1993 PLP 425 (PLC)

The petitioner was working as a tailor with the respondents since July 1986 and his services are stated to have been terminated orally on 15‑3‑1989.

2. The matter was taken before the Labour Department, but the conciliation talks having broken down the petitioner sent a grievance notice on 14‑5‑1989. As he could not receive any satisfaction from the reply dated 25‑5‑1989, he filed the petition before the Labour Court.

3. It was stated in the Written Reply that on 15‑3‑1989 the petitioner was offered the termination letter and was also directed to return the sewing machine, belonging to the hotel which was with him, and the legal dues would be paid thereafter. This was not to the liking of the petitioner and he refused to accept the letter. It was further added that he had refused to receive the letter during‑the conciliation proceedings also. It was then that the letter was sent to him by registered post at his residential address.

4. The petitioner was his own witness and Abdul Majeed the Personnel Manager and Mehmoodul Hassan, the Assistant Personnel Manager of the Hotel appeared on behalf of the respondents.

5. The Labour Court, found the termination to be illegal and ordered reinstatement with full back benefits.

6. It was contended by Mr. Zamirul Hassan learned counsel for the appellant that the services of the appellant were terminated in view of the re organisation in which the tailoring work had been entrusted to M/s. Komal Garment on contract. He maintained that it was the right of the employer to select the mode in which he would gel his work done, and that he was not answerable for his actions in that pursuit to any authority, so long as no infringement of any law was involved. No fault could be found in acquiring the services of a contractor either, even if permanent employees had to be displaced, provided that the change was bona fide, and not hit by any law. In this context he referred to the cases of P.IA. Shavers Poultry Breeding Farm Limited v. Raheem Bux and another 1980 PLC 1224; M/s. Bayer Pharma Limited v. Mirza Hussain Akhtar 1981 PLC 224 and M/s. EMESCO Industries Limited v. S. Irfan Ahmed 1983 PLC 981,

7. Mr. Aftab‑i‑Alam Kizilbash, learned counsel for . the respondent however argued that to substantiate the need for re‑organisation, the employer had to show that there was a scheme of re‑organisation or that it was necessitated by economy. If that was not properly established then the bluff had to be called off. He argued that there was no evidence at all to show that any reorganisation in the running of the Hotel had even been attempted and all that happened was that the services of the appellant had been dispensed with. He sought reliance for the same from the case of KTC v. Khawaja Muhammad and others 1980 PLC 821.

8. All these citations are from this Tribunal, and I agree with the view taken in the cases referred to by Mr. Zamirul Hassan. But as will be seen, that will be incidental to the matter, and. we can leave them alone altogether.

9. It goes without saying that in cases of termination of service I simpliciter, within the meaning of Standing Order 12(3) the only requirement I A is, that it should be conveyed to the employee, giving the reasons for the same. In the instant case all that has been said is that a letter was offered to the respondent and he had refused to receive the same. Abdul Majeed in his cross -examination has testified that he had entrusted the same to his Assistant who has not been named, but evidently he meant Mehmoodul Hassan the Assistant Personnel Manager. The latter mentions that the Personnel Manager had handed over a letter to him to be delivered to the respondent, but the latter had declined to receive it until he was paid the legal dues. The matter does not end here. Altogether a different story emerges later on, which reads as under:‑‑ "(4) ‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑ I told him that he should bring the sewing machine of the Hotel which he had taken for repairs, alongwith the bill, and he will be paid ‑all his legal dues and the repairing charges of the machine at that time, on which he left the Hotel premises without receiving his termination letter. I handed over the said termination letter, back to the Personnel Manager.

10. There is nothing to indicate‑‑‑‑actually nobody has been said‑‑‑‑that the letter thereafter was sent by post, duly registered, or otherwise. The one letter which was sent to the respondent was after the breakdown of the talks before the Labour Directorate, which has been filed not by the appellant, but by the respondent himself alongwith the envelope. Though the letter is dated 15th of March, the envelope in unmistakable terms bears the date of 10‑5‑1989. The position is quite clarified from the Written Reply filed by the appellant before the Labour Court where he had said "in the said joint meeting held on the 10th of May, 1989 the respondent had again offered said termination letter to the applicant in the presence of the Assistant Director Labour‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑‑. As the applicant had refused to receive the said letter of termination even before the Assistant Director Labour therefore it was sent to him by registered post at his residential address." All these details pertain to the 14th of May.

11. So it is abundantly made out that there was no letter given to the respondent synchronising with the termination of his employment at all, simultaneously asking him for the collection of dues. Even the payment whenever the offer was made was kept dependant on the return of the sewing machine. The respondent has stated in his cross‑examination that the repair charges were Rs.150 and the sewing machine could be fetched from the shop, if the charges were made available.

12. This seems to be the genesis of the whole trouble; the so‑called reorganization brought about, though it is not relevant for the purposes of the case as to how things took such a turn. Be that as it may, for all intents and purposes, the long and the short of it is, that the requirements of clause 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 have not been fulfilled, inasmuch as neither any letter giving reasons of the termination was despatched nor any genuine offer to clear the dues was forthcoming. The respondent could have taken any other remedies, but the payment of the dues could not be made conditional. I am therefore clearly of the view that there is no merit in the appeal. I will therefore uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal. H.B.T./2125/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.