P L D 1961 W (PLP)

Kh. Abdur RaAim for Appellant. S. H. Qadiri for Respondent. This order will dispose of both the Revenue Appeal No. 19 of 1959‑60 (Buniad Ali v. Karam Bakhsh) and Revision No. 74 of 1959‑60 (Abdul Majid v. Karam Bakhsh), as they relate to the same Lambardari, the facts of which are as follows :‑ There were two non‑Muslim Lambardars in Chak No. 13/1‑AL District Montgomery and on their evacuation to India the Collector .appointed one Sardar Ali and the present appellant Buniad Ali. It is the latter's Lambardari which is in dispute. Abdul Majid the other petitioner was also a candidate for this Lambardari but he withdrew in favour of Buniad Ali whom the Collector appointed mainly on the ground that he represented the Major community and came of Lambardari stock. Karam Bakhsh respondent and Abdul Majid both appealed to the Commissioner who intervened on the ground that hereditary claims were not the deciding factor and the mere fact that Abdul Majid who was the direct descendant of a Lambardar had relinquished his claim in favour of his near collateral Buniad Ali, was not to be given that weight which the Collector had given. in making this appointment. This factor was merely one of the several ones which had to be taken into consideration. He then proceeded to assess the merits of the various claimants in terms of Land Revenue Rule 15 and came to the conclusion that Karam Bakhsh the present respondent was clearly and decidedly the best of the candidates in the field. As regards the, strength and importance of the various communities the Commissioner was at some pains to get the facts verified and came to the conclusion that the Arain community to which the respondent belonged was decidedly in a better position. He thereupon accepted the appeal and appointed Karam Bakhsh instead. Buniad Ali has filed a second appeal and Abdul Majid has filed a revision petition against that order. A preliminary objection has been taken in the appeal that it is time‑barred. Under section 14 of the Land Revenue Act time runs from the date of the order and not when the appellant comes to know of it. In this case the learned Commissioner reserved orders and finally announced them on 7‑9‑1959 in the ad absence of parties who were to be. informed. The appellant Buniad Ali's contention is that he learnt of the order on 25‑12‑1959, when the Dhal Bachh of the village was given by the Patwari to Karam Bakhsh respondent. He applied for a certified copy of the Commissioner's order on 26‑12‑1959 and a copy was supplied to him the same day. He applied for a copy of the Collector's order on 4‑1‑60 and it was supplied to him on the following day. The appeal, however, was lodged on 14‑1‑

60. It will thus be seen that the period of 90 days allowed for filing appeal had already expired when Buniad Ali got to know of the order and it is for the appellant now to explain every day of the delay which took place in filing the appeal. Nol explanation is forthcoming regarding. the period from 26‑12‑59 to 4‑1‑60 and again from 5‑1‑60 to 14‑1‑

60. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the latter had to make up his mind whether to file a second appeal or not and he had also to make other arrangements. The appellant, however, stated before me that he was bent on filing a second appeal under any circumstances. A period of 3‑4 days in modern times when transport facilities are easily available and means of communication are highly developed would be more than enough to move from Multan to Montgomery and then to Lahore to file an appeal. A reliance has been placed on certain observations made by Mr. Allan Mitchel, F. C. in Taj Muhammad v. Mukhram (P L D 1950 W. P. (Rev.) 506), these run as follows: "If the first two of these unexplained periods did not exceed a week each and the final period a fortnight I should have been prepared to hold that the appellant after receiving intimation of the result of the proceedings in the Commissioner's Court had shown due diligence in the prosecu tion of his appeal." These observations relate to a period about 20 years ago. Since then as already observed by me transport facilities have increased manifold and so have other means of communications. I do not think that these periods of time should be more than three days each in the circumstances as they exist today and as this is not so, I am not prepared to accept the plea that the appellant has shown due diligence in the prosecution of his appeal. The burden rested heavily on him to show sufficient cause but the appellant has remained absolutely quiet on this issue in the application which had been filed by him praying for extension of the period of limitation. I would, therefore, hold that the appellant has failed to establish that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the time prescribed and dismiss it as barred by limitation. Regarding the revision petition the matter is somewhat simple. It is urged that Abdul Majid had not withdrawn in favour of Buniad Ali and the reason given is that otherwise he would not have appealed to the Commissioner. The record of the case clearly shows the facts to be to the contrary. Another point on which stress is laid is that his direct forefathers were Lambardars in the Punjab (India) before Independence and this fact is considered to have conferred on him some sort of a prescriptive right. This is clearly incorrect. It is merely one of the circumstances which has to be taken into consideration while making an appointment under Land Revenue Rules 15 (a). The third point that has been urged is that the tribal composition, of the Patti given by the learned Commissioner in his order is incorrect. This is a question of fact and as already observed by me the learned Commissioner took special care to get a report regarding the tribal composition of the estate. There is no substance in this revision petition either which similarly stands dismissed. K.M. A. Petition dismissed.