1969 PLP 338 (SCMR)

Nemo for Respondent. Date of hearing : 16th April 1969. M. R. KHAN, J.‑The dispute giving rise to this petition for special leave to appeal relates to payment of compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. The respon dent's son Nasiruddin was an electrician in the office of the Project Director, Barrages Project, under the WAPDA. On the 8th of July 1964 Nasiruddin was asked to remove electric wires and fans from the office premises at 19‑Queens Road, Lahore for shifting the same to another promises at 34‑Lawrence Road, Lahore. While removing the electric wires, Nasiruddin received an electric shock which ultimately caused his death. Thereafter his father Shamasuddin (respondent) made an application, claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act on account of the death of his son. This application was opposed by the petitioner, who is the Director General, Barrages Project, WAPDA. The only ground on which the claim for compensation was resisted was that Nasiruddin was not a "workman" as defined in the said Act. The Commissioner of Workmen's Compensation allowed the application and ordered payment of Rs. 6,000 as compensation. The petitioner preferred an appeal in the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore. In the appeal, the only question that arose for consideration was whether the deceased Nasiruddin was a "workman". The learned Judges of the High Court answered this question in the affirmative and dismissed the appeal. The petitioner seeks special leave to appeal against the High Court's decision dismissing the appeal. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterates the same question before us. According to him, Nasiruddin (deceased) though an electrician in the office of the Project Director was not a "workman" as defined in section 2(1) (n) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The definition of a "workman" in the Clause (n), section 2(1) of the said section is as follows:‑ "Workman' means any person (other than a 'person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of employer's trade or business who is (i)

. (ii) cmplo5cd on monthly wages not exceeding five hundred rupees, in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II . . . . ." It is not disputed that the deceased was employed on monthly wages and his monthly wages did not exceed Rs.

500. According to item (ix) of the Schedule II of the Act, a workman includes any person who is :‑ "employed in setting up, repairing, maintaining or taking down any telegraph or telephone line or post or any overhead electric line or cable or post or standard for the same." The learned Judges of the High Court have held that the deceased, an electrician came within the admit of item (ix) of Schedule II quoted above as he was employed in removing an overhead electric line and was, therefore, a "workman". Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that the internal electric wirings which were being removed by the deceased were not "overhead electric lines" and, as such, he was not a "workman". In support of this contention, the learned counsel referred to the definition of "overhead electric line" given in the Factories Act, Mines Act, Railways Act, Light House Act and Electricity Act. The definition of "overhead electric line" in those Acts cannot be imported in order to ascertain the meaning of the expression "overhead electric line" occurring in Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The expression "overhead electric line" has not been defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act. As such, the said expression should be understood in its generic sense. The Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficial legislation for the benefit of employees. That being so, the definition of "workman" should not be construed rigidly and too much technical importance should not be given to any particular word or expression used in relation to that definition. We, therefore, think that the learned Judges of the High Court were right in taking view that the deceased Nasiruddin was a "workman" as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act. The petition for special leave to appeal is out of time by 5 days, and an application has been made by the petitioner for condonation of delay. It is stated in the application that the delay was due to the fact that the petitioner was not informed by the copying agency of the High Court that the copy of the impugned order was ready for delivery. The petitioner himself should have taken care to ascertain when the copy applied for, was made ready. The alleged reason for the delay is not convincing. The prayer for condonation of delay is, therefore, rejected. In the result, the petition for special leave to appeal is dismissed both on merits and on the ground of limitation. Leave refused