P L D 1960 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

AMIRUDDIN AHMAD, J.-This is an appeal by special leave of this Court from a judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan at Lahore passed on a petition for writ under Article 170 of the late Constitution filed by respondent No. 1, Shah Muhammad Khan. The respondent No. 1 along with four other persons includ ing a member and ex-members of the District Board, sent a complaint in writing to the Inspector-General, Special Police Establishment, Karachi, making certain allegations of corruption and misappropriation of public founds against the Presidents of the Municipal Committee, District Board and Market Committee, Multan, and some others. On this the Inspector-General, Special Police Establishment, Karachi, who is respondent No. 2, deputed a Deputy Superintendent of Police, who is respondent No. 3, to investigate the matter. The latter registered a case under section 3 of Act II of 1947 on the 2nd October 1956, and commenced investigation. He made several arrests and wanted to make some more arrests when the Central Government inter vened on the 22nd of November 1956, suspended the investiga tion and ordered that the papers of the case should be handed over to the Provincial Police for such action as they might deem fit. Upon this the respondent No. 1, who describes himself in his writ petition as one of the active and eminent political workers of the Multan District and had been elected by the people from time to time to the District Board, Multan, apparently in the public interest filed the writ petition in question. He stated therein as follows :

"That the petitioner learns that the proceedings have been ordered to be suspended on the pretext that the Special Police Establishment has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases whereas such an order has been passed only to give protection to Syed Rehmat Hussain Shah Gilani, who is the principal accused in the case by transferring the cases to the Provincial Police where the accused is in a position to hush up the cases through his brother-in-law Mokhdoomzada Hassan Mahmood, Minister for Local Bodies", and in the last paragraphs of the petition he stated as follows :

"That the order of suspension of investigations, as indicated above, is a preclude to the transfer of the cases from the Central Police to the Provincial Police Agencies where, as already submitted, the principal accused is in a position to cloud the investigations with their influence and hush up the cases altogether. The order of the respondent No. 2 is clearly mala fide, unjust and uncalled for. That the petitioner has no legal remedy and hence he res pectfully invokes the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 170 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan Act for the redress of his grievance. In the above circumstances it is most respectfully prayed that an appropriate writ be issued against the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 restraining them to interfere with the police investigation being carried on by the D. S. P. above-named and directing the latter to continue with the investigation." Ostensibly he did not appear to have any personal interest or right in the matter but was acting pro bona publico. The High Court after discussing some sections of Ordinance VIII of 1948, by which the Special Police Establishment for investigation of offences was brought into being and given certain powers, held that the offences complained against were in connection with the matters concerning the Provincial Government and that a matter, which concerns defalcation or misappropriation of the District Board funds, con cerned the Provincial Government and that under section 3 the Central Government by a Notification had power to specify offences committed in connection with matters concerning the Provincial Government to be investigated by the Pakistan Special Police Establishment, and held that under section 2 (2) of the said Ordinance the Special Police Establishment in the present case had exclusive jurisdiction and powers of investigation and arrest. To our mind, the High Court has applied the section circum scribing the meaning of the opening words of subsection (2) which starts with the expression "subject to any orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf". This expression controls the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities of the Police ; and the latter part of the subsection, under which exclusive jurisdiction and powers of investigation and arrest have been given, also begins with a proviso as follows :

"Provided that, unless otherwise directed by the Central Government by a general or special order, where such offences or persons concerned in such offences are connected with matters concerning the Central Government or the Special Police Establishment has already started investigation of or has been ordered by the Central Government to investigate any such offence, the said Police Establishment shall have exclusive jurisdiction and powers of investigation and arrest." This exclusive jurisdiction is also controlled by the proviso "unless otherwise directed by the Central Government by a general or special order", and in this case the Central Government has made a special order against which the writ was directed and High Court's direction was issued. The ground on which leave was granted was to consider :

"Whether the complainant Shah Muhammad Khan had a vested right enforceable by writ to have his complaint of cor ruption and mal-administration enquired into by the Special Police Establishment, and not by the Provincial Police, or whether in making an order entrusting the investigation to the Provincial Police, there has been a breach of a mandatory requirement of law such as calls for correction by a writ." No law or regulation gives a complainant a vested right, which can be enforced by a writ to have his complaint investigated by a particular branch of the Police, and the law gives powers to the Central Government by a general or special order to take away the jurisdiction and powers of investigation and arrest of the Special Police Establishment by the proviso to section 2 (2) of the Ordinance referred to above. The respondent No. 1, therefore, had no right to maintain a petition for writ and the High Court was in error in issuing a direction on such a petition. The order of the High Court is, therefore, set aside and this appeal is allowed. R. B. A. Appeal allowed.