1987 PLP 1929 (CLC)

Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another P L D 1970 S C 139 and Kanwal Nain and 3 others v . Fateh Khan and others P L D 1983 S C 53 ref. Malik Abdus Sattar Chughtai for Petitioner. In a suit filed by Amir Hassan respondent No. 1 to claim share in the inheritance of one Imam Bakhsh who, he claimed, was his father; he also filed an application for a prohibitory order being passed against the defendants. Contest appears to have been entered thereto with the assertion that the plaintiff is a son actually of the defendant Muhammad Bakhsh, a brother of the deceased Imam Bakhsh. A number of documents were placed before the trial Court by the parties in support of their respective assertions and, upon a cursory examination thereof, learned trial Judge concluded that he did not appear to have a prima facie case and had not been proved to even be in possession of the land wherefore he was not likely to suffer irreparable loss either. Consequently, by his order dated 1‑6‑1987, he rejected his application.

2. In an appeal there against filed by the plaintiff‑applicant, a learned Additional District Judge duly attended to the documents and differing with the view held by the trial Judge, concluded that he has got a prima facie case and since he is still in possession of the land, therefore, he is also likely to suffer irreparable loss. Consequently, setting aside the order of the trial Court as being based on no cogent reasons, he accepted the appeal by his order dated 16‑5‑1987 into passing an order requiring status quo to be maintained till the final disposal of the suit.

3. Muhammad Ramzan, who is another brother of the deceased Imam Bakhsh and had been arrayed as defendant No. 5 in the suit, has now come up to this Court on revision wherein the plaintiff/ applicant has been arrayed as respondent No. 1 and the other defendants as respondents No. 2 to 6 but, for the reasons better known to the petitioner himself, he has recorded the father's name of respondent No. 1 as Muhammad Bakhsh contrary to the record of the suit and the appeal below wherein he is described as a son of Imam Bakhsh. I have not been able to discover any hypothesis for such a mis-description being made innocently while preparing this record and it can well have been made deliberately with the object of being able to divert attention at some later stage for confusing the issue to foster the interests kept dear by the person concerned.

4. Be the above as it may, learned Additional District Judge has duly attended to the documents placed on the record of the trial Court and has come to the conclusion that a prima facie case exists in favour of Amir Hassan and upon due consideration of the rules governing the grant of temporary injunctions, he has exercised his discretionary jurisdiction in his favour by holding that the trial Court had improperly exercised its discretion. The order passed in the appeal below in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction is really unexceptionable so that it cannot be considered to have been passed arbitrarily or fancifully within the rule of law laid down in Shahzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Mahmood Khan and another (P L D 1970 S. C.139) and, hence, it cannot become amenable to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction as has been reiterated also in Kanwal Nain and 3 others v. Fateh Khan and others (P.L.D. 1983 S.C. 53).

5. Learned counsel, however, contends that the said respondent is likely to squander away the property in the event of his coming to be invested therewith and has verbally prayed for an order of prohibition being passed against him. This prayer, apart from being a new one, also remains unsubstantiated on the record and is really outside the scope of the present proceedings, therefore, I have declined to entertain it. If ever an occasion arises, the petitioner can approach the trial Court by means of an appropriate application and if a proper case is made out for the purpose then that Court will be able to pass a suitable order in exercise of inherent jurisdiction vesting in all Courts to preserve the subject of litigation.

6. There is no force in this Civil Revision which is accordingly dismissed in limine. K.B.A./M‑306/L Petition dismissed in limine