CLC 1991

1991 PLP 803 (CLC)

MUKHTAR ALI KHAN LODHI and 8 others ‑‑‑ Petitioners Versus DY. ADMINISTRATOR, E.T.P. (RURAL) and 2 others ‑‑‑ Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi
Decided Date
Constitutional Petition No.D‑362 of 1985, decided on 8th November, 1990.
Honorable Judges
Saleem Akhtar and Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1991 PLP 803 (CLC)
Forum / Court Karachi
Bench Members Saleem Akhtar and Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo, JJ
Parties MUKHTAR ALI KHAN LODHI and 8 others ‑‑‑ Petitioners Versus DY. ADMINISTRATOR, E.T.P. (RURAL) and 2 others ‑‑‑ Respondents
Primary Law Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1991 PLP 803 (CLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1991 PLP 803 (CLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Saleem Akhtar and Mukhtar Ahmed Junejo, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1991 PLP 803 (CLC) (MUKHTAR ALI KHAN LODHI and 8 others ‑‑‑ Petitioners Versus DY. ADMINISTRATOR, E.T.P. (RURAL) and 2 others ‑‑‑ Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑‑

Representation

  • Maroof Ali Khan for Petitioners.
  • S.H. Fani for Respondents.
  • Date of hearing: 8th November, 1990.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑‑ Art. 199 ‑‑‑ Martial Law Regulation (M.L.R.57) ‑‑‑ Authority having once found that it had no jurisdiction on subject‑matter agitated before it, it should dispose of matter on that point without making any observation on the merits of the case‑‑‑Any observation made upon merits of case by Authority would be without jurisdiction.

Judgment & Decree

‑‑‑‑ Art. 199 ‑‑‑ Martial Law Regulation (M.L.R.57) ‑‑‑ Authority having once found that it had no jurisdiction on subject‑matter agitated before it, it should dispose of matter on that point without making any observation on the merits of the case‑‑‑Any observation made upon merits of case by Authority would be without jurisdiction. Maroof Ali Khan for Petitioners. S.H. Fani for Respondents. Date of hearing: 8th November, 1990. SALEEM AKHTAR, J.‑‑‑The petitioners' grand father was allotted land in Survey Nos.617, 326 and 327 Deh Thano Tappo Malir, Taluka and District Karachi East. Under Martial Law Regulation 57 petitioners' predecessor was allowed to purchase the land by order dated 30‑6‑1974. On 1‑7‑1974 Evacuee Laws were repealed and on 16‑12‑1974 Haji Fikhatullah the grand father of the petitioners died. However, on 10‑3‑1975 permission to purchase was withdrawn but it was restored in favour of Shaukat Ali Khan the father of the petitioners and on 23‑10‑1976 he paid entire price. This transfer was challenged by the brother of Shaukat Ali Khan in Revision Application and the transfer was withdrawn on 18‑5‑1977. This order was challenged by the petitioners in Constitution Petition No.60 of 1977 which was allowed on 2‑10‑1984. The transfer remained in the name of petitioner as legal herself Shaukat Ali Khan. On 25‑8‑1985 P.T.D. was issued in favour of the petitioners. The respondent No.1 filed a reference under M.L.R. 57 in respect of these agricultural lands praying that the petitioners or any other persons claiming through or under them or on behalf of them may be ejected under MLR 57 and the same may be restored to the applicant free from encumbrance. The petitioners took up the stand that the property is not an evacuee property. It was declared skin land as far back as on 11‑2‑1966, therefore the Chairman Evacuee Trust Property acting as an authority under MLR 57 had no jurisdiction to entertain the reference. The respondent No.2 by order dated 20‑3‑1985 held that the property in dispute is an evacuee trust property but simultaneously held that being a sikni property it cannot come within the purview of MLR 57 and the reference was therefore dismissed. The Revision Application filed against this order by the petitioners challenging the observations of respondent No.2 that the property is an evacuee trust property was also dismissed with the observation that the petitioners may represent their case before the Chairman about the status of the property in question. Mr. Maroof Ali Khan the learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the ‑only grievance of the petitioners is that having held that respondent No.2 had no jurisdiction as the property was sikni land he was not competent to make further observation reflecting upon the character of the property. A perusal of the order will show that respondent No.2 has held that the property is sikni land. Therefore he had no jurisdiction and authority under Martial Law Regulation 57 to entertain and decide the reference. In these circumstances it was not necessary at all to have made any observation with regard to the merits of the case. Once an authority holds that he does not have any jurisdiction on the subject‑matter agitated before him he should dispose of the matter on that point without making any observation on the merits of the case. Any observation made upon the merits of the case will also be without jurisdiction. The petitioners have contended that due to this observation cloud has been cast upon their title to the property and respondents Nos.2 and 3 taking advantage of it are creating trouble for them. Mr. S.H. Fani the learned counsel states that as suggested by the Joint Secretary in his order the petitioners may approach the Chairman for declaration about the nature and character of the property. The nature of the property is not disputed by the petitioners who state that it has been allotted to them legally and is not an evacuee property. If respondents Nos.2 and 3 are aggrieved by such treatment and consider that the property is an evacuee trust property and has illegally been allotted to the petitioners they may move proper application to the relevant authorities for such declaration. The petitioners need not approach any authority in that regard because on the basis of documents in their possession prima facie they are entitled to the land. We therefore declare that the observation of respondent No.2 declaring the aforestated property as trust evacuee property is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. H.B.T./M‑1330/K Petition allowed.