1984 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

3. Brief facts of the case are that an F. I. R. No. 155/78, dated 11th September, 1978 under sections 302 and 307/34, P. P. C., P‑ S. Thekariwala, Tehsil and District Faisalabad, was registered at the said station. Dur ing the course of investigation of the case, respondent No. 1 suspended the appellant w. a. f. 11th September, 1978 on the strength of the investi gation so conducted in this case. A show‑cause notice was issued on 22nd October. 1978. The appellant submitted his reply to the respondent No. I viz. S. P. Faisalabad, on 5th November, 1978. However, respondent No. 1 did not find the reply satisfactory and dismissed him from service on the ground that he had been involved in a murder case, which was still sub judice. The appellant was ultimately acquitted by the order of trial Court. He filed an appeal before the D. I.‑G. Police appraising him of the fact that he had secured an acquittal and thus liable to be re‑instated. The D. L‑G. Police found that as the appellant had been given the benefit of doubt and his acquittal was not honourable, therefore, the judgment in his favour, would be of no avail to him and dismissed his appeal. He field a petition before the Additional Inspector‑General of Police, which was dismissed. Hence this appeal.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as learned District Attorney appearing on behalf of respondents and have perused the record of this case carefully.

5. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the appellant that vide Notification issued by the Finance Department. Government of the Punjab No. FD‑SRI‑3‑45/81, dated 2ist January, 1982 the appellant was entitled to be re‑instated in service, as he was acquitted finally by the trial Court. Learned counsel for the appellant has made a grievance that although the appellant has been acquitted by the competent Court of law yet the D. I.‑G. Police has ignored the said judgment and without any foundation has held the acquittal as giving the benefit of doubt, which according to the learned counsel for the appellant, was against the facts of the case. He has also submitted that the D. I.‑G. Police, without reading the entire judgment has hastily concluded, that as the judgment was passed by giving benefit of doubt, therefore, the appellant was not entitled to be re‑instated on the strength of the judgment.

6. On the other hand learned District Attorney has adopted the reply filed by the Department and has maintained that as the judgment of the trial Court did not give honourable acquittal in favour of the appellant, therefore, the D. I.‑G. was fully justified to dismiss his appeal. He has further submitted that during the course of investigation it was found that the appellant, although not mentioned in the F. I. R. was present at the spot and had participated in the said crime.

7. We have given our anxious thought to the arguments so advanced by the parties and have perused the entire judgment of the learned Addi tional Sessions Judge, Faisalabad carefully. We have also taken into consideration of Annexures 'D' and `E' report of roznamcha of Police Post, Jhang Bazar, District Faisalabad, which goes to show that on 11th September, 1978 the day on which F. I. R. was registered against the appellant Behram Khan, he was deputed on Traffic duty near Chowk Jhang Bazar. It was also evidence from the said Annexure that Behram Khan returned at 8‑10 p. m. on 11th September, 1978 after performing duty back to the Police Post. We have also taken note of the letter No. S(R)‑1‑13/58/SOXIII, dated 30th September, 1958 from the Governor of West Pakistan addressed to all the Head of Departments, in which it has been stressed that unless and until it is found that acquittal of the civil servant involved in a case was merely on technical ground or due to evidence having been suppressed, he should be re‑instated in service and the judgment should be accepted and no further departmental action should be taken against him. We are very much conscious of the fact that the entire case of the appellant hinges on the fact whether he has been acquit ted due to technical flaw or suppression of evidence at his instance or his case was considered to be justified case in the eye of the trial Court for acquittal. To resolve this issue we have gone through the judgment care fully as stated in the earlier part of our judgment and find that the name of the appellant is not mentioned in the F. I. R. which is placed at page 87 of the file and with this background, we find that in the lengthy judgment delivered by the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore that ail the facts of the case and evidence so produced by the prosecution has been discussed elaborately. At page 51 of the judgment at the close of para. 25, learned Judge has observed as under :‑-- "In these circumstances the prosecution was left with only ocular evidence which was false and in any case was not free from doubt." In para. 27 of the said judgment, it has been observed :‑‑ "As a result of the above discussion it has been abundantly made clear and I have been pursuaded to conclude that the prosecution has failed to prove that Abdul Sattar was murdered by the accused when Ghalib Khan had fired and injured him with the shot‑gun. Similarly there was no evidence at all to conclude much less to prove if Muhammad Ayub had made a murderous assault at Ijaz Ahmad and others as alleged by the prosecution and as was the charge framed. The prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the accused. Resultantly I conclude that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case against any of the accused. All the three accused are acquitted of the offence with which they were charged. They are present on bail. Their bail bonds shall stand discharged." However, we ignore the documents so produced before us regarding the plea of alibi by the appellant that he was somewhere else on the date of occurrence because the same has not been discussed by the Additional Sessions Judge, but the fact remains that the Additional Sessions Judge has nowhere stated that he has acquitted the appellant or other accused either on technical ground or because they have been instrumental in suppressing the evidence which was available with the prosecution or that the judgment is based on the benefit of doubt. This we have made very clear by quoting relative portion of the judgment as given above. To satisfy ourselves about this crucial issue, we have read the entire judgment and find that the evidence was produced by the prosecution and none of the witnesses were declared as hostile, but on the other band, it was found that the evidence so produced was false or the testimony of those wit nesses was not free from doubt. In these circumstances we fail to under stand as to how the learned D. I.‑G. has observed in his judgment that in the case of the appellant he has been acquitted on account of benefit of doubt so given to him. What the learned Judge has said is that the evidence produced by the prosecution was either false or at least was not free from any doubt. This by no measure, can be construed that the acquittal was based by giving benefit of doubt to the appellant, a fact which has been so misunderstood by the D. I.‑G. therefore, we find no material from the entire judgment to uphold his contention.

8. In view of the instructions of the Governor of the Province in the letter so mentioned above, a copy of the same has been placed on the record, we do not find any reason to uphold the three impugned orders, which are contrary to the facts of the case as well as mandatory instructions laid down by the Governor in this behalf. We once again reiterate that unless and until it is proved that the acquittal of the civil servant in a criminal case, has been caused by suppression of evidence or it was due to some technical flaw, the competent authority was under obligation to re‑instate him in service once he has been found not guilty by the competent Court of Law.

9. The result is we accept the appeal, set aside all the impugned orders so referred to above and direct that the appellant be re‑instated in service with all back benefits. There will be no order as to costs. M.I. Appeal accepted.