1976 PLP 457 (SCMR)

Moulvi Sirajul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by Muhammad Ajaal Siddique, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing : 8th July 1976. DORAB PATEL, J.‑The dispute in this petition for leave relates to a bungalow in Risalpur leased by the third respondent to the petitioner. In the events that happened, the third respondent filed an application against the petitioner for her eviction under section 17 of the Cantonment Rent Restriction Act, 1953. The application was pressed on several grounds one of which was that the petitioner was using the demised premises for a purpose not contemplated under the demise. As this application was dis missed by the Rent Controller an 7‑3‑1974, the third respondent filed an appeal against this order in the District Court, Peshawar. The appeal was heard by the learned District Judge and the petitioner was represented by the fourth respondent, who was both her attorney and her husband. In the course of the hearing of the appeal on the 14th of December 1974, the fourth respondent made an offer that if the third respondent "takes oath on the Holy Qur'an that Bungalow No. 116 in question was given to the (petitioner) only for the residential purposes and the said premises were not given on rent to her for running a hostel, then the suit may be decreed in favour of the (third respondent)". The third respondent was willing to take oath and said on oath that the premises in dispute had been demised only for residential purposes, therefore, in view of the fourth respondent's statement the learned District Judge by his order dated 14‑12‑1974 allowed the appeal and directed the eviction of the petitioner. Moulvi Sirajul Haq informed us that the petitioner had filed a review application against this order, which she withdrew as she could not obtain a stay. Thereafter the petitioner filed a writ petition against the respondents in the Peshawar High Court against the said order of 14‑12‑1974 and this petition was pressed on two grounds. The first was that the agreement to dispose of the appeal by a special oath was collusive and the second was that the power of attorney given by the petitioner to the fourth respondent did not empower him to agree to dispose of the appeal by a special oath. The respondents contested the petition which was dismissed by a Division bench of the Peshawar High Court on 24‑2‑1976. Hence this petition for leave. The question whether the compromise entered into on 14‑12‑1974 by the fourth respondent was the result of collusion between him and the third respondent, is a question of fact and Moulvi Sirdjul Haq that he could not press this plea. That is correct and learned counsel pressed the petitioner only on tae ground that the fourth respondent had not been empowered by the petitioner under her power of attorney to dispose of the appeal against her by a special oath. The petitioner had executed a power oaf attorney on 24‑1‑1974. The power was with reference to the litigation between her and the third respon dent, and she had, by the power of attorney expressly empowered the fourth respondent to enter into agreements on her behalf. As the power to enter into agreements was conferred with reference to the pending litigation. it included the power to settle that litigation by any type of agreement and the manner in which the fourth respondent had compromised the appeal was only a type of agreement, therefore, it cannot be said that he had exceeded the authority conferred on him by settling the appeal In the manner adopt by him. Moulvi Sirajul Haq submitted that a power of attorney had to construed strictly and cited authority in support of this submission. We agree with the proposition that a power of attorney has to be construed strictly but the construction placed on the petitioner's power of attorney in the instant case by the District Court was a reasonable and proper construction, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petitioner's constitu tional petition. The petition is without merit and is dismissed, but we give the petitioner tour months time to hand over vacant possession of the demised premises to the third respondent on the condition that she would pay the rent due from her until the date of the delivery of the possession of the demised premises to the third respondent. Petition dismissed,