1977 SCMR 521 (PLP)

Fazle Ghani Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court Noor Ahmed Noori, Advocate‑ on‑Record for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing; 10th October 1977. WAHEEDUDDIN AHMAD, J.--‑This petition is directed against the order of a Division Bench of the High Court of Sind in Constitutional Petition "to. D/111 of 1977. By Order dated 27‑9‑1977 the petitioner was allowed arid respondent No. 2 was directed to publish the directions of the National Industrial Relations Commission in the official Gazette as provided for in sub‑rule (3) of rule 2 of the Pakistan Essential Service (Maintenance) Rules, 1962. The petitioner is the employer of respondent No. 1 who was dismissed from service on 24‑10-1972. Respondent No. 1 challenged this order before the Junior Labour Court under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The petitioner raised objection about the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain such an application and contended that the pro visions of Pakistan Essential Services (Maintenance) Act, 1962 were applicable to all classes of employment under Gazette Notification dated 28‑9‑1972. The objection was upheld and respondent No. 1 was directed to approach the specified authority under the said Act to obtain his remedy. This order was maintained in appeal but it was challenged in the Sind High Court in Constitutional Petition No. 671 of 1973. The petitioner in this case also pleaded that the remedy of respondent No. 1 was to invoke the jurisdiction of the specified authority referred to in the above Act, and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction. This contention found favour with the High Court and the respondent's petition was dismissed. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 moved the specified authority, namely, the Chairman, National Industrial Relations Commission, constituted under Ordinance XXIII of 1969. The employer defended the case on merits and raised no objection as to the jurisdiction of the said Authority. The proceedings have come to an end, and the Chairman, NIRC has given his decision, and as required by law, had directed the Central Government to publish the directions given by him in the official Gazette. It appears that the directions of the Chairman, NIRC were sent to the ministry of Labour, and the said Ministry had forwarded these directions to the Interior Division for publication in the official Gazette. The petitioner challenged this action in a constitutional application before the Sind High.Court. and contended that as the Chairman, NIRC had no jurisdiction in the matter, his directions should not be allowed to be published in the official Gazette. This application was dismissed by order dated 22‑9‑1977. The petitioner now seeks permission to file an appeal against the said order. In support of the petition, Mr. Fazle Ghani, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Chairman, NIRC had no jurisdiction to entertain respondent's application regarding termination of his services and he was not competent to issue any directions in that behalf. He has referred to a decision of the Lahore High Court in P L D 1972 Lab.

798. In our opinion, on the facts of the present case, the view taken in this case is not applicable. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that his client raised objection about the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, and insisted that the matter should in for trial before the specified authority mentioned in the Essential (Services) Maintenance Act, 1952. This position was also taken before the High Court. In such circumstances, the petitioner was estopped to raise this point in the constitutional petition filed by him in the High Court. Besides, the petitioner also submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the specified Authority, and waived the objection relating its jurisdiction. The mere fact that the Lahore High Court has now taken a different view, is no ground to allow him to take a different stand. Apart from this, we see no harm in the publication of the direction of the Chairman, NIRC. In this view of the matter, we do not consider this as a fit case for interference. The petition is dismissed.