1994 PLP 597 (PLC)
KARIM BUX and 2 others Versus THE GENERAL MANAGER, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, LAHORE and 7 others
| Citation | 1994 PLP 597 (PLC) |
| Forum / Court | Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh |
| Bench Members | Agha Ali Hyder, Appellate Tribunal |
| Parties | KARIM BUX and 2 others Versus THE GENERAL MANAGER, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, LAHORE and 7 others |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1994 PLP 597 (PLC)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1994 PLP 597 (PLC)?
The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sindh bench comprising: Agha Ali Hyder, Appellate Tribunal.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1994 PLP 597 (PLC) (KARIM BUX and 2 others Versus THE GENERAL MANAGER, PAKISTAN RAILWAYS, LAHORE and 7 others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Malik Muhammad Saeed for Appellants.
- Shabbir Ahmed Awan for Respondents.
- Date of hearing: 20th January, 1994.
Headnotes / Summary
Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Ss. 35 & 36‑‑‑Seniority‑‑‑Jurisdiction‑‑‑Employees had prayed that Authority should permanently be restrained and directed not to implement its policy letter with regard to seniority which according to employees was illegal and void by its nature‑‑‑Seniority of staff had not been revised through the policy letter, but only certain clarifications had been made in the light of judgment of Supreme Court‑‑‑Nobody's right having been affected one way or the other by said policy letter issued by Authority, prayer of employees was pre‑mature‑‑‑Labour Appellate Tribunal/Labour Court having no powers to grant stay/injunction employee's prayer was refused. Khushi Muhammad and others v. General Manager, Pakistan Railways PLD 1970 SC 203; Federation of Pakistan v. Azam Ali etc. PLD 1985 SC 175 and Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited v. 2nd Labour Court, Karachi 1973 PLC 111 ref.
Judgment & Decree
6. It was very clearly mentioned in the written statement that the seniority of the staff had not been revised yet, but only certain clarifications had been made in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court. This is what was deposed to by the respondent's witness Abdul Ghani, Abdul Razzak one of the appellants in his cross‑examination had also stated that the seniority list was under preparation and he did not know whether the same had been issued. Karim Bux is more forthright, and has admitted that there is no letter received regarding the change of seniority. So, it cannot be said that anybody is hurt. The position, therefore, is that there is nothing beyond a threat or portent, looming large over the heads of the appellants but there is no real cause of grievance to them as nobody's rights have been affected one way or the other. In short the petition is premature. That by itself is enough to dispose of the appeal but there is something more to it.
7. The relief sought by the petitioners is that the respondent should be restrained from implementing the policy dated 11‑3‑1987.
8. The powers of the Labour Court are, to be found in section 35(5) of the IRO which reads as under:‑‑ "(5) A Labour Court shall‑‑ (a) adjudicate and determine as industrial dispute which has been referred to or brought before it under this Ordinance, (b) enquire into and adjudicate any matter relating to the. Implementation or violation of a settlement which is referred to it by the Provincial Government, (c) try offences under this Ordinance, (and such other offences under any other law as the Provincial Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf.), (d) exercise and perform such other powers and functions as are or may be conferred upon or assigned to it by or under this Ordinance (or any other law). And the procedure of the Court is to be found in section 36 which reads as under:‑‑
36. Procedure and Powers of Labour Court.‑‑ (1) ......................................................................... (2) A Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) including the powers of: (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects, and (c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents. (3) ............................................................. (4) ............................................................. (5) .............................................................
9. These provisions do not bestow the powers of granting injunction to I the Labour Court. Support is to be found for the said proposition from a judgment of the Division Bench of the Sindh High Court namely Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited v. 2nd Labour Court, Karachi 1973 PLC 111 in which the interim order of the Tribunal in an application under section 34, I.R.O. praying in substance, for a declaration that the petitioner be continued to be employed by the management, had been challenged. The Bench consisted of Tufail Ali Abdul Rehman, C.J., and Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim, J. and the judgment was delivered by the Chief Justice, wherein it was observed as under:‑‑ "I am, therefore, of the view that subsection (2) does not confer upon a Labour Court, while adjudicating and determining an industrial dispute, all the powers of a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code but only such of them as may be described as procedural, i.e. such as are required `for the purpose' of adjudication and determination. Now, it is clearly not necessary in order to be able to adjudicate or determining a dispute, that pending the adjudication determination, a party be restrained from giving effect to the kind of the order of which respondent No. 2 complained to the Labour Court." I am of the opinion that there is, no merit in this appeal. I will therefore, uphold the order and dismiss the appeal. H.B.T./2311/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.