1988 PLP 759 (PLC(CS))
TEXTILE MANAGEMENT LTD. & MUHAMMAD FAROOQ TEXTILE MILLS LTD. Versus M.A. QADEER
| Citation | 1988 PLP 759 (PLC(CS)) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind |
| Bench Members | Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | TEXTILE MANAGEMENT LTD. & MUHAMMAD FAROOQ TEXTILE MILLS LTD. Versus M.A. QADEER |
| Primary Law | Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1988 PLP 759 (PLC(CS))?
This judgment primarily cites: Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1988 PLP 759 (PLC(CS))?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1988 PLP 759 (PLC(CS)) (TEXTILE MANAGEMENT LTD. & MUHAMMAD FAROOQ TEXTILE MILLS LTD. Versus M.A. QADEER). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Masood Mirza and Siddiq Mirza for Appellants.
- M.M. Jeelani for Respondent
- 5. I have heard Messrs Masood Mirza and Siddiq Mirza, the learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. M.M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. Mr. Masood Mirza has submitted that the appellant No.l was a Private Limited Company whereas the appellant No.2 was a Public Limited Company and this fact is enlisted on the Stock Register of the Country. He further pointed out that the appellant No.l is purely a commercial establishment whereas the appellant No.2 is mainly engaged in the manufacture of cotton yarn, textile fabrics, finished or otherwise, having its factory at Korangi Industrial Area, Karachi and its registered office was situated at the above address. He further pointed out that it was on admitted position that the appellant No.l did not employ 20 or more workers and as such the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial' Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were not applicable in respect of persons employed therein, and that is why the respondent had preferred a grievance petition to the appellant No. 2 in which the respondent had ceased to be in the employment since 22‑10‑1977, when he settled all his legal dues as far back as 26‑11‑1977. Mr. Masood Mirza, the learned,,. Counsel on behalf of the appellants has further argued that the impugned order was vague, unspecific and devoid of being implemented as both the appellants had been directed to reinstate the respondent with full back benefits within 15 days and in the eyes of law the impugned order is not a proper order, unless it contained the directions to any one of the above two appellants. He further argued that the learned Labour Court had erred in not appreciating the admitted position of the fact that the respondent was originally employed by appellant No.2 when he ceased to be in its employment as far back as October/ November, 1977. Mr. Masood Mirza has pointed out that the respondent, in his cross -examination has specifically admitted that the appellant No.l was a Private Limited Company whereas the appellant No.2 was a Public Limited Company and as such, their complexion, function and status were different from one another, thus, the learned Labour Court was misguided by the circumstantial evidence in arriving` at the conclusion that both the appellants were sister concerns, which conclusion was contrary to the facts and law. He, lastly submitted that a person can be employed by one employer at a time and thus, by holding both the appellants liable for the consequences, arising out of the impugned order led to ambiguity to the extent of absurdity. On the other hand, Mr. M.M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate for the respondent has no legs to stand in support of his case as he has nothing to submit in rebuttal of the submission of Mr. Masood Mirza. I would, therefore, hold that both the appellants were separate and independent concerns having separate identity and status not connected with each other and that the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance 19681 were not applicable to the establishment of appellant No.2. I further hold that the respondent was an employee of appellant No.l and not of appellant No.2, ‑ therefore, his grievance petition against both the appellants before the learned Labour Court was not legally maintainable, hence, it is dismissed.
- 6. As regards the issue of termination of services of the respondent is concerned, it is submitted by Mr. Masood Mirza for the appellants that admittedly the appellant No.l did not employ 20 or more workers and as such the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial. Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 were not applicable to its employees and that it was further an admitted position that there was no relation of master and servant between the appellant No.2 and the respondent, therefore, the termination of service of the respondent by appellant No.l was correct and lawful. Mr. Masood Mirza, the learned Counsel for the appellants argued that in view of the admitted position, the present case did not come' within the mischief of Standing Order 12(3) of the said Ordinance) Mr. Masood Mirza has contended that as the number of employees ink the appellant No.l establishment were less than 50, therefore, the, provision of Standing Order 12(1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 were applicable, thus, the termination of the respondent from service was quite lawful and need no interference. In support of his arguments, Mr. Masood Mirza has relied upon an Authority reported in P L D 1981 S C 39. On the other hand, the contentions of Mr. M.M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate for the respondent, on this issue, particularly in view of the above facts and circumstances, have no force. Case laws relied upon by him are distinguishable, hence, not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. I would therefore, hold that the termination of the respondent by the appellant No.l, in view of the above factual and legal position was correct and lawful and thus, maintained. Hence, the respondent was not entitled to maintain his grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, which is liable to be dismissed.
Headnotes / Summary
‑‑‑Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1908). 5.0.12‑‑Termination of services‑‑Worker claiming that his services were terminated by appellant No. l whereas he was in employment of appellant No. 2--Worker brought grievance petition against both appellants as both were allegedly sister concerns‑‑Labour Court accepting petition and reinstating worker‑‑Worker admitting in cross‑examination that appellant No.l was a private limited company and appellant No.2 was a public limited company and as such their complexion and function were different from one another and both concerns were having independent and separate identity and not connected with each other‑ -Provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance 1968 not applicable to establishment of appellant No.2‑‑Held, worker was employee of appellant No.l and since number of workers with said appellant was less than 50, provisions of Standing Order No.12(1) of Standing Orders Ordinance 1968 were attracted‑‑Grievous petition of worker against both appellants was not legally maintainable and termination of services of worker was quite lawful‑‑Order of Labour Court reinstating worker was set aside in circumstances.
Judgment & Decree
This is an appeal filed by Messrs Textile Management Ltd, and Messrs Muhammad Farooq Textile Mills Ltd, against an impugned order dated 30‑11‑1986, passed by the Sind Labour Court No.IV, Karachi, who had allowed the grievance petition of the respondent, namely, M.A. Qadeer, under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969.
2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent alleged that originally he served with appellant No.2, namely, Messrs Muhammad Farooq Textile Mills as a permanent workman and as since both the appellants were sister concerns, hence, after 9 years of service with appellant No.2, the respondent was required to join appellant No.l, namely, Messrs Textile Management Limited. Thus, he joined the services of the appellant No.l, but, he was also performing the work of appellant No.2 and as such, in fact, he was in the employment of appellant Np.2, through appellant No.l. It was alleged by the respondent that his services were terminated by appellant No.l, vide order, dated 16‑4‑1985. Thereafter, he submitted his grievance notice, dated 12‑7‑1985 to both the appellants, but, the appellant No.2 did not send reply to the grievance notice, while the appellant No.l had rejected his grievance, hence, he submitted his grievance petition before the learned Labour Court against both of the appellants.
3. The appellant No.l resisted the petition on merits, while, appellant No.2 had filed only legal objections to the effect that the respondent had voluntarily resigned their service on 22‑10‑1977 and was released from the service on 26‑11‑1977. It was also the case of the appellant No.2 that there existed no relationship of 'employer and employee' between it and the respondent. While, the case of appellant No.l was that the respondent had joined the service on 1‑11‑1979, vide appointment letter, dated 17‑1‑1980 and that it was an independent concern and had no connection with appellant No.2 and further that the number of employees working with it have been less than 20 since its inception, hence, the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were not applicable to it. On merits, it was the case of the appellant No.l that the respondent's services had been lawfully terminated, thus he was not entitled to maintain the grievance petition which was liable to be dismissed.
4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits‑in‑evidence and were duly cross‑examined. Thereafter the learned Labour Court had passed the impugned order, 'hence, the present appeal.
5. I have heard Messrs Masood Mirza and Siddiq Mirza, the learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. M.M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate on behalf of the respondent and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. Mr. Masood Mirza has submitted that the appellant No.l was a Private Limited Company whereas the appellant No.2 was a Public Limited Company and this fact is enlisted on the Stock Register of the Country. He further pointed out that the appellant No.l is purely a commercial establishment whereas the appellant No.2 is mainly engaged in the manufacture of cotton yarn, textile fabrics, finished or otherwise, having its factory at Korangi Industrial Area, Karachi and its registered office was situated at the above address. He further pointed out that it was on admitted position that the appellant No.l did not employ 20 or more workers and as such the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial' Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were not applicable in respect of persons employed therein, and that is why the respondent had preferred a grievance petition to the appellant No. 2 in which the respondent had ceased to be in the employment since 22‑10‑1977, when he settled all his legal dues as far back as 26‑11‑1977. Mr. Masood Mirza, the learned,,. Counsel on behalf of the appellants has further argued that the impugned order was vague, unspecific and devoid of being implemented as both the appellants had been directed to reinstate the respondent with full back benefits within 15 days and in the eyes of law the impugned order is not a proper order, unless it contained the directions to any one of the above two appellants. He further argued that the learned Labour Court had erred in not appreciating the admitted position of the fact that the respondent was originally employed by appellant No.2 when he ceased to be in its employment as far back as October/ November, 1977. Mr. Masood Mirza has pointed out that the respondent, in his cross -examination has specifically admitted that the appellant No.l was a Private Limited Company whereas the appellant No.2 was a Public Limited Company and as such, their complexion, function and status were different from one another, thus, the learned Labour Court was misguided by the circumstantial evidence in arriving` at the conclusion that both the appellants were sister concerns, which conclusion was contrary to the facts and law. He, lastly submitted that a person can be employed by one employer at a time and thus, by holding both the appellants liable for the consequences, arising out of the impugned order led to ambiguity to the extent of absurdity. On the other hand, Mr. M.M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate for the respondent has no legs to stand in support of his case as he has nothing to submit in rebuttal of the submission of Mr. Masood Mirza. I would, therefore, hold that both the appellants were separate and independent concerns having separate identity and status not connected with each other and that the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance 19681 were not applicable to the establishment of appellant No.2. I further hold that the respondent was an employee of appellant No.l and not of appellant No.2, ‑ therefore, his grievance petition against both the appellants before the learned Labour Court was not legally maintainable, hence, it is dismissed.
6. As regards the issue of termination of services of the respondent is concerned, it is submitted by Mr. Masood Mirza for the appellants that admittedly the appellant No.l did not employ 20 or more workers and as such the provisions of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial. Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 were not applicable to its employees and that it was further an admitted position that there was no relation of master and servant between the appellant No.2 and the respondent, therefore, the termination of service of the respondent by appellant No.l was correct and lawful. Mr. Masood Mirza, the learned Counsel for the appellants argued that in view of the admitted position, the present case did not come' within the mischief of Standing Order 12(3) of the said Ordinance) Mr. Masood Mirza has contended that as the number of employees ink the appellant No.l establishment were less than 50, therefore, the, provision of Standing Order 12(1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 were applicable, thus, the termination of the respondent from service was quite lawful and need no interference. In support of his arguments, Mr. Masood Mirza has relied upon an Authority reported in P L D 1981 S C
39. On the other hand, the contentions of Mr. M.M. Jeelani, the learned Advocate for the respondent, on this issue, particularly in view of the above facts and circumstances, have no force. Case laws relied upon by him are distinguishable, hence, not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. I would therefore, hold that the termination of the respondent by the appellant No.l, in view of the above factual and legal position was correct and lawful and thus, maintained. Hence, the respondent was not entitled to maintain his grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, which is liable to be dismissed.
7. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would set aside the impugned order and would allow the present appeal. The grievance petition of the respondent is hereby dismissed. The amount of back benefits, deposited by the appellants in this Tribunal be returned to them forthwith. M.Y.H./1194/Lb.S Appeal allowed.