1989 PLP 729 (CLC)

2. The appellant is the landlady of a plot bearing No.H.3/1. S.No.4, Siddique Wahab Road, Karachi, the front portion of which is in occupation of the respondent as tenant at a monthly rent of Rs.3,

000. The appellant is carrying on business of selling timber and timber related goods in the remaining portion of this plot, where she is also running a saw mill. The appellant requires the premises in occupation for expansion of her business. The agreement of tenancy executed between the parties came to an end on 31‑12‑1985. The appellant, therefore, served the respondent with notices to vacate the demised premises. The refusal of the respondent to do so led the parties into this litigation.

3. The respondent resisted the proceedings on the plea that the appellant wanted an increase of rent from Rs.3,000 p.m. to Rs.15,000 p. m.

4. The appellant has examined A1 Nasir (P.W.1) who is her son and attorney, while the respondent examined Karamuddin Hashwani, Managar of the branch as (D.W.1).

5. On the assessment of evidence available on record, the learned Ist Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller (South), Karachi, decided the issue of personal requirement against the appellant and consequently dismissed the application for ejectment vide order dated 29‑11‑1987. This order is the subject‑matter of the present appeal filed under section 21 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.

6. I have heard Mr. Mushtaque A. Memon, learned counsel for appellant and Mr. Muhammad Ahsan Shaikh, learned counsel for respondent.

7. The impugned order which is very brief shows that the learned Rent Control disposed of the case in cursory manner. He decided the issue of personal requirement in a few lines which are as follows:‑ "From the evidence on record it is also clear that the applicant is already in possession of bigger portion of the same premises and she is doing the business there. The applicant has also failed to prove that the premises which is already in her possession is not sufficient for‑doing the business of timber. Under these circumstances, when the applicant is already doing the business of timber in two shops, therefore, in my opinion she is not in need of the present premises and her bare words that she wants to expand the business is not sufficient to be believed "

8. Clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance empowers the Rent Controller to put the landlord in possession of the premises, if the landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use or the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children. As observed in Haji Muhammad Ibrahim v. Hamzo Khan, PLD 1987 Kar. 520 the right to claim possession from a tenant would be regulated by the Court only to the extent to examine whether the request for possession is inspired with good faith or it is frivolous and mala fide. Sufficiency and insufficiency of accommodation is a matter of individual taste and discretion with which a Court would hardly interfere. All that the Controller has to see or an appellate Court has to examine is that the "landlord requires the premises in good faith for his own occupation or use of spouse or any of his children".

9. The record as it stands shows that the appellant is carrying on her business of sale of timber and allied goods under the name and style of "Honest Enterprises", on the remaining portion of the disputed plot. It is also clear from the record that Haji Abdul Shakoor, husband of the appellant is running a separate business under the name and style of "Honest Timber Trading Company" at separate premises away from each other. It appears that the learned Rent Controller was influenced by this fact and he treated both he business concerns as one. He also read the provisions of section 13(3)(a) (1) of the Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (since repealed), in clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance, which simply lay down that a landlady has only to establish that she requires the premises in good faith.

10. The plea of personal requirement of the disputed premises finds place in paras Nos.17 to 33 of the affidavit‑in‑evidence filed by A1‑Nasir (P.W.1), who is son and attorney of the appellant. His evidence shows that the premises in occupation of the appellant are not sufficient for her business requirements, who wanted to expand A her business and include sale of plywood, hardboard, chipboard Formica sheets, flush doors and other related goods for which a large show‑room and storage space was required with a big frontage. The statement made by A1‑Nasir (P.W.1) on oath to the effect that a market had sprung around the disputed premises for sale of flush‑doors, plywood, chipboard, Formica and other related goods, has again gone unchallenged and unrebutted and this factor alone was sufficient for deciding the issue of personal requirement in affirmative.

11. It is always open to a landlady to choose her own premises. for expansion of her business. The construction that I have placed on the language of clause (vii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance, is indicative that unlike the provisions of clause (i) of subsection (3‑a) of section 13 of the defunct Sind Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, no pre‑conditions are prescribed to seek ejectment of the tenant on the ground of personal requirement, except that the requirement should be in good faith.

12. The respondent has alleged mala fides on the ground that the appellant was interested in getting the rent enhanced. There is, however, nothing on record to prove this allegation. Admittedly the agreement for tenancy executed by the parties had expired on C 31‑12‑1985 and it was thereafter that the present proceedings were instituted. Even otherwise section 15‑A of the Ordinance, provides a check, although a loose one, against reletting of the premises after getting the same vacated on ground of personal requirement.

13. All these factors, when combined together, clearly make out a case for ejectment. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside and the eviction of the respondent is ordered. The respondent is, however, allowed two months' time to vacate the demised premises.

14. In the result the appeal is allowed, but the parties are left to bear their own costs. H. B. T./Z‑85/K Appeal allowed.