1986 PLP 1572 (MLD)

This writ petition is directed against order, dated 27‑4‑1985 of the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, whereby he dismissed petitioner's appeal and maintained order of their ejectment from the disputed property passed by the learned Rent Controller on 21‑3‑1984.

2. Zahoor‑ud‑Din and another sought ejectment of the petitioners from the disputed property on the ground that the same is, required by them for their personal use and further that the petitioners defaulted in payment of rent. The ejectment application was resisted by the petitioners. Learned Rent Controller framed following issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties:‑ (1) Whether the respondents have defaulted in the payment of rent for the disputed period? O.P.P. (2) Whether the petitioners require the disputed property for their personal use and occupation in good faith? O . P . P. (2‑A) Whether the petitioners have duly served the respondents with notice under section 13‑A of the Ordinance? OPP. (2‑B) Whether the respondents have spent any amount on any additional construction as alleged by the respondent in preliminary objection No.1 with permission of the petitioners. If so to what, extent and with what effect? O.P.R. (3) Relief. The learned Rent Controller recorded evidence led by the parties and vide his order, dated 21‑3‑1984 directed the petitioner's ejectment from the disputed property. On appeal the aforesaid order was maintained by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore. Hence this petition.

3. At the very outset learned counsel for petitioners in view of the dictum pronounced by the Supreme Court in Syed Amjad Ali Shah v. Iqbal Ahmad Farooqi and anothers P L D 198.5 S C 242 conceded that the controversy as to whether non‑residential portion of the building could be got vacated for residential purposes has been, set at rest. The landlord can get vacated non‑residential portion of te residential building for personal use. He however, contended that the Additional District Judge provided no opportunity to them to lead evidence. The application made by them for adducing additional evidence was not even adverted to by the learned Additional District Judge, in the impugned order. It was submitted that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings Zahoor‑ud‑Din respondent purchased another house in the same street. He had shifted in that house with his family, as such their personal need for the house in question has vanished or at least diminished.

4. Learned counsel representing the opposite side on the other hand contended that the petitioner in his statement made reference to the purchase of the house by Zahoor‑ud‑Din, but sought production of additional evidence at the stage of the appeal. It was contended that the application for additional evidence was moved to delay and frustrate finalization of the ejectment proceedings. Learned counsel made reference to Mst. Umari and another v. Faqir Muhammad and another P L D 1983 Lah. 349 and submitted that the petitioners cannot ask for production of evidence as of right.

5. I have considered the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners but find myself not persuaded to interfere in the impugned orders passed by respondent Nos. 3 and

4. The perusal the evidence on the record reveals that the respondents stood short of accommodation in comparison to the number of persons constituting their families. The application for adducing additional evidence was undeniably moved long after the petitioners had about the factum of Zahoor‑ud‑Din's purchasing the house in petitioner additional evidence promtply and awaited the decision of the learned Rent Controller in the matter. As a matter of fact he moved application on 20‑9‑1984. T4ere is nothing on the record explaining the reason o such a delay except that the petitioners wanted to prolong the finalizatio of ejectment proceedings pending against them. The unanimous conclusion reached by learned Rent Controller a well as lower appellate authority in holding that the disputed portion of the property was required bona fidely for the use of landlords in subject to no exception. No other point was raised by learned counse before me.

6. For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this petition and dismiss it with costs. A.A. Petition dismissed.