P L D 1952 Dacca 79 (PLP)

IBRAHIM, J.

‑These two rules arise out of two pre- emption cases under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The petitioner, Chand Banoo, who is a minor and is represented in these proceedings by her brother Suraj Ali who is a co -sharer with her in respect of 8 annas of a holding to which C.S. plot No. 943, which is the subject matter of the proceed ings, appertains. The other 8 annas share of the holding belongs to Ismail, Abu Baker and Julekha, the heirs of Nophu, paternal uncle of the petitioner. It appears that Nophu's heirs were in possession of the aforesaid‑C.S. plot No.

943. On the 22nd February 1942, Ismail, Abu Baker and Julekha sold half of the land to Abdul Sobhan and Dadu Mia, opposite parties in Civil Revision No. 23 of 1948 and the remaining half to Amir Hossain the opposite party in Civil Revision No. 25 of 1948 by registered deeds of sale The peti tioner filed the case which is the subject matter of Civil Revision No. 25 of 1948 on the 1st April, 1946, and the other case out of which the Civil Revision No. 23 of 1948 arises, on the 27th April 1946, for pre‑emption under section 26F of the Bengal Tenancy Act. Her case was that notices under section 26C were not served in either of these cases, that her brother Suraj Ali her next friend in these pro ceedings first came to know of the sales on the 12th January, 1946, and that consequently both the petitions were within time though filed more than 4 years after the sales. Both the Courts below rejected this plea. The appellate Court on a close examination of the evidence came to the finding that Suraj Ali was present at every majlis in which the sale‑deeds were executed and that consequently he had knowledge from the very beginning. The Court of first instance, however, took the view that the question of brother's knowledge was immaterial and that the petitions were within time as the opposite parties failed to show that the petitioner herself had knowledge beyond the period of limitation. He, therefore, allowed the miscellaneous cases in respect of both the sales. On appeal the decision of the Munsif was reversed by the learned Additional District judge overruling the contention that section 6 of the Limitation Act applied and that the petitioner being a minor the limitation did not run against her and that the applications must consequently be regarded as within time. Mr. M. Fazlul Huq first took the same plea. But on close perusal of section 6 and section 8 of the Limita tion Act, he frankly conceded that section 6 was of no help to the petitioner. Section 6 applies to suits and applications for execution of decrees. Section 8 definitely says that "Nothing in section 6 or in section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre‑emption." From section 29 it would be obvious that section 6 has no application to a question of limitation where limitation is prescribed by a special or local law. Mr. Huq, however, contends that as notice was not served there was fraud and the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of section 18 of the Limitation Act. But it would appear that there was no fraud in this case. The finding of the appellate Court definitely is that Suraj Ali, the brother, was present in the very sitting in which the two deeds of sale were executed on the 22nd February, 1942. This is inconsistent with the idea that fraud was committed. There was no clear pleading about fraud and none has been found by the appellate Court and as I have just stated the idea of there having been any fraud is inconsistent with the facts proved. The sales seem to have been made with the full knowledge of Suraj Ali and there could not be any reason why the notice so far as petitioner Chand Banoo was concerned should be suppressed. It does not appeal to me in these circumstances that the learned appellate Court committed any mistake or error or material irregularity. I see no reason to interfere. The Rules are accordingly discharged. Parties will bear their own costs. A. H. Rule discharged.