1998 PLP 653 (CLC)

(1) Sher Afzal Khan and others v. Haji Razi Abdullah and others (1984 SCMR 228). (2) Malik Shahab Din and 4 others v. Imdad Ali Ghallu A.D.C.(G), Bahawalpur and 7 others (1986 CLC 2194). (3) Mst. Memona Begum v. State (PLD 1990 Rev. 8). ' (4) Anjuman Falaho Bahbood Muhajreen v. Abdul Majeed (1991 CLC 1806). (5) Zar Khan and 8 others v. Faqir Gul and 4 others (PLD 1993 Peshawar 39). (6) M. Sharif and others v. M. Anis Nagi (1993 CLC 1123). (7) Ghulam Muhammad v. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukhera and 4 others (1993 MLD 423).

5. After the repeal of the settlement laws the Notified Officer enjoys limited authority to decide the pending or remand cases as laid down under section 2(2) of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975. It reads as under:‑‑‑ "Upon the repeal of the aforesaid Acts and Regulations, all proceedings which immediately before such repeal, may be pending before the authorities appointed thereunder shall stand transferred for final disposal to such Officers as may be notified by the Provincial Government in the official Gazette and all cases decided by the Supreme Court or a High Court after such repeal which would have been remanded to any such authority in the absence of such repeal shall be remanded to the officers notified as aforesaid. " Obviously, the petitioners' case was not pending at the relevant time. Moreover, it was not remanded to the Notified Officer by the High Court or the Supreme Court. The Revenue Authorities or for that matter other Authorities are not clothed with the power to make a reference to the Notified Officer merely because the allotment/transfer of evacuee property appeared to be tainted with fraud or forgeries. The Notified Officer does not enjoy plenary powers like a Civil Court. This view finds support from the judgment in the case of "Sultan Hassan Khan and 2 others v. Mst. Nasim Jahan and 17 others" (1994 SCMR 150). The relevant part of the judgment is reproduced below: "The question therefore, to be considered would be whether forgery and fraud have been committed by the petitioners' predecessor‑in‑interest in obtaining PTD in his favour. Such question cannot be decided by the departmental authorities. Where question of fraud, forgery or misrepresentation is involved, unless specifically barred under law, the jurisdiction remains with the Civil Court to decide such issue." In the case of Sher Afzal Khan and others (relied upon by the respondents learned counsel), it was held as under:‑‑‑ "We do not see how, after the repeal of these laws, the authorities under the new dispensation that came into being under the repealing statute and under the new scheme promulgated in 1976, could undertake an enquiry in order to review and reopen such past and closed transactions. Even a case of fraud could be enquired into or adjudicated upon provided jurisdiction to exercise such power survives the repeal. No such provision was pointed out by the learned counsel. The exercise of jurisdiction was, therefore, palpably coram non judice and wholly a incompetent."

6. In view of the above legal position, I am not inclined to interfere in the impugned orders, dated 27‑6‑1995, 29‑9‑1996 passed by the learned Additional Commissioner (Revenue) and the Member, Board of Revenue respectively. The petitioners may, if so advised, file a civil suit for redress of their grievance. In case, any suit is filed by the petitioners, the same shall be independently decided by the Civil Court on merits in accordance with the law. The petition is dismissed in limine with the above observation. A.A./S‑152/L Petition dismissed.