2012 PLP 1112 (CLD)

The instant R.F.A. is directed against the judgment dated 20-9-2011 passed by the learned Additional District Judge Lahore with powers of Insurance Tribunal Punjab under the Insurance Ordinance (No.XXXIX) of 2000.

2. One Ali Ahmad who died on 29-2-2004 due to heart attack was an insurance policy holder with the Postal Life Insurance under Policy No.CL-35605-LHC. After his death, the respondent No.1 being the nominee of the deceased lodged the claim to recover the amount of insurance policy by moving an application before the Insurance Tribunal Punjab/Additional District Judge-I Lahore and the claim was allowed vide judgment dated 20-9-2011.

3. The instant appeal has been filed under section 124 of the Insurance Ordinance (No.XXXIX) of 2000 before this Court. C.M.No.2-C of 2012

4. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has raised a preliminary objection that the R.F.A. is barred by limitation by one day. It is further argued by the learned counsel that although the appellant has moved an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 through C.M.No.2-C of 2012 for condonation of delay but the special law regulating the preferring of an appeal under the Insurance Ordinance (No.XXXIX) of 2000 prescribes a period of 30 days limitation for preferring an appeal therefore .the delay cannot be condoned by invoking the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

5. The learned counsel for the appellant has however stressed upon the provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act 1908 for seeking the condonation of the delay. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the instant appeal is preferable within a period of 90 days as per Article 156 of Limitation Act, 1908. It is further argued that the law favours adjudication on merits and mere technical ground cannot be allowed to prevail against the entertainment of this appeal on merits.

6. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties.

7. The special law regulates the preferring of the instant appeal and prescribes a period of 30 days for the purpose as per section 124(2) of Insurance Ordinance 2000. Section 29 of the Limitation Act 1908 specifically gives protection to the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law. The Insurance Ordinance (No.XXXIX) of 2000 is a special law legislated on the subject of insurance and regulates the enforcement of the insurance claim and the impugned judgment was passed by the Tribunal constituted under section 121 of the Insurance Ordinance (No.XXXIX) of 2000. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Article 156 of the First Schedule of Limitation Act 1908 governs the period of limitation of the instant appeal is not sustainable. Section 29 of the Limitation Act 1908 is reproduced below:-- "Saving! (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section 26 of the Contract Act, 1872. (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefore in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law: (a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and (b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply. (3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to suits under the Divorce Act (IV of 1869). (4) Sections 26 and 27 and the definition of "easement" in section 2 shall not apply to cases arising in territories to which the Easements Act, 1882, may for the time being extend. It is also noted that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 have also been specifically excluded from its application to the matters being governed and regulated by any special or local law. The case-law in the reported judgments cited as ALLAH DINO AND ANOTHER v. MUHAMMAD SHAH AND OTHERS (2001 SCMR 286), SHUJAHAT HUSSAIN v. MUHAMMAD HABIB AND ANOTHER (2003 SCMR 176), CITY DISTRICT GOVERNMENT, LAHORE THROUGH DISTRICT COORDINATION OFFICER, LAHORE v. MIAN MUHAMMAD SAEED AMIN (2006 SCMR 676), BEGUM SYEDA AZRA MASOOD v. BEGUM NOSHABA MOEEN (2007 SCMR 914), ILAM DIN v. HASSAN DIN AND OTHERS (PLD 2006 LAHORE 121) and TAJ MUHAMMAD AND OTHERS v. PIRZADA KHALID MANSOOR AND OTHERS (2007 CLC 213) can be relied upon as guideline to the point that while interpreting the provisions of section 115 of C.P.C. it has been laid down that where a period of limitation is prescribed under a specific provisions of special or local law then the general principles of law of Limitation Act are not applicable. It is also laid down by the honourable Courts of Pakistan in the above case law that the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908 cannot be in such like cases invoked for seeking condonation of delay. The C.M. moved by the appellant for condonation of delay of one day in preferring the appeal is therefore not entertainable and is accordingly dismissed. MAIN CASE

8. As the appeal preferred by the appellant is admittedly barred by one day therefore the same is also dismissed. S.A.K./G-9/L Appeal dismissed.