1983PLC 152 (PLP)

(c) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)

‑‑‑ Ss. 25‑A & 38 ‑Re‑instatement with full back benefits ‑Peti tioner found to have contributed substantially in delay of proceed ings before Labour Court‑Order of Labour Court awarding full back benefits, in circumstances, modified by Appellate Tribunal allowing 50% of back benefits. Aftab Yousuf, M. D. for Appellants. Respondent in person. Date of hearing : 28th July, 1982. DECISION This appeal is directed against the decision of the learned Second Labour Court, given on 24th March, 1982, on the grievance petition filed by the respondent workman, directing his re‑instatement in service with full back benefits. The grievance of the respondent, as disclosed in his grievance petition, is that he was a permanent employee of the appellants as a weaver and that his services were illegally terminated on 11th February, 1981. On the other hand, the case of the appellants is that the services of the ,respondent were terminated. During the period of his probation, vide letter, dated 7th February, 1981, and as the respondent refused to take delivery of this letter, the said totter of discharge of service was sent to his home address by registered post, acknowledgement due. The learned Labour Court has allowed the grievance petition of the respondent workman on two grounds, firstly, that the so‑called letter of discharge has not been issued by a competent authority, and secondly, that the said letter does not disclose the reasons for discharge and is, thus, in violation of the provisions of clause (3) of Standing Order 12.

2. As the learned counsel for both the parties have remained absent in spite of the fact that today's date was fixed on their request. I have heard the parties, who are present in person.

3. The first issue which falls to be considered in this case is whe ther the respondent had become a permanent workman when he was discharged from service. On this issue the learned Labour Court has given no finding. The claim of the respondent that he had become a permanent workman is based on the ground that he was discharged from service on 11th February, 1981. It is not disputed that the respon dent was employed in the appellant establishment, vide letter of appointment, dated 10th November, 1980. It has, therefore, been the effort of the respondent to establish that his services were terminated after the expiry of three months from 10th November, 1980, when he was first employed in the .appellant establishment. As already stated, it is the case of the respondent that his services were terminated on 11th February, 1981. He has led no evidence, beyond his own statement, to substantiate his contention that he was discharged from service on 11th February. 1981. No doubt the respondent has been supported, to some extent, in this behalf by Gulab Khan, the General Secretary of the Workers' Union in the appellant establishment, who has stated that the respondent has completed three months service with the appellant establishment, but I am not inclined to place any great reliance on his evidence, firstly, because he was unable to state on what date the respondent was employed in the appellant establishment, secondly, he was unable to refute the suggestion that the services of the respondent were terminated on 7th February, 1981, and thirdly, this Gulab Khan has a grievance against the appellants because he had been removed from service by the appellant. Assuming, however, that the respondent had put in one day's service beyond three months that does not make him a permanent workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders unless he had satisfactorily completed probation of three months service. No evidence was led to establish that the respondent has satisfactorily completed his period of probation.

4. Now as regards the two grounds on which the learned Labour Court has found in favour of the respondent, the admitted position is that the letter of discharge of the respondent was neither signed by the proprietor nor by .the Manager of the factory. This letter is admittedly signed by the Wages Clerk of the appellant. No evidence is forth coming to show that the said Clerk was authorised to discharge or terminate the service of any workman. No doubt Aftab Yousuf, the Managing Director of the appellants, has stated that a week prior to the issuance of the discharge letter, dated 7th February, 1981, he had decided to terminate the services of the respondent but no evidence in support of his assertion was led. I am, therefore, unable to accept his statement in this behalf.

5. The letter of discharge of the respondent suffers from another serious defect in that it does not state the ground for the discharge of the respondent. Clause (3) of Standing Order 12 provides that not only the letter of discharge, even in the case of a probationer or a temporary workman, must be in writing but it must specifically state the reason for the discharge.

6. I am, therefore, in agreement with .the view of the learned Labour Court that the discharge of the respondent was invalid and must, therefore, be set aside. There remains the question whether the appel lant is entitled to back benefits. An examination of the record of the learned Labour Court shows that on a number of hearings the case bad to be adjourned due to the absence of the respondent and his learned counsel. On two other occasions although the respondent was present but his counsel was absent. In these circumstances I am of the view that the respondent has substantially contributed to the delay in the proceedings before the learned Labour Court. In the circumstances, while concurring with the view of the learned Labour Court that the respondent be re‑instated in service I would modify the direction with regard to the payment of full back benefits to the respondent arid direct that he be paid fifty per cent back benefits.