1985 PLP 751 (PLC)

This constitutional petition assails the judgment, dated 4th April, 1983, passed by the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore.

2. The respondent Muhammad Arif was employed as Bus Conductor by the Punjab Urban Transport Corporation. In December, 1979, he was charge-sheeted for embezzlement inasmuch as he had allegedly charged fare from 13 passengers but did not issue tickets to them. As a result of domestic inquiry conducted by the employer, the respondent was found guilty of embezzlement in respect of four passengers and consequently he was dismissed by the District Manager on 21st January, 1982.

3. After service of the grievance notice, the respondent challenged his dismissal before the learned Labour Court Rawalpindi under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The learned Presiding Officer of Punjab Labour Court No. 6, Rawalpindi, after hearing the parties concluded that full opportunity of being heard had been given to the petitioner and all the legal requirements were duly fulfilled. He consequently dismissed the grievance petition of the respondent.

4. Feeling aggrieved, an appeal was preferred by the respon dent before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal and the learned Tribunal after going through the records found that the charge of embezzlement was not proved against the respondent inasmuch as no passenger was examined during the course of domestic inquiry to say that he had in fact paid the fare to the conductor but he did not issue ticket to him. It was also found by the learned Tribunal that even at the time of checking by the checker, who reported the alleged embezzlement against the respondent, no statement of any passenger was recorded in the presence of the conductor concerned. In view of these observations the learned Tribunal accepted the appeal and set aside the decision of the learned Labour Court on 4th April, 1983. The re-instatement of the respondent was, therefore, ordered. Thus the present constitutional petition.

5. It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the petitioner (employer that the factual part of a domestic inquiry by the employer is open to the scrutiny by the Labour Courts only to the limited extent and that abstract principles or standards of criminal prosecution or of a civil litiga tion should not be applied to such proceedings.

6. There can be no dispute about this proposition of law, which has in fact been enunciated in Punjab Road Transport Board, Lahore v. Fazal Elahi and another (P L D 1976 Lah. 1414), but even the limited scope of scrutiny by the Labour Courts, positively includes the assessment that if the finding arrived at during the domestic inquiry is justified and warranted by the material available on the records of such inquiry. In the circumstances of the present case it has been clearly held by the learned Appellate Tribunal as a finding of fact that the allegation of embezzlement against the respon dent was not proved as there was nothing on the record to suggest in the absence of the statement of the passengers concerned that the respondent had in fact received the fare from the passengers but had not issued tickets to them. This finding of fact recorded by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction even if on the basis of evidence adduced before the Labour Court a different conclusion could be arrived at. It is a settle proposition of law that a Court or Tribunal of competent jurisdiction can decide a matter rightly or wrongly and its decision cannot be interfered with in exercise of writ jurisdiction. In Muhammad Husain Munir and others v. Sikandar and others (P L D 1974 S C 139), it has been observed "It is wholly wrong to consider that the constitutional provision was designed to empower the High Court to interfere with the decision of a Court or tribunal of inferior jurisdiction, merely because in its opinion the decision is wrong. In that case it would make the High Court' jurisdiction indistinguishable from that exerciseable in a full-fledged appeal, which plainly is not the intention of the Constitution-makers. When there is jurisdiction to decide a particular matter then there is jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly and the fact that the decision is incorrect does not render the decision without jurisdiction."

7. In the light of above discussion, we find that our interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction is not called for in the under consideration case. The writ petition, in this view of the matter, is dismissed, but there shall be no order as to costs. M. Y. H. Petition dismissed.