2008 PLP 454 (MLD)
NASIR AHMED GILL, ADVOCATE — Appellant Versus TAHIR MEHMOOD and 2 others — Respondents
| Citation | 2008 PLP 454 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | NASIR AHMED GILL, ADVOCATE — Appellant Versus TAHIR MEHMOOD and 2 others — Respondents |
| Primary Law | Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2008 PLP 454 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2008 PLP 454 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2008 PLP 454 (MLD) (NASIR AHMED GILL, ADVOCATE — Appellant Versus TAHIR MEHMOOD and 2 others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- NASIR AHMED GILL, ADVOCATE---Appellant
- Sher Afghan Asadi for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss.3, 4 & 7
Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.417(2)
Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.302(b)/34
Right of appeal had been conferred on convict against his conviction and on the Provincial Government from an order of acquittal by a Special Court
No such right had been conferred on the complainant, which implied that the Legislature in its wisdom did not deem it appropriate to extend the right of appeal on a private complainant
Section 7 of Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, at the time of its enactment did not contemplate a right of appeal to any one except convict but on realization that there was no provision in the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 to check an acquittal, right of appeal was conferred on the Provincial Government by an amendment introduced in S.7
Whenever the Legislature intended to extend the right of appeal, it did so by positive legislation
Contention that keeping in line with the provisions of S.417(2) Cr.P.C. such a right should have been granted to the complainant, was devoid of any substance as a right not conferred by the legislature could neither be read into an enactment nor could the same be supplemented by implication
Appeal being incompetent was not maintainable.
Judgment & Decree
This appeal is directed against the acquittal of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 who were tried along with their co-accused Tariq Mehmood by the Special Court established under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, Faisalabad, for offence under section 302 read with section 34, P.P.C. At the conclusion of the trial accused Tariq Mehmood was convicted under section 302(b), P.P.C. and sentenced to death whereas respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were acquitted. Through the instant appeal, the appellant, has challenged the acquittal of the respondents.
2. We have heard the learned counsel and have gone through the judgment of the learned Trial Court.
3. The question which needs determination by us relates to the very maintainability of the appeal. The Suppression of Terrorists Activities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1975) was promulgated and was published in the Gazette of Pakistan, dated 3rd February, 1975 with a view to provide for speedy trial of offences committed in furtherance of or in connection with acts of sabotage, subversion and terrorism. The offence triable under the Act by the Special Court constituted under sections 3 and 4 of the Act are duly mentioned in the schedule appended with the Act, the provision for appeal from the judgment of the trial Court is provided under section 7 of the Act which reads as under:-- "Appeal from sentence imposed by Special Court etc.
(1) A person sentenced by a Special Court shall have a right of appeal to High Court within whose jurisdiction the sentence has been passed "(and the Provincial Government may direct any person appointed by it for the purpose to present an appeal to the High Court from an order of acquittal passed by a Special Court)" but save as aforesaid and notwithstanding the provisions of the Code or of any other law for the time being in force or of any thing having the force of law by whatsoever authority made or done, no Court shall have authority to revise such sentence or to transfer any case from a Special Court or to make any order under section 426 or section 491 or section 498 of the Code or have any jurisdiction of any kind in, respect of any proceedings of Special Court. (2) An appeal under subsection (1) shall be preferred to the High Court within 30 days of the passing of the sentence or order of acquittal as the case may be and shall be heard and decided by a Bench of not less than two Judges of the High Court within three months. (3) Chapter XXIX of the Code shall apply to the suspension, remission and commutation of sentences passed by a Special Court."
4. The right of appeal has been conferred on the convict in case of conviction and the Provincial Government from an order of acquittal by a Special Court. No such right has been conferred on the complainant which implies that the legislature in its wisdom did not deem it appropriate to extend the right of appeal on a private complainant. It is noteworthy that section 7 of the Act at the time of its enactment did not contemplate a right of appeal to any one except the convict. On realization that there was no provision of the Act to check acquittals, right of appeal was conferred on the Provincial Government by special amendment introduced through Suppression of Terrorists Activities Act (Special Courts Amendment) Act 1976. The conclusion which can be drawn from the foregoing is that whenever the legislature intended to extend the right of appeal, it did so by positive legislation. The argument that keeping in line with the provisions of Section 417(2), Cr.P.C. such a right should have been granted to the complainant under the Act is devoid of any substance as a right nor conferred by the legislature can neither be read into an enactment nor can the same be supplemented by implications.
5. In the light of the above discussion, we have no hesitation in holding that the appeal is incompetent and therefore, not maintainable at law. Consequently it is dismissed. H.B.T./N-106/L Appeal dismissed.