1999 PLP 2848 (SCMR)

IRSHAD HASAN KHAN, J.

Through this common order we intend to dispose of Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos. 1599 to 1675 of 1998, arising out of a consolidated judgment, dated 15-10-1998, passed in Appeals Nos.97-L of 1998 to 132-L of 1998 and 143-L of 1998 to 183-L of 1998, by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal).

2. Brief facts are that vide Staff Order No. 1177, dated 7th November, 1994, the respondents, Senior Assistants (P) having qualified for promotion were placed in the higher grade of Officer Grade-III viz. Rs.2370-200-6370 with effect from 1st July, 1994. It was stated in the above Staff Order that they will be entitled to all allowances and fringe benefits as admissible under the rules from the aforementioned date. It was further observed that they will continue to work as Assistants till vacancies in the Senior Assistant cadre occur for absorbing them. After lapse of about three years, the petitioner vide Staff Order, No.440, dated 20th September, 1997, withdrew the earlier Staff Order in the following terms:

"Placement as Officer Grade-III allowed to the following Senior Assistants (P) under placement to placement policy from the dates mentioned against each, vide Staff Orders Nos.1177, 137 and 875, dated the 7th November, 1994, 7th February, 1995 and 31st, December, 1995 respectively, is deemed to have been withdrawn and they are re-designated as Senior Assistant (P) from the said dates (c.f. Central Directorate's Letter No.BSD (NG-ii) 2519/1-SUK-97, dated the 25th June, 1997. "

3. Being aggrieved with the above Staff Order, the respondents, after exhausting departmental remedy, approached the Tribunal for redress of their grievance. In consequence, the Tribunal vide the impugned judgment, dated 15thDecember, 1998 accepted the appeals and set aside the Staff Order impugned before it, inter alia, with the following observations:-- "(7) We have gone through the impugned order which is devoid of an reasoning as to why the steps for cancellation or withdrawal of earlier orders of placement in higher grade were being taken. In the impugned orders, as said earlier, it has been said that the placement order issued vide Staff Order No.1177 etc.' is deemed to have been withdrawn.' Learned counsel for the Respondent Bank was asked as to what is the term 'Placee' and why the expression 'deemed to have been' made in the context of things. He submitted that 'Placee' is a kind of ad hoc appointee but he agreed that it was an unusual word of some un common lineage. We are of the view that this word might be peculiar to the internal functions of a Bank or specially to the respondent Bank but the meanings are not at all clear and we cannot agree with the learned counsel that it meant 'ad hoc' because if that was the wish and desire of the employer, they could have said so without mincing words. Since it is an admitted position that the appellants after being (placed) as Officers Grade-III were given all the benefits financial and otherwise attached to the upgraded posts, hence, there is no doubt in our mind that even if 'it was a sugar coated pill', the appellants rightly considered it to be an advancement in their career and promotion in their jobs. The Bank remained a silent spectator for three years. In other words the Bank accepted their enhanced status quietly (sic) and without demur. Now, it cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate Even otherwise the impugned order, which offends against the basic principle of Audi Alteram 'Partem is not sustainable in law. As to the argument that the appellants have not been reverted, they have only been re-assigned to their previous duties is not tenable. The reason is that the appellants became Officers Grade-III, in pursuance to the Policy letters, dated 6-6--1979 and 3-8-1994, which speak of 'Promotion' and nothing else. To begin with these lay down the 'Promotion' Policy, these contain the criteria for 'Promotion' and also lay down the wisdom and objectives behind the 'Promotions' to be given to the Officers and Staff of the Bank. "

4. Khawaja Muhammad Farooq, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the principle of locus poenitentiae was attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case, inasmuch as, the respondents were appointed in the service of the petitioner as Assistants and were holding the posts of Assistants when on 1-7-1995 they were given placement in the pay scale of Officer Grade III but were to continue performing the duties of their posts till such time when-regular vacancies occurred in the posts of Senior Assistants. He further contended that the placement did not amount to promotion and was, therefore, liable to be recalled at any time in the exigencies of service.

5. It is true that the competent Authority has the legal authority to terminate an ad hoc appointment and it may do so for any reason relatable to exigencies of service without a show-cause notice. In the instant case, however, a bare perusal' of Staff Order No.1177 shows that the respondents were to continue to work till vacancies in the posts of Senior Assistants occur for absorbing them. This being so, the authority concerned has abused the power vested in it in withdrawing the Staff Order No.1177, without giving a show-cause notice. The Tribunal was right in holding that the principle of locus poenitentiae was not applicable in the circumstances of the case. When faced with this Khawaja Muhammad Farooq vehemently argued that the respondents were not entitled to all allowances and fringe benefits as admissible under the rules to Senior Assistants. This contention is also without any force. It is specifically stated in Staff Order No, 1177 that the respondents herein would be entitled to all allowances and fringe benefits as admissible under the rules from the date mentioned in the above Staff Order.

6. Be that as it may the controversy raised herein relates to individual grievances. We are not satisfied that the matter involves substantial question of law of public importance warranting interference, under clause (3). of Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.

7. Resultantly, the petitions are dismissed and leave to appeal declined. M.B.A./S-142/S Petitions dismissed.