1988 PLP 744 (MLD)

This is a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan whereby, Muhammad Ramzan petitioner wants this Court to declare the orders dated 26‑11‑1979 and 27‑1‑1980 passed by the learned Commissioner, Multan and learned Member Board of Revenue respectively to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

2. The facts leading up to this petition in brief are that on the death of Noor Hayat, Lambardar of Chak No.93/M.L., the petitioner, Mst. Ghulam Bibi, his wife, Muhammad Sharif respondent and 5 others applied for appointment as Lambardar. The Collector appointed the petitioner as temporary Lambardar of the Chak vide his order dated 26‑7‑1979. Feeling aggrieved Muhammad Sharif respondent riled an appeal before the Commissioner, Multan Division which was accepted on 26‑11‑1979 and Muhammad Sharif respondent was appointed as temporary Lambardar in place of Muhammad Ramzan petitioner. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner filed appeal before the learned Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab which too, was rejected on 27‑1‑1980. Hence this writ petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions before me. (i) That as against respondent, the petitioner has a preferential right of appointment as Lambardar of the Chak inasmuch as the petitioner being son‑in‑law of Noor Hayat is related to him whereas Muhammad Sharif respondent No.l is a stranger; the petitioner owns 120 Kanals of land in Chak No. 93/M.L. whereas respondent No. 1 owns 82 Kanals; the relatives of the petitioner are in Government service whereas respondent No.l has no such relatives: the petitioner has been assisting Noor Hayat deceased Lambardar in the collection of the revenue for sufficient long time whereas the respondent had collected revenue for two crops when Dhal‑Bach was given to him after the death of Noor Hayat. (ii) Since most of the allottees of Chak No.93/M.L., have been conferred proprietary rights, the Chak, therefore, ceases to be a Government Chak and as such the appointment of respondent No.l as Lambardar by the Commissioner under Rule 19 of the Land Revenue Rules, was illegal. (iii) That the learned Commissioner has condemned the petitioner unheard and has not properly applied his mind inasmuch as the petitioner filed appeal before hint but he has described it as a revision.

4. I have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel and have gone through the impugned judgments with care. I find that the facts pointed out by the petitioner in contentions Nos. 1 and 2 have been refuted by the learned Commissioner in his impugned order inasmuch as the Commissioner has observed that the contentions raised by the learned counsel for Muhammad Sharif appellant therein that Chak is chiefly owned by State; the appellant owns 91 Kanals of land and he belongs to majority community of Sial, is an educated person of a good moral character and had been collecting the Government dues for two crops after the dearth of Noor Hayat are correct and that Muhammad Ramzan petitioner respondent/therein, was a landless person at the time of appointment by the Collector and as such he could not be appointed as Lambardar. I am of the opinion that since the contentions Nos. 1 and 2 stand refuted by the Commissioner, the matter requires deeper investigation which cannot be done by this Court while sitting in Constitutional jurisdiction. Furthermore, there is nothing on the record of this writ petition to substantiate the claim of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner had a preferential right of appointment as Lambardar as against Muhammad Sharif respondent. The only document, i.e., Tamleeknama, which was executed on 28-8-1979, i.e., after the decision of the Collector is not very much helpful to the petitioner. No other document has been placed on the record. As for contention No. 3 I find that the petitioner was very much present before the learned Commissioner and he was heard before the decision. As for the grievance of the petitioner that the learned Member, Board of Revenue has described the appeal as revision in his order dated 27‑1‑1980, I am of the opinion that it does not create a good ground for interference with the impugned orders. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter and they could pass a right as well as a wrong order. It appears that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 applied mind to the factual and legal aspects of the matter and have given sound reasons in support of the conclusions arrived at by them, and as such it cannot be said that the impugned orders were passed without lawful authority.

5. For what has been stated above, there being no force in this petition, the same, is hereby dismissed in limine. Writ refused.