the rent for the month of July, 1976 should be deposited before the 15th of August, 1976. This, according to the learned counsel, the appellant was admittedly unable to do under the belief that the civil Courts were closed for the month of August. Consequently, the rent was deposited on 10-9-1976. I asked the , learned counsel to explain this delay from 1-9-1976 to 10-9-1976 assuming that the Courts were closed for the month of August and his client was under a bona fide impression that he would not be able to deposit the rent. His reply is that the best answer is provided by In re: Visumal Chatumal Khilnani v. Ali Bakhsh and others (P L D 1968 Kar. 521). This is the main stay of the learned counsel's argument in support of this appeal and it was on the consideration of this authority that this appeal was admitted to a regular hearing.

3. I have carefully gone through the precedent judgment and find that it only would help a person who was under a bona fide belief that during the vacation the rent deposit could not be made. It however would entitle the person to the concession that on the re-opening of the Court he could expeditiously deposit the same. In the present case however, no justification has been shown or explanation given for the period as between 1-9-1976 the date on which Courts reopened and 10-9-1976 the date when the deposit was made. The appellant on no conceivable principle can claim benefit for the period when the Courts were open and deposit of rent could be made unless there were circumstances beyond his control which prevented him B from doing so. The appellant was not relieved of the obligation to deposit the rent or to comply with a mandatory order of the Court. The matter is more akin to a case where limitation expires during vacation and a litigant can institute the suit or appeal on the opening day. As soon as the facility for depositing the rent became available on the expiry of the vacation, he was obliged to do so at once.

4. This aspect of the matter has also been touched in the precedent judgment because the objection as to why the rent was not deposited on 1-7-1964 in that case was condoned on the ground that there was a medical certificate on the record that the child of respondent No. 1 was very ill then and secondly he being out of Karachi his wife could not attend to the District Courts for this purpose.

5. The precedent cited in fact goes against the appellant because it has relied on two earlier decisions from Karachi jurisdiction reported as P L D 1965 Kar. 367 and P L D 1966 Kar. 523 wherein a view had been taken that the question whether the default was negligent or otherwise is a question of fact and stands concluded by the order of the first appellate authority. In this view .of the matter, the finding of the first appellate authority would become immune from scrutiny by me in second appeal. Therefore, in any view of the matter, this is not a fit case in which the High Court in exercise of its powers in second appeal is required to interfere with the concurrent orders of two Courts below holding the appellant guilty of default in compliance with the orders of the Rent Controller in terms of section 13(6) of the Ordinance. The appeal thus fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. M. Y. M. ???????? Appeal dismissed.