1986 PLP 770 (CLC)

P L D 1985 Lah. 498 ref. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)‑‑ ‑‑‑S. 115‑‑Revisional jurisdiction‑‑Scope of‑‑Scope of Revisional jurisdiction, held, was limited to grounds mentioned in S. 115, Civil Procedure Code and ground, outside such scope could not be considered in revisional jurisdiction. Syed Inayat Ali for Applicant. S.A. Naqvi for Opponent. Date of hearing: 20th November, 1985. This Revision Application is directed against the concurrent findings judgment of Mr. Ghulam Nauman Shaikh, VIIIth Additional District Judge, Karachi, dated 31‑7‑1983, upholding the judgment of Miss Anis Tahir III Class Civil Judge XVIII, Karachi, dated 31‑1‑1978, dismissing the suit of the appellant with no order as to costs. The appellants had filed a suit alleging that they were the owners of plot of land with a shop constructed thereon bearing No. 1 situated in Commercial Area, Liaqatabad, Karachi. Their father Muhammad Saleh who was the original owner of the shop had given the same to the respondent as a licensee at the rate of Rs.2 per day. The respondent carried on the business of Hair Cutting Saloon in the said shop and continued to pay the hire charges. Muhammad Saleh, died in 1955 and six months after his death the respondent stopped paying hire charges. Hence he has prayed for possession and recovery of hire charges as well as mesne profits. The suit was contested by the respondent who pleaded that he was owner of the disputed shop and that the same was constructed by him with the permission of Shabbir Hassan. He denied that he was a licensee of the appellants or that he had agreed to pay of Rs.2 per day as hire charges or had Overpaid any amount as such to the appellants or their father Muhammad Saleh. He had further pleaded that the appellants are not entitled either to the possession of shop or the mesne profits. On the pleadings of the parties numerous issues were framed b3' the trial Court. The main question that came up for the consideration of Court was as to whether the respondent was licensee of the appellants and was liable to ejectment, hire charges and mesne profit. The trial Court decided all the issues against the appellants after a full‑fledged trial and production or oral and documentary evidence by both the sides. It was held by the trial Court that the disputed shop was sold by Saleh Muhammad to the respondent on 16‑11‑1961, through a sale agreement for Rs.B,

000. Thereafter the respondent was allotted this shop by K.M.C. The K.M.C. also executed registered lease‑deed it his favour. The trial Court further came to the conclusion that a dispute was raised on the construction of shop by one Shabbir Hassan, who' was silenced by the respondent on payment of Rs.500. The findings of the learned trial Court are based upon strong documentary evidence. The sale agreement referred to above has beer produced by the respondent as Exh. P.

9. In this agreement it ha: been clearly mentioned by Saleh Muhammad the father‑ of the appellants that he had sold the shop in question to respondent Muhammad Hussain for Rs.2,000 and also delivered possession thereof to him and that the respondent was made exclusive owner thereof. Appellant GhnlArr Muhammad was confronted with this agreement in the witness‑box. He admitted that it was signed by his father Muhammad Hussain. He did not allege that it was forged or otherwise invalid. This agreement is, dated 16‑12‑1961. This agreement has been attacked by the appellants' counsel on the grounds that it was unregistered and therefore, neither it had created any title in favour of the respondent nor could it be admitted in evidence. The contention of the appellants counsel does not hold any water. Exh. P. 9, even if it is unregistered can be admitted into evidence for a collateral purpose that is, the delivery of the possession of the shop by Muhammad Saleh to the respondent. It has also created an estoppel against Muhammad Saleh and his heirs. The respondent's title is not based on this document alone, but subsequently he got this shop allotted in his name from K.M.C. The original allotment order, dated 2‑10‑1973, has been produced as Exh.D.8. The respondent also obtained the registered lease‑deed of this shop from K.M.C. which has been produced in original as Exh.D.7. He also got another agreement of a piece 4 feet into 20 feet of this shop from father and mother of the appellant which is evidence by another agreement, dated 13‑5‑1967 with which also Ghulam Hussain, was confronted. It has been produced by the respondent. He has not denied the signature of his father and mother on the same but has only stated that he could not say whether the same bears the signature of his mother or not. He has also not alleged that this was a forged document. The respondent's Advocate has shown to me the registered lease of this portion of 4 feet into 20 feet or 11.77 square yards which is, dated 19‑7‑1978. It could not be produced during the trial because it has been obtained subsequently. He has produced the mutation in the K.M.C. record as Exh.D.l. According to it shop in dispute was mutated in his name from the namel of Shabbir Hassan as well as Muhammad Saleh. Finally he produced receipts of taxes paid in respect of this shop from time to time as Exh.D.2 to D.6. The respondent has examined himself or oath. The above documents have corroborated his evidence and in turn he has proved the execution of some of these documents by his evidence as well. As against this, applicants have not produced any material document of title. The only document produced by them is an agreement Exh. P.1, which purports to have been executed by the respondent according to which the shop in suit was given on hire to the respondent at Rs. 2 per day. It is, dated 2‑9‑1959. The respondent had denied to have taken the shop on hire at Rs.2 per day in his cross‑examination but still the appellants did not confront him with the above agreement. Apart from that this agreement is prior in date to the agreement Exh. P. 9 and, therefore, cannot have precedence over it. Appellant Ghulam Hussain, examined himself and one witness namely A.K. Moen, and repeated all the averments made in the plaint. But the oral evidence of the appellant has no value whatsoever in the face of the above strong documentary evidence led by the respondent. The learned trial Court as well as the 1st appellate Court were, therefore, perfectly justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant had no case whatsoever. Mr. Syed Inayat Ali, Advocate who appeared for the appellant took a preliminary objection to the judgment of the 1st appellate Court and pointed out that the learned Additional District Judge had given improper and scanty reasons in support of the findings and his judgment, therefore, did not comply with the requirements of rule 31 of Order XLI, C.P.C. He should have given and should have discussed the evidence in detail. I do not agree with this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The judgment of the Additional District Judge though short is comprehensive and deals with all the material points involved in the case and had discussed and has dealt with all the material points. It shows that the learned Judge has applied his mind to the material on the record. This according to me is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the above provision. The learned Additional District Judge was not necessary required the refer to every item of evidence or document taken into consideration by the Civil Judge, as he had considered all the relevant points required to be determined in the appeal. Hence his judgment has not become bad in law so as to call for interference in second appeal. In this connection a recent ruling is relied upon, which is reported in P L D 1985 Lah. 4.98 where it was held that the 1st appellate Court need not refer to every item of the evidence or document and that requirement of Order XLl, rule 31, C.P.C., stood squarely complied by the 1st appellate Court, and impugned judgment did not suffer from any infirmity. Apart from that the scope of Revision Application is limited to the grounds mentioned in section 115, C.P.C. In the present case no ground mentioned in the above section is attracted. Hence I do not find any merit whatsoever in this Revision Application and dismiss the same with costs. A. A. Revision dismissed.