1989 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

2. The case of the appellant as submitted by his learned counsel is that tile instructions dated February 17, 1968 envisage grant of one increment to the candidate securing first position. Since the appellant had secured such a position amongst the Accounts Assistants, he was entitled to an advance increment. According to him. It made no difference if Zubair Chaudhry who stood first in the class or group of Accountants was also awarded an advance increment. It was contended that more than one participant could claim such an increment because the Accounts Assistants and Accountants constituted two separate classes and they took two separate examinations. Reliance was also placed on an earlier occasion when Abdur Rauf Baig and Muhammad Shafiq Chishti had both been allowed an advance increment each on the result of the final examination of the same course.

3. Refuting the contentions raised, the learned counsel for WAPDA submitted that the interpretation being placed on the Office Order of 1903 were wholly fallacious inasmuch as it permits the grant of advance increment to only one trainee from amongst all the participants of a course no matter in how many classes or groups the participants are divided. It was contended that it is the overall first position that is material for the purposes of the grant of advance increment and not the class‑wise first position. The learned counsel explained that no doubt the appellant had secured the highest marks in the class of Accounts Assistants, but his overall position amongst the trainees was second and so, he was rightly refused the award of advance increment. He also refuted the contention that the two groups of trainees took separate examinations. According to the learned counsel for WAPDA, only one examination common for all, was held in accordance with the past practice. Referring to the precedent in the cases of Baig and Chishti relied upon by the appellant's counsel, it was explained that both the candidates had secured equal number of marks and so, the Authority decided to grant advance increment to each of them. It was this tie and nothing else which resulted in the award of advance increments to more than one trainee. It was urged that the facts and circumstances of the precedent quoted were so different that it could not be justifiably claimed that in the instant case also, the appellant be declared eligible for the grant of an increment in addition to the trainee who secured the highest marks in the course and was awarded an advance increment.

4. We have heard both the sides and have also perused the record. In our view the whole issue revolves round the instructions contained in the Office Order dated February 17, 1968. 1t would be appropriate to reproduce it below. It reads: "OFFICE ORDER The Authority has decided that one advance increment may be allowed to the trainee who obtains the 1st position, and Merit Certificates may be issued to trainees who secure the 2nd, 3rd and 4th positions in the final examination of the WAPDA, Accounts Training Institute, Lahore. These orders will take effect from July 1, 1967." From a plain reading of the above Office Order it is clear to us that it provides for the award of advance increment to one trainee who secures the first position in the final examination of the Institute. It is not denied that the appellant and all others were co‑participants in the same course which was held from 11‑11‑1974 to 1‑3‑1975. It is also not the appellant's case that courses of study were different. No evidence has been produced to establish that two separate examinations were held. So, the conclusion we have reached is that the Accounts Assistants and Accountants attended a common training course and took one final examination. Amongst the Accounts Assistants the appellant stood first securing 607 marks while Zubair Chaudhry with 646 marks was first amongst the Accountants. Thus, overall first position was obtained by Zubair Choudhry and so he alone was entitled to the advance increment. The appellant being not the rightful claimant cannot be said to have been unfairly treated. His grievance is misconceived.

5. The respondent‑department has also raised the preliminary objection that the order refusing the grant of advance increment having been passed on 8‑10‑1978, the appeal filed on 23‑7‑1985 was hopelessly barred, by time. We do not find that this objection is valid. The fact of the matter is that the appellant's claim for advance increment submitted to the Chief Accountant WAPDA was rejected on 8‑10‑1978. Against this order, the appellant addressed an appeal/representation to the General Manager Finance. The evidence on record shows that the matter remained pending for long and the appeal was finally rejected vide General Manager Finance letter of 2‑6‑1985. This decision having been communicated to the appellant on 29‑6‑1985, the appeal filed on 23‑7‑1985 is held to be within time. The objection is overruled.

6. As discussed above, there being no merit in the appellant's appeal it is hereby dismissed.

7. No order as to costs. M.Y.H./420/Sr. F Appeal dismissed