P L D 1957 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs in a suit filed against the Federation of Pakistan for damages for non -delivery of goods consigned to the North‑Western Railway. The plaintiffs are a firm, named Messrs. Abdul Rahim Ghulam Qadir. On the 8th of October 1948, one Abdur Rahim, (not the same Abdur Rahim whose name appears as part of the firm's name) who has appeared as plaintiffs' witness in this case and who alleges that he was a partner at that time in the plaintiff firm, consigned at the Karachi Railway Station four bundles of foreign cloth to be carried to Sangla Hill, by parcel train, the consignee being himself. The goods should have arrived at Sangla Hill in about two days. After waiting for their arrival till the 16th of October 1948, the consignee telegraphed to the General Manager, North Western Railway, that the goods had not been received and that he was entitled to the loss incurred by him in respect of them. There was further correspondence between the parties. The goods never arrived and ultimately, after serving the Railway Administration with a notice under section 80, Civil P. C., Messrs Abdul Rahim‑Ghulam Qadir filed the present suit on the 9th of November 1949, for the recovery of Rs. 13,234‑4‑3, out of which Rs. 12,034‑4‑3, represented the price of the cloth and the balance of Rs. 1,200 represented the profit which the plaintiff would have earned by the sale of the cloth. Various defences to the suit were raised by the Federa tion of Pakistan, but it will be necessary only to refer to three which have been argued before us. The trial Court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to Rs. 12,034‑4‑3 on account of the cloth which had been lost. It held, however, that there was no proper notice under section 80, Civil P. C. and that the plaintiffs had no locus standi to sue, not being either the consignor or the consignee. On these two grounds it dismissed the suit. Learned counsel for the appellants addressed us on these two grounds while learned counsel for the respondent has raised an additional ground, namely, the absence of a notice under section 77 of the Railways Act. These are the only three points with which we are concerned in this appeal. The question of notice under section 80, Civil P. C., may be shortly disposed of. A notice had, according to the plaintiffs been served on the 28th of May 1949, on behalf of the defendant‑respondents it is urged in the first place that the notice had not been received at all. The second objection is that according to the notice the suit was to be brought against the Governor‑General of Pakistan and not the Federa tion of Pakistan. It is a matter of some surprise that an objection on a ground of non‑receipt of notice should be urged. Learned counsel who appeared for the defendant in the trial Court had admitted receipt of the notice. No affidavit had been filed either by the learned counsel or by some other person on behalf of the defendant to show that this admission had been made under any misapprehension. Under the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider this question any further. The objection that the notices were invalid because the person who was to be sued was mentioned as the Governor General of Pakistan, is altogether without force. By this time, it should be regarded as settled law for this Court that provisions relating to notice are only to be substantially complied with, vide Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Iqbal (P L D 1953 Lah. 460), The Federation of Pakistan v. The Muslim Vehari and Wehniwal Bus Service (P L D 1955 Lah. 256) and Firm Muhammad Sadiq‑Imam Din v. The Federation of Pakistan (PLD1956(W.P.)Lah.1093). The Supreme Court case The Federation of Pakistan v. Mrs. A. V. Issacs (P L D 1956 S. C. (Pak.) 431), also supports this interpretation. If a notice under section 80, Civil P. C., reaches the proper person, if it creates no real mistake as to the person who is to be sued, and if it apprises the person served of the substance of the claim which is to be put forward in Court, there is sufficient compliance with section

80. There is no doubt that by an amendment of the Civil P. C., on the 29th of April 1949, the words "Federation of Pakistan" had been substituted in section 80, Civil P. C., for the words "Governor‑General" and this notice was served about a month later, but it can hardly be urged that any person was misled by the use of the words "Governor‑General‑in‑Council". It should be obvious from the notice that the person who was serving this notice intended to sue the Central Government of Pakistan. It should be remembered that "Governor‑General- in‑Council" was only the authority who was to be "named" if a suit was to be brought against the Central Government. Section 79, Civil P. C., expressly says so. The phrase "Federa tion of Pakistan" is also a name to be used when suing the Central Pakistan Government. The real defendant is the Central Government whatever the name by which it is sued. The objection is purely technical and entirely devoid of merit. We hold that the notice was valid. The objection as to the failure to notify a claim under section 77 of the Railways Act, has no greater force. On the 16th of October 1948, Abdur Rahim sent a telegram to the General Manager (Claims) stating that four bundles which had been despatched from Karachi to Sangla Hill, per R. R. 59390, had been lost and that he was entitled to Rs.12,034‑4‑3 for the loss incurred. This is a sufficient compliance with section

77. As regards the right of suit; it is clear on a perusal of the record that the goods belonged to the plaintiff‑firm. In fact, this has not been contested before us. The person who actually purchased the goods was Abdur Rahim P. W., but most of the beechaks are in the name of the firm and even where the name of Abdur Rahim appears, the number of licence under which the goods were purchased is the same. That licence obviously belonged to the plaintiff firm. Abdur Rahim has entered the witness‑box and has stated that he purchased these goods on behalf of the firm of which he was at that date a partner, though he has now settled his accounts with the firm and has gone out of it. There is no rebuttal of this evidence. The locus standi of the plaintiffs `can be urged on two grounds : (1) that Abdur Rahim was the agent of the plaintiffs anal as principals they have right to sue in respect of a contract into which the agent entered ; (2) that they are owners of the goods. It is not necessary for us to consider whether in their capacity as owners they would be entitled to sue, for we have no doubt that in their capacity as principals the plaintiffs have such a right. That Abdur Rahim was their agent is established by the very fact that the plaintiffs are owners, and also by the evidence of Abdur Rahim. Under section 231 of the Contract F Act, an undisclosed principal is entitled to enforce the perfor mance of a contract entered into by his agent. The second paragraph of this section, which is a kind of proviso, has no application in the present case, and in fact has not been relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent. The section is clear, but there is also authority in support of the proposition vide East Indian Railway v. Firm Baldeo Gutain (92 I C 1007), which is on all fours with the present case. It was held in that case that if the goods were actually consigned by the servant or, agent of a party, that party can sue for damages for loss of the goods. The only argument put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent in this connection is that according to section 72 of the Railways Act, the railways are liable only to the bailor. We are of the opinion that section 72 has no relevance in determining the question of locus standi. Accord ing to section 72, the liability of the railways is that of a bailee. The section only defines the nature of the liability. F It does not say who is the person who is to enforce the liability. The section was not intended in any way to override the provisions, of section 231 of the Contract Act which enables the principals to sue though the contract has been entered into by the agent. As a result this appeal is allowed and the plaintiff‑firm is granted a decree for Rs. 12,034‑4‑3 with costs in both the Courts. A. H. Appeal allowed.