2008 PLP 314 (SCMR)

MUHAMMAD MOOSA K. LEGHARI, J.

This petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order, dated 18-9-2007 passed by a learned Division Bench of High Court of Sindh, Karachi, whereby the constitutional petition filed by the petitioners was dismissed. The petitioners claimed to be the employees of Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. and alleged that their services were terminated by an incompetent authority in violation of the law and fundamental rights.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners admitted before the learned High Court that the alternative remedy before the Labour Court is available to the petitioners. Accordingly the petition filed by the petitioners was dismissed and it was observed that the petitioners shall be free to seek redressal of their grievances from the proper forum under the law.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners at length. Learned counsel contended that the petitioners were employed by the Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. on daily wages basis and were working there since 5-6 years, as such they have become permanent workers consequently, they are entitled to protection of service under the Standing Orders Ordinance, but their services were terminated without notice, in violation of law and the fundamental rights provided under the Constitution. Thus, the High Court was competent to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction.

4. However, after considerably arguing the case learned counsel for the petitioners has to eventually concede before us that the petitioners being workmen were entitled to seek remedy from the Labour Court under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. He however, subsequently, made a feeble submission to convince us that since a question of law involving fundamental rights was raised, constitutional petition before the High Court was competent. We are afraid this proposition is simply unacceptable. It is well-recognized that if a right has been conferred by a statute and a complete mechanism has been provided for enforcement thereof, there could hardly be any occasion to invoke the applicability of fundamental rights. The jurisdiction of the High Court will be patently barred under Article 212 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in view of the specific forum provided for redressal of the grievances of the petitioners, even if the order proposed to be challenged may have been passed in whatsoever circumstances viz. mala fide, coram non judice or without jurisdiction. This principle has been laid down in the case of I.A. Sharwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad and others 1991 SCMR 1041. Besides it is also well-settled proposition of law that writ jurisdiction could not be exercised where equally efficacious remedy is available. As claimed by the petitioners in the case in hand, they are workmen and have been employed by a Corporation i.e. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. In such circumstances, their remedy would be before the Labour Court established under the Industrial Relation Ordinance.

5. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed and leave is refused.

6. After the order was announced, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners intend to seek remedy from the appropriate forum but their grievance petitions may not be entertained on account of bar of limitation. He, therefore, prayed for issuing such directions, so as to condone the delay. We are unable to accept such a prayer as it will be for the competent forum to deal with the question of limitation. However, we feel it proper to observe that in case of any such move is made on behalf of the petitioners it may be given due consideration in view of the fact that the rights of employment of the petitioners are involved in the matter. M.H./A-71/SC Petition dismissed.