1990 PLP 39 (PLC)

Ch. Ataullah for Appellant. Ali Ahmad Awan for the Respondent. Date of hearing: 5th June, 1989. The appeal captioned above challenges the decision, dated 12‑12‑1988 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.1, Lahore, whereby the grievance petition of the appellant for her reinstatement in service his been dismissed.

2. The appellant was a steno typist employed on 18‑2‑1982, at the monthly salary of Rs.1,

000. After completing the period of probation she had been asking the respondent to raise her emoluments but to no purpose. She tendered resignation, which is Exh.RA. It was not accepted. Noting was made on this resignation by some authority on 20‑12‑1984, which shows that on the said date or sometime before that, the undated resignation was tendered. Another resignation tendered by the appellant is Exh.R.E. which also does not bear any date. Noting recorded on it bears the date as 30‑4‑1985. Firstly, on 6‑4‑1985 an order terminating the services of the appellant was recorded giving reason that her services were no longer required, but afterwards vide order, dated 30‑4‑1985 the said order was withdrawn and resignation of the appellant was accepted. The order is Exh. P.Z. The case of the appellant is that at the time she was recruited, she was given an oral assurance that her pay would be increased and since it was not done, therefore, she had tendered a conditional resignation and the condition was that if her pay was increased, her resignation be treated as withdrawn, a d that the bottom of the resignation Exh.R.E wherein she had requested that if her salary was increased, her resignation be treated as withdrawn, was torn away. The respondent does not admit this position. His case is that the resignation Exh.R.E. was unconditional and it was accepted on the request of the appellant. In the order, by which the said resignation was accepted, it is said that the appellant had requested for the withdrawal of the order of termination from service, dated 6‑4 1985 and for acceptance of her resignation. The appellant's case is that she did not make any such request. The appellant also asserts that her pay had in reality been increased and she was paid Rs.1,995 as arrears of pay for three months. According to her, the increase per month was at Rs.665. In this respect she has produced petty cash voucher, dated 15‑1‑1985 exhibited as P.X. This is a photostat copy. The respondent does not own this document. It purports to bear the signatures of an officer who was not examined by either of the parties. Since the appellant was relying upon this document and the respondent was disowning it, the onus was upon the appellant to examine the officer who had signed the document. If this petty cash voucher had in reality been issued by the respondent and the appellant after receiving the amount covered by it had signed it, it could be in the custody of the respondent and not in the possession of the appellant. When the learned counsel for the appellant was confronted with this position during arguments, he said that Exh.P.X. was obtained by the appellant from the respondent. No employee of the respondent was examined by the appellant to prove that Exh.P.X. was prepared by the respondent. Since this copy is not an attested one, it has no evidentiary value. The fact that the copy is unattested and it has not come from proper custody, disproves the assertions of the appellant that her pay afterwards was increased by Rs.665 per month, that she received Rs.1,995 as arrears of three months and that since her claim was accepted, therefore, her conditional resignation could not be accepted. After the termination of service, she ‑received salary for the month of April, 1985 at Rs.1,150, Rs.385 towards encashment of un-availed leave and Rs.1,872 as provident fund vide Exh.R.F. She admitted the receipt of the amount in her statement. The admission made by her in cross‑examination reads as, "I had received Exh.R.F. and the amount mentioned in it". She also admitted that the company did not owe any dues to her. If her pay had been increased at Rs.665 per month, she would not have accepted the wages for the month of April at the rate of Rs.1,

150. So this is wrong that her pay was afterwards increased. Her assertion that she had given a condition at the end of the resignation Ex.RE that if her pay was increased, the resignation be treated as withdrawn and that the portion in which she had given such a note was afterwards torn away, as mentioned above, is not correct. I have carefully examined the edges of the document. A torn paper leaves turning marks which are not present in Ex.RE. So this is incorrect that some portion of Ex.RE was bearing any note as asserted by the appellant and that the said portion was torn away.

3. This contention of the respondent made in the impugned order does not appear to be correct that on the request of the appellant the order of termination dated 6‑4‑1985 was withdrawn and the resignation Ex.RE was accepted. The appellant had no occasion to make this request because either way she was not to remain in service. It could not make any difference if her services had been terminated simplicitor or her resignation had been accepted. Of course if an order of dismissal had been recorded against her, it could be believed that she requested that the order of dismissal be withdrawn and her resignation be accepted but this is not the case of the parties. Even if the appellant did not make any request that the order of termination dated 6‑4‑1985 be withdrawn and that her resignation be accepted, the respondent Was quite competent to withdraw its order by which the appellant had been terminated and to accept her resignation which by that time had not been withdrawn. There appears to be a wisdom behind withdrawing the order of termination dated 6‑4‑1985 and accepting the resignation of the appellant and that is that the order, dated 6‑4‑1985 did not bear explicit reasons for the termination of services. The reason given is only this that the services of the appellant were no longer required. No reason is given why the services were no longer required. If this order had not been withdrawn, it would have been set aside for the reason that it was in violation of Standing Order 12(3) of Standing Orders Ordinance. So finding this legal flaw in the order, it was withdrawn and the resignation of the appellant was accepted. The grievance petition of the appellant, therefore, was rightly disallowed.

4. As a result of the discussion made above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. A.E./696/Lb.P Appeal dismissed.