1993 PLP 687 (MLD)

Miss Lubna Ghulam Murtaza for Respondents. Date of hearing: 15th December, 1992. 1 This is a tenant's first, appeal under section 24 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963; from the order of the Rent Controller, Sialkot, whereby he directed the eviction of the appellant from house No.1009, Ward No.6, Sadar Bazar, Sialkot Cantonment.

2. The appeal arises-out of an application filed by Mahboob Akhtar, respondent No.1, against the appellant under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, alleging that Mangoo Masih deceased-husband of Allah Rakhi appellant and father of Mahboob Masih, respondent No.2 was his tenant in respect of the house in question and after his death, the appellant and respondent No.2 have remained in possession of the house as a tenant under him, at a rate of Rs.150. The ejectment was sought on the ground of default in payment of rent and subletting of the premises to respondent No.3. It is also asserted that the house was required by respondent No.1 for his own use.

3. This application was originally contested by the appellant as also the respondents, by filing a joint written statement through their counsel Mr. Muhammad Zubair Qureshi, Advocate. The proceedings before the Rent Controller continued for about 4 years, when on 14th May, 1992, it was stated by respondent No.2, who is the son of the appellant that if respondent No.1 forgoes his claim for arrears of rent, he shall vacate the premises and hand over its possession to the respondent on 17th May, 1992. The statement was also signed by Mr. Muhammad Zubair Qureshi, Advocate. The offer was accepted by respondent No.1. Consequently, the Rent Controller, on the same day i.e. 14th May, 1992, proceeded to pass an order of ejectment in favour of respondent No.1 and against the appellant and respondents Nos.2 and

3. Mst. Allah Rakhi appellant herein has come to this Court by filing this appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that neither the appellant nor any of her authorized agents have ever consented to vacate the premises -and the agreement arrived at between respondent No.1 and respondent No.2 was not binding on her. Learned counsel for the respondents has, on the other hand, argued that the interest of the appellant is common with respondent No.2 who is her son. She, however, is bound by his statement which was also signed by the learned counsel for the appellant and respondents Nos.2 and 3.

5. Although it is correct that the appellant was not present nor did she personally make any statement when compromise was recorded but the fact remains that respondent No.2, who is not only son of the appellant, but is also living with her in the same house had in consideration of the rent being forgone by respondent, agreed to vacate the house. This statement was also signed by the learned counsel who had been engaged jointly by the appellant and respondents Nos.2 and

3. Mr. Taqi Ahmad Khan, Advocate, has pointed out that Mr. Muhammad Zubair Qureshi, Advocate, did not make any statement of his own, but had merely signed the statement made by respondent No.2 for the purpose of identifying him. Even if it be so, the fact remains that Mr. Muhammad Zubair Qureshi, Advocate, did not raise any objection that he had no authority on behalf of the appellant to enter into the compromise or that the arrangement arrived at was not acceptable to her. The statement made by respondent No.2, who is living in the same house and is son of the appellant is equally binding on the appellant when her interest is common with that of respondent No.2. There is no allegation that the said respondent had acted fraudulently or collusively. It is also to be seen that the agreement was arrived, at after 4 years of litigation and the respondent No.2, as consideration for the said agreement, had forgone his claim for arrears.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the authority of the Supreme Court in Karam v. Murid Hussain and 7 others 1981 SCMR 942 which supports her contention and applies with full force. In that case also, the compromise was challenged on the ground that the petitioner before the Supreme Court had not consented to the agreement, which was not binding on him. While repelling this contention, it was observed that the son of the petitioner had made the statement accepting the compromise, which were supported by the counsel representing them. This appeal appears to have been filed afterthought with a view to frustrate a lawful agreement between the parties. As already noticed, it is not a case of the appellant that her son was acting in collusion with respondent No.1 or that any fraud has been played on her. In this view of the matter, this appeal is without any force. It is I accordingly dismissed, with no orders as to costs. The appellant shall vacate the premises within one month from today. H.B.T./A-313/L Appeal dismissed.