P L D 1955 Lahore 187 (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑--The property in dispute in this second appeal belonged to one Ata Bakhsh who died according to the plaintiffs on 20th of March, 1951, and according to the defendants about a year earlier: The plaintiffs in this case are Ahmad Bakhsh, real brother of Ata Bakhsh, and Iqbal Muhammad and Fida Muhammad who claim to be his uterine brothers. The defendants are the widow and descendants of Khuda Bakhsh, the paternal grandfather of Ata Bakhsh. The sole point for decision in the case was whether Ata Bakhsh had died after or before Khuda Bakhsh, his grand father. If he died before the death of his grandfather, * then the defendants would become entitled to the share that Khuda Bakhsh would inherit in his property which is admit tedly five‑sixths, one‑sixth going to Mst. Sharam, the mother of Ata Bakhsh. If on the other hand, Khuda Bakhsh had died before Ata Bakhsh, Mst. Bharawan, widow of Khuda Bakhsh, as well as the descendants would be excluded. The trial Court found in favour of the defendants holding that Ata Bakhsh had died about a year earlier than Khuda Bakhsh. Khuda Bakhsh had admittedly died on' the 17th of March, 1951. On appeal the learned District judge agreed with the plaintiffs and found that Ata Bakhsh died on the 20th of March, 1951, The defendants have filed the present appeal. The finding of the learned District judge on which his judgment is based is obviously a finding of fact and unless learned counsel for the appellants is able to point out some legal flaw, the decree of the learned District judge has to be maintained. Learned counsel for the appellants urges in the first place that the approach of the learned District judge is not proper. But when I asked him to explain what he meant by the word "approach" all that he could say was that there were some documents which ought to have been regarded as important and which the learned District judge did not rely upon, while there were some documents on which the learned District judge relied and which had been prepared under circumstances throwing doubt on their correctness. This is hardly the kind of attack which can sustain a second appeal. The learned District judge's reasoning is not liable to be attacked. He may refuse to rely upon evidence which to learned counsel for the appellants appears good, or may act on the evidence which to the learned counsel far the appellants appears to be weak. The learned District judge is the sole judge of facts and the conclusions from facts arrived at by him cannot be impeached unless the conclusions be not possible in law. 'Learned counsel urges that the trial Court had accepted the oral. evidence of a number of witnesses which the learned District judge has disregarded. He says in doing so the learned District judge has violated the rule of law that when a case depends upon oral evidence and the reliability of witnesses, the finding of the trial Court should not be interfered with. There is no rule and there can possibly be no rule which may debar an appellate Court from setting aside a finding of fact simply because the finding is based on oral evidence or on the opinion of the learned trial judge as to the reliability of witnesses. There‑is no doubt that the opinion of the trial Judge who watches the demeanour of the witnesses is entitled to weight, but that is all that can be said about it. Learned counsel refers to certain observa tions of their Lordships of the Privy Council that the findings of the trial Court should not in such cases be lightly interfered with. But their Lordships do not say that the appellate Court cannot set aside the finding of the trial Court in such cases. There is one question of law however which has been argued and with which I have to deal. The learned District judge has in this case relied upon certain entries on' a copy from death register which had been obtained by the plain tiffs from the office of the Civil Surgeon. Learned counsel argues that these copies which were issued by the Civil Surgeon were not copies of documents falling within section 35 of the Evidence Act and in fact were only copies of copies and therefore inadmissible in evidence. I may explain here the position with respect to the entries in the registers of deaths. Under rule 22 of the Chaukidari Rules framed under section 39A of the Punjab Laws Act, it is the duty of every village headman as well as watchman to maintain a death register and to report to the officer in charge of the police station, within the limits of which his village is situate, all deaths which occur in such village. Under rule 22.45, volume III of the Punjab Police Rules, every police station is to maintain a register of deaths. As will appear from para. 551 of the Punjab Medical Manual the village watchmen have to bring their registers to the police stations on their fortnightly visits, and. from these books and oral inquiries from the watchmen the station clerk compiles the register of deaths. This register is kept at the police station for a year and is then forwarded to the office of the District Medical Officer of Health. (Previously it was the Civil Surgeon and now by an amendment it is the District Health Officer. It is further provided in rule 22.66 of the Police Rules that copies of the death register which is being maintained are to be submitted fort nightly to the Superintendent of Police who shall countersign the ' copies and forward them to the District Medical Officer of Health. If the copies which have been produced are copies of the register which was being maintained in the police station, the appellants have got nothing to urge against them, for they 'are apparently public records kept by public servants under the provisions of a statute, i.e., the Police Act. Learned counsel urges, however, that the copies produced in this case are in fact only copies of those copies which are under the provisions of rule 22.66 to be forwarded by the police station to the office of District Medical Officer. Learned counsel points out that copies had in this case been granted before a period of one year had expired and therefore the original register was still lying at the police station. Assuming that this is correct and it is only a copy of the copies forwarded to the District Medical Officer, still there can be no legal objection to the reception of these certified copies in evidence. The provision for the preparation of these copies is contained in the Police Rules. If by a statute there is a provision for the preparation of a particular docu ment which is a copy of another public document, the copy prepared is also a public document falling within the purview of section 35 of the Evidence Act. It may be regarded as duplicate, but even if it is regarded as a copy, it does become a public record kept by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. Learned counsel contends that there is no particular provision for the maintenance of the copies as a register or a record, but it is obvious that when copies are being forwarded to the office of the District Medical Officer of Health, they are to be kept there. Even apart from the Police Act, the executive government could very well have given directions to its District Medical Officers of Health for the preparation or maintenance of registers of births and deaths. I would point out that its power to prepare statis tics in respect of births and deaths is recognized in section 22 of the District Boards Act. Section 35 of the Evidence Act speaks of two kinds of documents‑one those in which entries E are made by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country and the other a record kept by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty If the executive government were to order the maintenance of such record, the entries would be made in the performance of official duty and would be relevant under section

35. There is no force in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. R. S. A. 245/53 which is an unnecessary appeal filed against the decree of the District Judge in the cross‑appeal is also dismissed with costs. A. H Appeal dismissed.