P L D 1952 Baghdad﷓ul﷓Jadid 38 (PLP)

ABDUL AZIZ, C. J.-Mst. Khandal brought a civil suit to obtain a declaration that in the presence of her marriage with one Shah Muhammad her second marriage with Pathana defen dant was against the Muslim Law and consequently invalid. She succeeded to get a decree in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge Bahawalpur. Appeal of Pathana against that decree was dis missed by the learned District Judge Bahawalpur on 29th of December, 1951. This is a second appeal before this Court. Various grounds of appeal were raised on behalf of the appel lant but one of them was that the learned District Judge after hearing the arguments on 16th of August 1951 and without keeping a memorandum of arguments decided the appeal five months after that, i.e., on 29th of December, 1951. It was not possible for the learned District judge to keep in mind the arguments heard five months back and to give a correct deci sion and in accordance with law. There is no denial of the fact that the arguments in the appeal were heard by the learned District judge on 16th of August 1951 and the appeal was adjourned to 29th of August 1951 for consideration and after 29th of August 1951 it was adjourned to 15th of October 1951, 20th of October 1951, 31st of October 1951, 12th of November 1951, 6th of December 1951 for the same purpose It was on 29th of December 1951 as I have already remarked the judg ment was scribbled and delivered. Rule 1 of Order 20 Civil P. C. lays down "The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day, of which due notice shall be given to the R parties or their Pleaders". The word future day to my mind means reasonably future day and not an unreasonably future day. The object of the argument to be heard, before the case is finally decided, is to afford an opportunity to the parties to put their case before the Court both on facts and law. It becomes the imperative duty of the Court immediately after hearing the argument to deliver its judgment one way or the other. If he is unable to do so immediately the arguments are concluded then the law allows him to adjourn the case to some future day for that purpose. Future day, as I already stated, should be a reasonable day, during which the learned Judge can retain in his brain, the arguments which were addressed to him and which is a condition precedent under law, to decide cases and to deliver his judgment. It passes my comprehension how a Judge can discharge that pious duty five months after hearing the arguments, as I cannot conceive for moment that he can ever retain in his brain the arguments of the parties for such a long period. If the judgment is delivered in such like circumstances then to my mind it would be tanta mount to deliver a judgment without hearing the parties. And it is settled law that no valid judgment can be given without hearing the parties. The circumstances of the present case' therefore clearly lead me to the conclusion that the judgment, delivered by the learned judge five months after hearing the! arguments, was no judgment in the eyes of law. This practice; had been-severely criticised by the Hon'ble Chief Justice in the F. B. ruling Satyendra Nath Ray Chaudhry v. Kastura Kumari Ghatwalin, 1935 Cal.

756. The same view was adopted by Nagpur Judicial Commissioners Court in Rajab Khan v. Langdaji, 15 I C

938. From the circumstances in the present case and the law bearing on the subject I cannot hesitate to observe that the judgment delivered by the learned judge was tantamount to deliver a judgment without hearing the parties. The record shows that within the intervals of 16th of August 1951 and 29th of August, 1951, i.e., within the period of 14 days he was unable to make up his mind. Could it be reasonably possible for him to retain the arguments in his brain for five months and then to be competent to deliver the judgment in accordance with law ? My conclusion is in the negative. In these circumstances I have no alternative but to hold that this judgment not being in accordance with law must be set aside and I do hereby set it aside directing the learned judge to call upon the parties to re-argue the case before him and then to decide it immediately after hearing the arguments. If not, then within a reasonable period which to my mind should never be more than a fortnight. I pass no order as to costs. The cost in the lower Court shall be the cost in the cause. The parties shall appear in the Court of District Judge Bahawalpur on 6th March, 1952. In the end I cannot hesitate to strongly deprecate the slovenly method of writing judgments months and months after hearing the arguments, which not only affects the course of justice but also results in inflicting undeserved punishment on the poor litigants of engaging counsel for the second time to argue their cases. A. H. Judgment set aside.