P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

B. Z. KAIKAUS, J.‑

This is an appeal against the judgment of Habib Ullah, J. setting aside the order of the Rehabilita tion Commissioner on the ground that he determined the matter as an appeal although he was entitled to hear only a revi sion petition.

2. The appellant before us is one Akhtar Aksi. His brother, Ahmad Sher, was allotted the house in dispute in 1950. After some time Ahmad Sher joined Government service and left for Karachi. Aftab Ahmad respondent applied for allotment of the house on the ground that the allottee was no longer occupying it. This application was resisted on behalf of the appellant, Akhtar Aksi, on the ground that as a matter of fact he too was a joint allottee of the house along with his brother, Ahmad Sher. The Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner decided against the appellant and allotted the house to Aftab Ahmad. There was an appeal to the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner. The learned Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner held that the insertion of the naive of the appellant in the allotment order was a forgery and he dismissed the appeal. On this, there was a revision to the Custodian, who set aside the order of the Additional . Rehabilitation Commissioner and remanded the case to the Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner for proper inquiry into the question as to whether the addition of the appellant's name was in fact a forgery. The Deputy Rehabilitation Com missioner again made an inquiry and confirmed the finding that the insertion of the name of the appellant was an inter polation. Against this order there was an appeal to the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner, who too did not accept the appel lant to be an allottee. Against this order the appellant filed a revision petition to the Rehabilitation Commissioner. By his order dated 30th August; 1956, the Rehabilitation Commissioner set aside the order of the Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner. He did not think it necessary to go into the question as to whether the insertion of the appellant's name was a forgery. He proceeded on the ground that the appellant had been in pos session of the house since 1950, and although he was a local, he was essential to Lahore being a journalist and had been paying the rent regularly and, therefore, he should not be disturbed.

3. The respondent filed a writ petition against this order on the ground that throughout his order the learned Rehabilita tion Commissioner has referred to the proceedings before him as an appeal and as he was, in fact, not hearing an appeal but a revi sion petition, the order should be set aside on the simple ground that he misconceived his jurisdiction. This contention has been accepted by Habib Ullah, J.

4. After giving the matter careful consideration, we have reached the conclusion that we should uphold the order of the learned Single Judge. It is true that so far as revisions before the Rehabilitation Commissioner are concerned, there is little difference between the grounds on which an order can be interfered with in appeal and those in which it can be interfered with in revision. The section relating to revisions says the Rehabilitation Commissioner can examine the record of a case with a view to determine the `legality' or `propriety' of an order and it is on the same grounds that an order can be inter fered with on appeal. But there is a fundamental distinction between appeals and revisions whether preferred before a Civil Court or before the Rehabilitation Commissioner and that is,, that an appeal is the right of a party, whereas interference in revision is a matter for the discretion of the authority invested with revisional powers. Learned counsel for the respondent urges that even if there was one per cent. chance of the Rehabilita tion Commissioner not having made the order that he has made, if he was conscious of the fact that he was not hearing an appeal but a revision, then his order should be set aside. We find force in this contention. It is no doubt very improbable that the learned Rehabilitation Commissioner would have made a different order if he had known that he was hearing a revision petition, but we cannot say that there is no possible chance of there having been a different order. The Deputy Rehabilitation Commissioner had found that a forgery had been committed by the appellant. The Additional Rehabilitation Commissioner had found that there was no proof of the appellant being an allottee. The learned Rehabilitation Commissioner had himself not reached a finding that the appellant was an allottee. It may be that if the learned. Rehabilitation Commissioner had known that he was deciding a revision only, he may have refused to interfere because it was a matter of discretion. Even 'though generally Rehabilitation Commissioners would not make any great distinction between the powers of appeal and revision, we are only concerned with the possibility of a difference having been made in this case and that possibility cannot be excluded. It is the right of a party that the Tribunal that determines his case should be conscious of the bounds of the jurisdiction that it has to exercise. The learned Single Judge was, in our, opinion, right in ordering a fresh hearing of the revision by the Rehabilitation Commissioner.

5. This appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs. K.B.A./A.H. Appeal dismissed.