P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

INAMULLAH, J.‑

This is an appeal under section 4(1) (f) of the Sind (Requisition of Land) Act, XLVI of 1947, hereinafter called the Act, against an award dated the 23rd of August 1960, under section 4 of the said Act.

2. The facts giving rise to the appeal, briefly put, are these: Plot No. 206 measuring about 1,557 sq. yards situated in Garden West, Karachi, was requisitioned by the Sind Government on 1st July 1947. It was subsequently acquired by the Central Government on the 30th of March 1955. The plot is said to be owned by Shamsuddin and Ramzan alias Shamboo. It was purchased by them in 1946 for a sum of Rs. 15,570 at the‑rate of Rs. 10 per square yard.

3. There was a dispute about the compensation. Mr. Ashhad Ali, Official Assignee, was appointed an arbitrator under the Act. The Government contended that the compensation should be determined at the rate of Rs. 8 per square yard, while the respondent contended that the value of the plot was much more, and the compensation should be determined at the rate of Rs. 25 per square yard. The respondents also claimed interest from the date of acquisition till the date of payment " of the compensation.

4. The arbitrator awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 13 per square yard, and rent from the date of requisition, namely, from the 1st of July 1947, till the 30th March 1955, the date of acquisition, Rs. 9,412 at the rate of 6 per cent. per annum on the compensation. He refused to award interest from the date of acquisition till the date of compensation.

5. The respondents filed a cross‑objection on 20th of December 1960. Mr. S. J., Alam, the learned Advocate for the Government of Pakistan, raised a preliminary objection that no cross‑objection was maintainable. He contended in this connec tion that the only remedy provided under the Act is to file an appeal. In this connection, he referred to section 4 (1)(f ) of the Act, which reads as under:‑-- "An appeal shall lie to the Chief Court against an award of an arbitrator except in cases where the amount thereof does not exceed an amount prescribed in this behalf by rule made by the Provincial Government;" There is not much force in this contention.

6. Mr. Valliani, the learned Advocate for the respondents, contended that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to an appeal filed by' a party against the award made by the Arbitrator and, therefore, the respondents could file cross objections under Order XLI, rule 22, C. P. C. In this connection, the learned Advocate relied on Lal Khazanchi Shah v. Haji Niaz Ali (A I R 1940 Lah. 438). The question before the learned Judges in that case was as to whether the provisions of Order XLI applied to Letters Patent Appeal. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that it did apply. We do not find any distinction between an appeal under the Letters Patent and an appeal filed under section 4 (1) (f) of the Act. The power conferred by clause 1 of the Letters Patent does not prescribe any rule for filing an appeal. Similarly, section 4 (1)(f) of the Act does not prescribe A any procedure for filing an appeal. The question that arose in the case referred to was as to what procedure would be applicable. There the learned Judges observed as under:‑ "Order XLI would apply to Letters Patent Appeals and in general there is no difference between the procedure in Letters Patent Appeals and ordinary appeal so far as the Civil Procedure Code is concerned. Cross‑objections can be taken in Letters Patent Appeal from a first appeal." It is not necessary to refer to the cases that have been followed by the Judges in this case. Mr. Alam, the learned Advocate for the Government, however, contended that Order XLI, rule 22, which entitles the respondents to file cross‑objections will not apply to an appeal filed against an award, as the same cannot. be said to be an appeal against a decree. There is not much substance in this contention. In this connection, a reference may be made to section 104 which reads as follows:‑-- "An appeal shall lie from the following orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of, this Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no there orders." It would appear from the above that the Requisition Act is a law within the meaning of section 104 of the Civil Procedure Code. If that is so, the provisions of Order XLIII, rule 2 would apply, which reads as under:‑-- "The rules of Order XLI shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from orders." Therefore, Order XLI, rule 22 in an appeal filed against orders would be applicable. In support of this conclusion, we would make a reference to the case of Mst. Sabitri Thakurain v. Savi and another (AIR 1921 PC80). We may further add as observed by the Judicial Committee in R. M. A. R. A. Adaikappa Chettiar and another v. Chandrasekhara Thevar (AIR 1948 P C 12) that‑ "Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the Country are seized of such disputes, the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal." On the principles laid down by their. Lordships of the Privy Council, the cross‑objection would be maintainable. We would for these reasons, hold that the cross‑objection is maintainable.

7. Mr. Valliani, the learned Advocate for the respondents, raised three‑fold contentions before us: He contended in the first place that no compensation has been paid by the Govern ment to his clients as mentioned in the award. It is stated in the award dated the 28th of August 1960, that Government has paid Rs. 2,896 to the respondents. Mr. Alam for the Govern ment concedes that the Government has not paid this sum of Rs. 2,896 as mentioned in the Award. The Government is, therefore, not entitled to deduct this amount from the compen sation awarded by the Arbitrator.

8. In the second place, it was contended that the share of the respondents, Shamsuddin and Ramzan Ali, is not half and half, as determined by the Arbitrator, but that the share of Shamsuddin is two‑third, while that of Ramzan Ali is one‑third. This proposition is also conceded by Mr. Alam. We would, therefore, hold that the share of Shamsuddin is two‑third and that of Ramzan Ali one‑third in the plot in question. They are, therefore, entitled to compensation in the share that they have in the plot acquired by the Government.

9. In the third place, it was contended by the learned Advocate for the respondents that they are entitled to interest from the date of acquisition to the date of payment of the com pensation. We have already held in I A. No. 145 of 1960, decided on 3rd March 1965, that persons whose plots have been acquired by the Government are entitled to interest at the rate of Rs. 4 per annum from the date of acquisition till the date of payment. The respondents, therefore, are so entitled.

10. The only contention that was raised on behalf of the Government besides the preliminary objection which we have already disposed of, is that the respondents are not entitled to the compensation at the, rate of Rs. 13 per square yard. We have held in respect of a similar plot of land in I. A. No. 145 of 1960, that the award of the arbitrator holding the market value of the plots at Rs. 13 per square yard cannot be challenged. We do not see any difference between this plot and the one which was the subject‑matter of appeal in the above case. In fact, so far as this plot is concerned, it was purchased by the respondents at the rate of Rs. 10 per square yard, and the expenses came to Re. I per square yard. Therefore, the value of the plot, according to the respondents, came to Rs. 11 per square yard, which has not been disputed by the learned Advocate for the Government. For these reasons, we would hold the rate of Rs. 13 per square yard fixed by the Arbitrator to be the market value.

11. In the result, the cross‑objection is allowed to the extent observed above. The appeal is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs. S.A.H./A.H. Appeal dismissed.