P L D 1967 Dacca 297 (PLP)

MURSHED, C. J.‑This is an application, of the petitioner, who under an arrangement made by the Controlling Authority (Respondent No. 1), was appointed to conduct the business of the office of‑the Dehi‑Nizampur Local Council in the capacity of a Chairman during the casual vacancy in that office, namely, that of the Chairman, who has been detained under a preventive detention order for an indefinite period. The Controlling Authority purported to act under Rule 8‑A of the East Pakistan Local Councils .Business Rules which reads as follows:‑ "8‑A. If there is any casual vacancy in the office of the Chairman by reason of the resignation, removal or death of the elected Chairman or otherwise, the Controlling Authority may subject to the provision of the Order and the Rules `make, by an order in writing' such arrangement for conduct of the business and the exercise of executive powers of the Local Council during the continuance of the casual vacancy as he deems fit." What happened is that respondent No. 1 by an order in writing dated 6‑11‑65 asked the petitioner to conduct the business of the relevant Union Council under the provisions of the aforesaid rule. Sometime later respondent No. 1 asked respondent No. 2 to carry on the same business in Supersession of the order that he had passed earlier. Petitioner has, therefore, challenged the legality of the order by which respondent No. 2 was asked to conduct the business of the Union Council under the aforesaid rule. The points sought to be made by the petitioner in this petition are two folds. In the first place, it is contended that once the respondent No. I passed an order in writing in favour of the petitioner on 6‑11‑65, he was incompetent to pass the second order. The substance of this point is that under the aforesaid rule 8‑A of the East Pakistan Local Councils Business Rules, respondent No. 1 was not authorised to pass a second order. We have no hesitation to reject this contention, because it is obvious from the plain language of rule 8‑A, as quoted above, that the aforesaid rule merely purports to confer a power on the Controlling Authority to make a stopgap arrangement during the continuance of the casual vacancy. This does not mean that the Controlling Authority is authorised to make an order once and only once. To us it seems clear that the Controlling Authority has to pass an order in writing. But, there is no such limitation imposed by the language of the rule by which he is confined to make one order only. It is said that the Controlling Authority is not permitted to have a second bite at the cherry. It is patent from the phraseology of the rule itself that what was ‑intended was to enable him to make a stopgap arrangement. There is no reason to think that he can pass only one order and that having once passed an order he becomes functus officio. Our attention was drawn to subsection (10) of section 26‑F of the Bengal Tenancy Act which reads thus:‑ "An appeal shall lie to the ordinary Civil Appellate Court from any order of a Court under this section." It is clear from the language of subsection (10) of section 26‑F of the Bengal Tenancy Act that it creates a right to prefer an appeal against an order under that section. It is also, clear from the terms of subsection (10) in the context of section 26‑F that any order means any particular order. It is difficult, however, to import the text and context of subsection (10) of section 26‑F of the Bengal Tenancy Act into the language of Rule 8‑A of the East Pakistan Local Councils Business Rules. One creates a right and the other is merely an enabling provision which empowers the making of stopgap arrangement. This is a vital distinction which cannot be lost sight of. Secondly, it hag been contended that a 'right was vested in the petitioner because of the order made under the aforesaid rule 8‑A by which the petitioner was asked to conduct the business of the Local Council during the casual vacancy. We do not think, any right was created in favour of the petitioner or that any such right was vested in him. What has happened is that‑the Controlling Authority in exercise of his power that was conferred upon him, made a particular kind of arrangement which he was at liberty to alter according to the exigencies of the situation. This point is ancillary to the point which we have stated above. We, therefore, think that it is equally untenable. Thirdly, another grievance which cannot bear scrutiny for a moment, has been made to the effect that the petition was not given an opportunity to make a representation against his removal from the privilege of fulfilling a stopgap function. As we have held that no right vested in him, he cannot claim any right to be heard before another kind of arrangement is made by the Controlling Authority. This disposes of the points raised before us. The application is, therefore, rejected. M. R. KHAN, J.‑I agree. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.