PLC 1973

1973 PLP 367 (PLC)

ABDUR REHMAN Versus BANNU SUGAR MILLS

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Court N. W. F. P.
Decided Date
L. C. C. No. 214 of 1971, decided on 11th July 1972.
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1973 PLP 367 (PLC)
Forum / Court Labour Court N. W. F. P.
Bench Members N/A
Parties ABDUR REHMAN Versus BANNU SUGAR MILLS
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1973 PLP 367 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1973 PLP 367 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Court N. W. F. P. bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1973 PLP 367 (PLC) (ABDUR REHMAN Versus BANNU SUGAR MILLS). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Headnotes / Summary

West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1963 i, S. O. 15 -Misconduct

Sleeping during duty hours - Amounts to careless working in terms of S. O. 15(1) (11) involving punishment of fine or reprimand, but nut to misconduct warranting removal from service.

Judgment & Decree

(a) Wilful insubordination or disobedience, whether alone or in combination with others, to, any lawful and reasonable order of a superior: (b) theft fraud or dishonesty In - connection with the employer's business or property I Wilful damage to or 1036 of employer's goods or property: (d) taking or giving bribes or any illegal gratification: (e) habitual absence without leave or absence without leave for more than tore days I (f) habitual late attendance: (g) habitual breach of any; law applicable to the establish ment; (h) riotous or disorderly behaviour during working hours at the establishment or any act subversive of discipline ; (i) habitual negligence or neglect of work: (J) frequent repetition of any act or omission referred to in clause 1: (k) striking work or inciting others try strike in contravention of the provisions of any law, or rule having the force of law ; (l) go-slow.

5. Now from the perusal of these acts and omissions it would appear that the petitioner was not guilty of any act or omission, which amounted to misconduct. All that was alleged against him was that he was sleeping in the Time Office at about 11-45 p. m. while he was on duty. The allegation against hi can amount only to careless working which is mentioned in sub section (1) (ii) of Standing Order 15, for which he could be reprimanded or fined. The termination ref his services was, therefore, contrary to law, besides being inconsistent with natural justice.

6. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, urged that in view of the admission of his guilt during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court, the petitioner is not entitled to re-instatement. In this behalf he referred me to an application made by the petitioner (Exh. D. A.) on 3rd January 1972, wherein, he submitted an apology and prayed for re-instatement. There is no doubt that he did make this application but from a perusal of the endorsement of his immediate boss hereon it would appear that the petitioner was a good worker, and his case was, therefore, recommended for re-employment on the strength of which the petitioner was re-employed with effect from 4th January 1972, vide office Order of that date (Copy, Exh P. E). Now If the petitioner was a good worker and he could be re-employed in the same grate in which he was working when his services were terminated, there wag no reason why he could not be re-instated, especially when the enquiry made against him was not made in accordance with the principles of natural justice and also when the termina tion of his services was contrary to law. I, therefore, feel that the petitioner is entitled to re-instatement from the date from which his services were terminated. I have consulted my colleague, Mr. Shaida. A. Qureshi in this behalf and he agrees with me. Accordingly I accept the petition, set aside the order of the respondent terminating the services of the petitioner and direct that he shall be re-instated from .the date from which his services were terminated and he shall be entitled to all the benefits and privileges guaranteed to him by law from that date. Parties are, however, allowed to bear their own costs.