P L D 1967 Dacca 152 (PLP)

This appeal raises a very interesting point of jurisdiction. It has been preferred by plaintiffs in a suit instituted by them for a declaration that a decree passed against them by the Union Council Conciliation Court at Subhapur in Case No. 25 of 1963 is a nullity and that the same is not binding on the plaintiffs. In substance, plaintiffs' case is that a false case was instituted in the Conciliation Court by defendant No. 1 on the allegation that the present plaintiffs had accepted a deposit. of a sum of Rs. 195 to be kept by them in safe custody in order to enable the said defendant No. 1 to purchase rickshaw with the said money. The intention was to keep the money in readiness, at a safe place, to be utilised when the occasion for utilization would arise. On the institution of the said suit in the Concilia tion Court, a notice was served on the present plaintiffs who did not appear to contest the case pending before the said Conciliation Court. A decree was passed against the plaintiffs who were defendants in the former suit, ex parte. Hence the present suit has been instituted by them in the Court of a Munsif at Comilla. The defence (of the plaintiff in the former suit) before the learned Munsif was a traverse of the case alleged by the present plaintiffs. Defendant alleged that notices and all processes were duly served on the plaintiffs in respect of the case instituted by him in the said Conciliation Court. He also alleged that he had made over a sum of Rs. 195 to them on a definite undertaking given by the plaintiffs that the said money would be returned. In substance, his defence was as mentioned above. Before the learned Munsif three issues were framed, namely, (i) whether the notices and processes were served upon the plaintiffs who were defendants in the Conciliation Court; (ii) whether non‑attendance of the plaintiffs at the hearing of the case would vitiate the trial before the said Conciliation Court, and (iii) whether the Conciliation Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the subject‑matter of the suit. The learned Munsif found that the notices and summonses in respect of the impugned decree passed by the Conciliation Court were duly served upon the plaintiffs. Secondly, the learned Munsif also found that, notices having been served upon plaintiffs, the case before the Conciliation Court could proceed in their absence if they did not turn up to defend themselves at the hearing. However, on the third issue, namely whether the Conciliation Court had jurisdiction over the subject‑matter of the suit, the learned Munsif came to a finding that the case made by the defendant in the present suit (plaintiff before the Conciliation Court) did not amount to a contract. He, therefore, arrived at the conclusion that the decree passed by the Conciliation Court was a nullity because it was passed in the absence of jurisdiction by the Conciliation Court over the subject‑matter of the suit. He, therefore, decreed the suit and allowed the declaration prayed for by the plaintiffs. Defendant, thereupon, preferred an appeal which was heard and disposed of by a Subordinate Judge of Comilla. Before the learned Subordinate Judge the present plaintiffs did not contest the point that notices with respect to Case No. 25 of 1963 in the said Conciliation Court were duly served upon them. In any event, there is overwhelming evidence in this respect which has been accepted concurrently by both the Courts below. I think that this point has been rightly decided. The learned Subordinate Judge has also held that there is no question that the Conciliation Court was competent to proceed with the case in the absence of the present plaintiffs having regard to the fact that notices of the case were duly served on them. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the further conclusion that the transaction mentioned above disclosed a contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant. He, therefore, found that the Conciliation Court had jurisdiction over the subject‑matter of the suit in the said Court. Consequently, he allowed the appeal, reversed the finding arrived at by the learned Munsif on the third issue and dismissed the suit, Hence this appeal. , At the hearing of this appeal under Order XLI, rule 11, of the Code of Civil Procedure I was taken through the judgments pronounced by the Courts below. The only point which was contested before me is: had the Conciliation Court jurisdiction to try defendant's suit as made out by him in Case No. 25 of 1963 ? The other points have been concurrently found against the appellants in the Courts below and were not pressed before me. With regard to the question of jurisdiction, I would like to refer to section B (1) of the Schedule (Part 1) appended to the Conciliation Courts Ordinance (XLIV of 1961). Section B (1), referring to the subject‑matters which could be dealt with by the Conciliation Court, reads thus: "Suit for the recovery of money due on contracts, receipts or other documents." Now, the question is, whether the case alleged by the defendant, who was the plaintiff in the Conciliation Court, as stated above, amounts to a contract. There is no manner of doubt whatsoever that it does amount to a contract. Learned Munsif thought that inasmuch as the Contract Act required consideration to found a contract, the said transaction did not amount to a contract because no consideration passed from the promisor to the promisee. The learned Subordinate Judge very rightly held that consideration had passed between the parties and that the transaction amounted to a contract which came within the purview of section B (1) of the Schedule (Part I) appended to the Ordinance. In this case, defendant had approached the plaintiffs and asked them to keep in deposit a certain amount of money. On their agreeing to accept the same to be kept in custody, it is alleged by the defendant, plaintiffs undertook to return the money back to him on his completion of the transaction for the purchase of a rickshaw. When the defendant wanted the money back, the plaintiffs refused to do so. This transaction amounts to this that, on agreement of the plaintiffs to accept the money, they (plaintiffs) undertook a responsibility to keep the money on certain conditions. Again, on the aforesaid undertaking defendant parted company with the money deposited by him. So there was forbearance on the one side and acceptance of responsibility on the other. In the eye of law, this is sufficient consideration to constitute a contract. This is a well‑settled proposition. One may, however, refer to the case of Allah Ditto v. Sadhu Shah (A I R 1934 Lah. 179). In the eye of law, consideration would mean and include some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party and some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other. If one looks at the aforesaid transaction from a different point of view, the acceptance of money by the plaintiffs created a right in the defendant to have the money back, as stipulated and agreed upon by the parties. The acceptance of the money by the plaintiffs amounts to undertaking a responsibility by them. Therefore, from whatever point of view one looks at the case, the requirement of considera tion is fulfilled by an agreement as set out above. There can be no manner of doubt that the transaction does amount to a contract. I, therefore, hold that the appeal was rightly decided by the Appellate Court below. In these circumstances, I summarily dismiss the appeal under Order XLI, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. S. Q. Appeal dismissed.